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This thesis consists of three essays on the discretionary interactions of fiscal and monetary
policy authorities when they stabilise a single economy against shocks in the dynamic
setting.
In the first essay, I investigate the stabilization bias that arises in a model of non-
cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilisation of the economy, when the monetary
authority implements price level targeting but fiscal authority remains benevolent. I
demonstrate that the gain in welfare depends on the level of steady state debt. If the
steady state level of the government debt is relatively low, then the monetary price level
targeting unambiguously leads to social welfare gains, even if the fiscal authority acts
strategically and faces diﬀerent objectives and has incentives to pursue its own benefit
and therefore may oﬀset some or all of monetary policy actions. Moreover, if the fiscal
policymaker is able to conduct itself as an intra-period leader then the social welfare gain
of the monetary price level targeting regime can be further improved. However, if the
economy has a relatively high steady state debt level, the gain of the price level targeting
is outweighed by the loss arising from the conflicts between the policy makers, and such
policy leads to a lower social welfare than under the cooperative discretionary inflation
targeting.
In the second essay I study the macroeconomic eﬀect of the interaction between dis-
cretionary monetary policy which re-optimises every period and discretionary fiscal policy
which reoptimises less frequently. I demonstrate the existence of two discretionary equi-
libria if the frequency of fiscal policy re-optimizes annually while monetary policy adjusts
quarterly. Following a disturbance to the debt level, the economy can be stabilised either
in a ‘fast but volatile‘ or ‘slow but smooth’ way, where both dynamic paths satisfy the
conditions of optimality and time-consistency. I study several delegation regimes and
demonstrate that the policy of partial targeting the debt level results in far worse welfare
outcomes relative to a strict inflation targeting policy.
In the third essay, I extend the framework developed in the second essay to the case
with Blanchard-Yaari type of consumers. This brings in two eﬀects. First, an increase in
debt results in higher consumption via the wealth eﬀect, the marginal cost is higher so
the need for higher interest rate and higher taxation will increase, therefore the dynamic
complementarity between actions of the two policymakers become stronger. Second,
higher inflation aﬀects consumption via the average propensity to consume and this eﬀect
is likely to weaken the dynamic complementarity. I show that when the households are
assigned a mortality rate, overall the first eﬀect dominates the second. The transition
paths of the economic variables back to the steady state will be more volatile and the
multiple equilibria are more likely to arise.
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When a disturbance hits the economy oﬀ its steady state growth path, macroeconomic
control policies are used to mitigate the negative eﬀects and bring the economy back
on track. There was a consensus that stabilization task should be taken by monetary
policy while fiscal policy should focus on government debt control (see the discussion
in Kirsanova, Leith, and Wren-Lewis, 2009). This was reflected in the literature: much
richer research has been done on monetary policy design than on fiscal stabilization policy;
the research was done with implicit assumption that fiscal policy is concerned with debt
stabilization only, otherwise allowing automatic stabilizers to run.
However the existing empirical literature on monetary-fiscal interactions suggests that
fiscal policy does more than simply using automatic stabilizers; see, e.g., Auerbach (2003)
and Favero and Monacelli (2005), who analyzed fiscal policy in the United States. More-
over, Davig and Leeper (2005) demonstrate that the debt stabilization in the United
States was not the main priority of fiscal policy in the post-war period.
If fiscal policy is not predominantly concerned with the debt stabilization then it may
cause adverse eﬀects on the conduct of monetary policy and welfare (Sargent andWallace,
1981, and Leeper, 1991). Monetary policy may become concerned with debt stabilization
instead, and will choose to accommodate inflationary shocks.
At the same time, fiscal policy can also improve the social welfare, in particular in
cases when monetary policy is constrained. Stabilizing fiscal policy in a monetary union
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can substantially mitigate eﬀects of asymmetric shocks, especially in the case of significant
inflation persistence (see e.g. Kirsanova, Satchi, and Vines, 2003). Since the creation of
the European Monetary Union and the recent recession, when interest rates are close
to zero lower bound, there are calls for greater fiscal flexibility.1 The question of how
strategic the fiscal authority should be and to what extent fiscal policy can or should take
over the role of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy needs to be discussed.
It has long been known that when both monetary and fiscal policy are considered,
because of the interaction between them, the macroeconomic outcomes of the policies
are diﬀerent from those if we only consider eﬀects of one policy in isolation (see Hall
and Mankiw, 1994, Woodford, 2001). Since the work of Leeper (1991) the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy begun to receive more attention from macroecono-
mists. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Benigno and Woodford (2003), Dixit and Lamber-
tini (2003), Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005) among many
others aimed to set-up a theoretical framework to address various questions of how fiscal
policy can be used for the stabilization of the economy. Dixit and Lambertini (2003)
used a static model to further study the eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of pre-commitment
of policy makers; they also study the welfare consequences of the leadership structure of
these policy interactions. However, if the debt accumulation is to be taken into account
then the dynamic approach to modelling becomes more suitable. Making models dynamic
allows us to make conclusions on the optimal speed of debt stabilization. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) studied Ramsey-optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a sticky price
model and demonstrates the optimal near-random-walk behavior of the real debt. The
policy maker will not inflate the nominal debt to stabilize the real debt, because the
cost of increased inflation outweighs the cost of servicing the permanently higher debt
level. These results are similar as what Benigno and Woodford (2003) obtained using
1Davig and Leeper (2006) argued that during the liquidity trap when interest rate is close to zero
lower bound, the fiscal multiplier can be positive; Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) demonstrated that with
stabilising fiscal policy, the financially constrained agents can gain.
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the linear-quadratic framework. However, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2014) analyzed discre-
tionary policy-making with sticky prices and overturned this random walk result. They
showed that in the New Keynesian model which they study, the debt will be returned to
its initial steady state.
Motivated by these considerations, this thesis studies interactions between monetary
and fiscal policies in a small stylized New Keynesian model, using the linear-quadratic
framework and assuming non-cooperative optimizing authorities. If both authorities use
‘sensible’ policy objectives, such setup embeds the following transmission mechanism.
Suppose the economy is hit by a shock so the debt is above the steady state. A ‘sensible’
fiscal policy will react to bring debt back to the desired level, but this will typically
lead to a cost-push inflation. The ‘sensible’ monetary policy maker will want to control
inflation in one way or another so will most likely raise the interest rate and reduce the
marginal costs. A higher interest rate aﬀects the market rate on debt and results in
faster debt accumulation. The ‘sensible’ fiscal policy maker may want to raise taxes even
further. Such ‘dynamic complementarity’ between the actions of monetary and fiscal
policy makers — when actions of one policy maker reinforce actions of another policy
maker, see Cooper and John (1988) — can have a large eﬀect on the dynamics of the
economy. In particular, under discretionary policy when current policy decisions depend
on the private sector’s expectations of the future policy, multiple policy equilibria-also
called expectations traps-can arise (see King and Wolman, 2004) so if the economy is hit
by a shock it can converge back following one of several paths with diﬀerent volatility. The
inability of the policy makers to coordinate all agents on the Pareto-preferred adjustment
path leads to the higher than desirable volatility and the social welfare loss. In this thesis,
therefore, I will assume that discretionary policy makers have non-identical objectives and
study implications of such non-cooperative discretionary policymaking for the dynamics
of the economy.
Specifically, I make the following three main assumptions about the nature of inter-
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actions between the policy makers.
The first assumption is that both policy makers behave in a strategic way instead
of following simple rules. Each policy maker is given a policy loss function and policy
instruments, which can be changed in order to minimize the corresponding loss. There
is a number of important work in the literature assuming that policy makers operate
with simple rules (e.g. Taylor, 1985 and Leeper, 1991). Simple rules are easy to ana-
lyze and they provide insights into the nature of policy interactions and the transmission
mechanism of economic shocks. However, they require pre-commitment, i.e. the policy
makers have to credibly promise how they will react to shocks in all situations (Currie
and Levine, 1993) and they do not necessary reflect optimizing behavior of the author-
ities. There is the influential research which argues that the realistic monetary policy
is better described by "targeting rules"(see e.g. Svensson, 2003). What we observe as
rules is simply the equilibrium outcome of optimization done by the monetary authority.
Applying the same assumption to the conduct of fiscal policy may not seem to be cur-
rently most empirically relevant approach as many countries may claim that they do not
have institutional structure to conduct the fiscal stabilization at a regular basis, but can
become relevant in the near future 2. Therefore, this thesis will treat both policy makers
as acting strategically and minimizing its own loss.
The second assumption is that the fiscal policy maker plays a role of intra-period
leader. It means that the fiscal policy maker can perceive and exploit the reaction function
of the monetary policy makers. The existing institutional structure in many countries
makes it more likely that the fiscal policy maker is the intra-period leader: the monetary
policy is well studied and predictable; and the fiscal authority in the UK attends monetary
policy committee’s meetings, which creates bigger chances for the fiscal authority to be
able to exploit monetary policy maker’s decisions. The recent empirical works done by
Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010) and Le Roux and Kirsanova (2014) showed that the fiscal
2For example, the Oﬃce for Budget Responsibility has recently been established in the UK.
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leadership fits the data from the UK and Sweden, better.
The third assumption is about the degree of pre-commitment of the two policy author-
ities. Some recent empirical evidence shows that both authorities are likely to act under
discretion rather than commitment, see Givens (2012) and Chen et al. (2013) on mone-
tary policy and Le Roux and Kirsanova (2014) on monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
The full credibility which is required by pre-commitment is unlikely to realize: once the
state of the economy is observed, and in order to achieve the best welfare outcome, the
benevolent incumbent policy maker should use the policy instrument to coordinate all
future actions of all future consequent policy makers and the private sector. In a rational
expectations framework with forward looking agents, such commitment policy requires
the policy maker to control the expectations of all economic agents. However, the previ-
ously announced policy plans, which were optimal at the time of the announcement, may
not be optimal in future periods. Therefore the policy makers always have incentive to
deviate from the previously chosen plan. The forward looking private sector expects the
policy maker to reoptimize and deviate, this lack of credibility leads to the more realistic
setup: discretionary policy. Under discretionary policy, policy makers adjust the policy
plan every period, and the private sector expects all future policy makers to re-optimise.
In this thesis I only address the following two questions.
First, I study the eﬀect of strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions assuming
that the authorities do not share the same objective. I am particularly interested in the
scenario when discretionary monetary policy implements the price level targeting while
the fiscal authority minimizes the social loss function. Generally, any discretionary policy
regime results in lower social welfare comparing to the same regime under commitment,
as level and stabilization biases arise (Barro and Gordon, 1983, Svensson, 1997 and Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) ). The stabilization bias, which is studied in this thesis,
refers to the situation when the targeted variable converges back to its steady state with
volatility higher than that under commitment. This is because the policy maker without
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a credible commitment technique cannot exploit the expectation of private sector and
prefers to eliminate inflation faster, without relying on promises of future policy, and so
choosing to react more aggressively in initial periods after the shock. To improve the so-
cial outcome of discretionary monetary policy, many delegation schemes-which delegate
policy decisions to the policy maker with an objective which is diﬀerent from the social
objectives-were proposed. Examples include conservative central banker (Barro and Gor-
don, 1983, Rogoﬀ, 1985 and Clarida et al., 1999) with a higher weight or lower level of
inflation target in monetary policy objectives; price level targeting (Svensson, 1999 and
Vestin, 2006) where price level stability is in the policy objective function; speed limiting
policy, which targets the change in output gap (Walsh, 2003) rather than the level of
output gap; interest smoothing policy (Woodford, 2003b), under which the policy loss
function is augmented with a term with the change in the interest rate; nominal GDP
targeting which targets the level of economic activity in nominal terms (Hall and Mankiw,
1994), and nominal income growth (Jensen, 2002). It was shown that the stabilization
bias can be reduced using these appropriate delegation scheme, however these schemes
were studied using models with monetary policy only. What if a strategic fiscal policy
maker is given objective which does not necessarily coincide with the monetary policy’s
objective? It is known that such non-cooperative interactions can lead to a fight between
policy makers, see Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Blake and Kirsanova (2011). This
thesis studies the Price Level Targeting as it was frequently discussed recently by policy
makers as a realistic policy option3.
Second, I investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent frequencies of actions of monetary and
fiscal policy on the economy. In reality monetary policy operates monthly while fiscal
policy decides on tax and government spending annually or even less frequently. When
the economy is hit by shocks then fiscal policy who wants to contribute to stabilization
3In recent years Bank of Canada has been discussing extensively about whether economic welfare
might be improved by moving from the inflation-targeting framework to some form of price-level targeting
(the discussion is reviewed in Ambler and Ambler (2009).)
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may have to do large infrequent adjustments which will aﬀect monetary policy and the
economy. Such changes may strengthen dynamic complementarity between policy instru-
ments discussed above and change results on existence and uniqueness of discretionary
policy.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the analysis of non-cooperative
discretionary policy interactions, between the price level targeting monetary policy maker
and the social welfare targeting fiscal policy maker. Using the New Keynesian model with
debt accumulation, I study if this type of policy delegation leads to a reduction of the
stabilization bias and the gain in the social welfare. I demonstrate that the extent to
which the stabilization bias is reduced depends on the steady state level of debt. In the
low steady state level of debt case, the monetary price level targeting unambiguously
leads to social welfare gains even if the fiscal authority acts strategically, faces diﬀerent
objectives and has incentives to pursue its own benefit and oﬀsets some or all of monetary
policy actions. If the fiscal policy maker is able to conduct itself as an intra-period leader
the welfare gain of monetary price level targeting is particularly large. However, when
the steady state debt level is high, a positive disturbance to the debt results in optimally
higher taxes and so leads to the cost push inflation. Because the monetary policy maker
wants to bring inflation back while maintaining price stability, such policy results in
relatively large movements of the interest rate with large costs for the debt accumulation.
This greatly increases the conflict with the fiscal policy maker as with high level of the
existing debt the new debt accumulates particularly fast.
Chapter 3 contains the analysis of how the lower frequency of fiscal policy decisions
may aﬀect the result of policy interactions. I show that the dynamic complementar-
ity described above is substantially increased if the fiscal policy maker operates only
infrequently. This leads to the existence of multiple equilibria (so-called ‘expectations
traps’) and even to the non-existence of discretionary equilibria under certain conditions.
I study properties of such economy and investigate which policy delegation scheme are
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more likely to weaken the complementarity and mitigate the eﬀect of fiscal infrequency
on the economy.
Chapter 4 expands the framework developed in Chapter 3 by using Blanchard-Yaari
type of households (Blanchard (1985)) who are not infinitely-lived but face positive mor-
tality rate. This makes these consumers non-Ricardian so they treat the government debt
as wealth and the government has an extra channel of transmission of policy. I study how
this extension aﬀects the described above complementarity of agents’ decisions and the
welfare implications for the economy. The results show that under the same calibration,
the expectation traps and coordination failures are more likely to arise.
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Chapter 2
Price Level Targeting with Strategic
Fiscal Policy
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide evaluation of price level targeting with an
optimizing fiscal policy maker. The last several years have seen the increase of interest in
macroeconomic control policies which would reduce the risk of the economy getting into
the ‘liquidity trap’ i.e. approaching the zero low bound for nominal interest rates. Mon-
etary price level targeting and stabilizing fiscal policy have been proposed and discussed.
Price-level targeting has been subjected to an increasing interest in the monetary
policy literature. From the literature we know that there are several advantages of price
level targeting over inflation targeting:
First, by definition the PLT reduces the uncertainty of future price level, which pro-
duces a more certain future purchasing power of the money. After any unexpected dis-
turbance, inflation targeting requires the central bank bring the inflation back on track,
however the price will be stabilized on a new level of steady state like a random walk
and can drift far away from any given level. Therefore the future price level uncertainty
accompanying an inflation targeting policy depends on the sum of realizations of control
errors, which can get very large during long period. By definition the price level targeting
removes this uncertainty: in the case of a major shock causing the price to deviate from
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its steady state, price level targeting would provide a stronger guarantee of future price
stability around expected level.
Second, the PLT reduces the fluctuations in inflation and output. This contradicts
the early research which argued that targeting price-level may add unnecessary short-run
inflation fluctuation where a positive inflation shock must be oﬀset by an under target
deflation before it comes back to steady state. However, this conclusion was resulted from
models with exogenous policy reaction functions and back-ward looking agents. With
endogenous decision rules, Svensson (1999) demonstrated that under inflation targeting,
the variance of inflation is proportional to the variance in the output gap; but under
price-level targeting, the variance of price-level depends on the variance in output gap,
which means that the variance of inflation depends on the variance of the change of the
variance in output gap. With output persistence, this is smaller than the variance of the
output gap, resulting in smaller inflation fluctuation.
Later, Vestin (2006) applied a standard new-Keynesian model with forward-looking
elements. Forward-looking households expect the policy maker with a price-level target
has stronger incentive to bring the price level back on the steady state, which means the
interest rate will react stronger than in the inflation targeting case. Hence, the higher
upward pressure of the current inflation, the lower inflation in the following periods will
be expected households. Comparing to the case with inflation targeting, given the same
shock, the expected future inflation under the PLT deviates less from the steady state
level and overshoots when converging back. This helps to reduce the volatility of current
inflation and makes the stabilization easier under the price-level targeting than inflation
targeting.
Third, the PLT also has potential to reduce the likelihood of sustained deflation
or recession when interest rates are close to zero and the traditional monetary policy
tools are ineﬀective. By allowing the monetary policy maker adjust interest rate less
to economic disturbance, the PLT lowers the likelihood of hitting the zero lower bound
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(Billi, 2008). Even if interest rate is close to zero, the higher inflation expectation reduces
the real interest rate which helps to stimulate the economy, this makes the price level
targeting particularly appealing when there is deflationary pressures which are commonly
associated with recession.
During a period without many shocks hitting the economy, the PLT does not make an
obvious diﬀerence to the inflation targeting. As we discussed before that the major dif-
ference caused by these two policy targets could only be shown when there is a significant
deviation of inflation due to economic shocks, such as the recent financial crisis. It ap-
pears that current policies were not very eﬀective in improving the economic conditions,
the price-level targeting may be an attractive option for the central bankers, especially if
the economy is facing the danger of deflation.
Nevertheless, little research has been done in an economy with that fiscal policy also
behaves optimally. The literature on fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool
is relatively new, and policy proposals are typically motivated by the need to design
a powerful stabilization instrument in situations when monetary policy is constrained.
Before making a decision to change policy to price level targeting, it has to be proved
that the appealing features discussed above are still robust in models with more complex
features of modern economies. One of the first in line would be a model with optimal
fiscal policy.
An institutional implementation of these proposals would create two diﬀerent man-
dates for two policy makers. This might result in a conflict between the optimizing policy
makers as one of them will try to ‘undo’ the perceived harm done by the other.1
The central questions addressed in this Chapter follow on from this. If the policy
makers are unable to precommit, how does the monetary PLT aﬀect the social welfare
if fiscal policy is made strategic? What is the value of such delegation? What are the
welfare consequences of diﬀerent intra-period leadership regimes for monetary and fiscal
1See e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Lambertini (2006), Blake and Kirsanova (2011).
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policies?
To address these questions we study a version of the familiar sticky price model
modified to incorporate debt accumulation (Benigno and Woodford, 2003) with strategic
monetary and fiscal policy, pursuing diﬀerent objectives. This model contains all the
features as at the heart of many DSGE models used in policy analysis which makes it a
‘representative agent’ for our policy analysis. We concentrate on macroeconomic eﬀects
of diﬀering policy objectives and the ability of the fiscal policy to conduct itself as an
intra-period leader.2
To maintain the consistency, we continue using our previous framework but with mon-
etary policy targeting on price level as well as inflation, with diﬀerent assigned weights.
This enables us to compare the result with the literature to see the impact of interactions
between the non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy makers to the previous price level
targeting results with only optimal monetary policy, and to compare this result with our
previous model with monetary and fiscal policy both targeting inflation, in order to see
the impact of the price-level targeting to our original system.
We study a new Keynesian framework modified to incorporate debt accumulation with
strategic monetary and fiscal policy, pursuing diﬀerent objectives, assuming government
is using tax rate as a policy instrument to stabilize the economy. We assign diﬀerent
weight to price level and inflation for Central Bank’s policy objectives, in order to allow
temporary drift in the price level when they these ‘intermediate’ regimes may be relevant,
following the method by Batini and Yates (2003).
We demonstrate that when steady state debt level is low, only a small weight on
price level target can make a substantial improvement on social welfare, this finding also
provides us a way to avoid some of the cost of changing the completely policy target;
Fiscal leadership results much better social welfare than letting government and central
bank make the decisions simultaneously; Anther counter-intuitive result is that with
2Empirical evidence (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010) suggests that in countries without fiscal decen-
tralization, like the UK, the regime of fiscal leadership is the most relevant.
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price level targeting, in the low debt case the dynamic complementarity between fiscal
and monetary policy makers is weakened, despite their diﬀerent policy objectives, which
further helps the economy stabilization and avoid the multiple equilibriums.
However the results reverse when the steady state level of debt is high. In this case, the
conflicts between the two policy makers due to the PLT overweigh the merits PLT brings.
In relatively high debt case, the welfare loss in PLT is higher than inflation targeting.
PLT has two opposite eﬀects, on one hand it lowers inflation after the disturbance by
lowering expected future inflation, which makes the task of stabilization easier; on the
other hand an overshot of inflation is required in order to return the price level, which
causes a higher volatility of inflation. To maintain a higher steady state government debt
level, there will be higher tax, and initially lowered interest rate which cause the realized
inflation is almost as high as under inflation targeting; when inflation is at the same
level, due to the higher volatility of inflation required to deliver price level, PLT causes
higher loss. Steady state debt level matters to whether PLT improves or deteriorate the
stabilization results.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the model and
discuss the calibration. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical analysis of the five cases
we consider. The first three cases — commitment of benevolent policy makers which
delivers the lowest possible loss among all regimes, cooperation of benevolent discretionary
policy makers which results in substantial stabilization bias, and the cooperative PLT
by both policy makers — describe the three benchmark scenarios, to which we compare
and contrast the two cases of our main interest: monetary PLT either in the regime of
simultaneous moves or in the regime of fiscal leadership. Section 2.4 discusses the value
of delegation as exemplified by the monetary PLT in the regime of simultaneous moves.
Section 2.5 discuss the value of leadership, it compares and contrasts the two diﬀerent
non-cooperative regimes. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model modified to take account of the
eﬀects of fiscal policy, see e.g. Woodford (2003a) and Benigno and Woodford (2003). It
is a closed economy model with two policy makers, the fiscal and monetary authorities.
Fiscal policy is assumed to support monetary policy in stabilization of the economy
around the non-stochastic steady state.
The economy consists of a representative infinitely-lived household, a representative
firm that produces the final good, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms
and a monetary and fiscal authority. The intermediate goods-producing firms act under
monopolistic competition and produce according to a production function that depends
only on labor. Goods are combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to pro-
duce aggregate output. Firms set their prices subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity.
Households choose their consumption and leisure and can transfer income through time
through their holdings of government bonds. We assume that the fiscal authority faces
a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are financed by levying
income taxes3 and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
We assume that all public debt consist of riskless one-period bonds. The nominal value
B of end-of-period public debt then evolves according to the following law of motion:
B = (1 + −1)B−1 +  −   (2.1)
where   is the share of national product  that is collected by the government in period
, and government purchases  are treated as exogenously given.  is aggregate price
level and  is interest rate on bonds. The national income identity yields
 =  + (2.2)
where  is private consumption. For analytical convenience we introduce  = (1 +
3We could use distortionary consumption taxes to finance the deficit. The transmission mechanism
would be the same.
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−1)B−1−1 which is a measure of the real value of debt observed at the beginning of
period , so that (2.1) becomes
+1 = (1 + )
µ
−1 −   +
¶
 (2.3)
The first-order approximation of equation(2.3) about the non-stochastic zero-inflation







 −  (  + )
¶

where  =  ,  = ln
¡ ¢,   = ln ¡  ¢   = ln ¡ ¢   = ln ¡ ¢ and letters without
time subscript denote steady state values of corresponding variables in zero inflation
steady state. The private sector’s discount factor  = 1(1+ ). We have assumed  = 0
in order to make the presentation of the model particularly simple. This assumption
results in no first-order eﬀects of the interest rate and inflation on debt, so that the final
version of the linearized debt accumulation equation can be written as
+1 = 1 ( + (1− ) (1− )  −  −  )  (2.4)
where we used the linearized (2.2) to substitute out output and denoted  =  .4
The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve that describes Calvo-type price-
setting decisions of monopolistically competitive firms is standard (Benigno and Wood-
ford, 2003, Sec. A.5) and marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. A log-
linearization of the aggregate supply relationship around the zero-inflation steady state
yields the following New Keynesian Phillips curve












where  = (1−)(1−) (+) is the slope of Phillips curve. Parameter  is Calvo parameter,
parameter  is Frisch elasticity of labour supply,  is elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion and parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods Cost
push shock  follows an autoregressive process.
4Because we work with one-period debt only, its proportion in the total stock of debt is not very
large.
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 ¡2 + 2¢  (2.6)





=0  (     )   ∈ {} Each policy maker knows the laws of
motion (2.4)-(2.5) of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when formu-
lating policy. The following assumption follows Clarida et al. (1999) and substantially
simplifies the exposition of the model.
Assumption 1 (policy instruments) The monetary policy maker chooses consump-
tion  and then, conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of  and  decides on the
value of interest rate that achieves the desired  and . The fiscal policy maker uses the
tax rate   as policy instrument.
In what follows we assume that both policy makers and the private sector know that
the decision making is sequential and a diﬀerent policy maker may be in the oﬃce in
future periods. We refer to this policy as policy under discretion. Formally, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 2 (policy) Monetary and fiscal policy mix satisfies the following assump-
tions.
(i) Monetary and fiscal authorities act non-cooperatively.
(ii) Both authorities are assumed to optimize sequentially under time-consistency con-
straint.










 ¡2 + 2¢ (2.8)
5The criterion is derived under the assumption of steady state labour subsidy. Here parameter  is
a function of model parameters,  =  and  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
monopolistically produced goods.
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where  measures the degree of price-level-targeting in the monetary policy objectives.
The hybrid price level target monetary policy objective is the same as studied in
Roisland (2006) and Batini and Yates (2003). The following assumption substantially
simplifies the exposition without the loss of generality.
Assumption 3 The model is perfect-foresight deterministic.
In the standard New Keynesian model the only meaningful trade-oﬀ for the monetary
policy maker is created by cost-push shocks. In contrast, both policy instruments in
this model can completely insulate this economy against the cost push shock, but they
will face with fiscal consequences of such policy — the eﬀect on debt. In what follows,
therefore, we can only consider shocks to debt, if we reinterpret policy instruments as
those adjusted for movements needed to eliminate the consequences of cost-push shocks.
However, we can go further and only consider the deterministic version of the model where
the only disturbance can be generated by initially higher level of debt, 0 First, because
of certainty equivalence in LQ models all results on stability, existence and uniqueness do
not depend on the presence of stochastic component, see Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan,
and Sargent (1996). Second, in this model the welfare loss generated by either cost push
or debt shocks is simply the normalized loss generated by initial state 0. Because of the
transformation is monotonic the welfare analysis for the deterministic model applies to
its stochastic counterpart. We illustrate the second point in Section 2.4
To summarize, the law of motion of the deterministic economy can be written as:
 = +1 + κ +   (2.9)
 = −1 +  (2.10)
+1 = 1 ( −  −  )  (2.11)







  =  
(1−) 
Debt  and price −1 are endogenous predetermined state variables. The objectives of
each policy maker coincide and are given by formula (2.6).
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This model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Calibration of
 = 099  = 075 and  = 075 correspond to the most frequently estimated values of
the steady state annual interest rate of 4%, the average frequency of price changes of
one year, and consumption to output share of 75%. We calibrate the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply  = 30 consistent with macro-evidence of Peterman (2012) based on the
empirical work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages. The
empirical evidence for  is quite far-ranging from near 0.1 reported in e.g. Hall (1988)
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), to above 1 reported in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) find that the estimate of  increases from 0.3
for the aggregate data to 0.8 for cohort data, suggesting that the aggregation, which is
implicit in the macro data, may cause a significant downward shift in the estimate of .
Based on this evidence we calibrate intertemporal elasticity  = 03 The elasticity of
substitution between goods,  determines the monopolistic mark up. Chari et al. (2000)
argue for a markup of 11% for the macroeconomy as a whole. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) obtain elasticity of substitution 7.88, corresponding to a markup of 14.5%. We
calibrate  = 110
2.3 Policy
2.3.1 Cooperative Policy-Benchmark Cases
Benevolent Commitment Policy
Benevolent policy under commitment delivers the highest possible welfare, so the perfor-
mance of all other policies can be naturally compared with it. Commitment policy in a
similar class of models is thoroughly investigated, so this section recasts the known from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) results for our model.
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Proposition 1 The optimal Ramsey allocation can be written as
 =
½   (1− ) 0  = 0
0  = 1 2 3
 =
½ 0  = 0
 (κ − )2 0  = 1 2 3
 =
½ −  (κ − ) (1− ) 0  = 0−  (κ − ) (1− ) 0  = 1 2 3
  =
½ 
 (1− ) (+ κ (κ − )) 0  = 0
 (1− )κ (κ − ) 0  = 1 2 3
with the associated welfare loss  (1− ) ¡ (1− ) + (κ − )2¢ ¡  0¢2 








¡2 + 2¢+ +1µ 1 ( −  −  )− +1
¶
+ +1 ( − κ −   − +1)
¶

The corresponding first order conditions are:
0 = +1 − 
0 =  + +1 − 
0 =  − +1 − κ+1
0 = −+1 − +1
0 =
1
 ( −  −  )− +1
0 =  − κ −   − +1
which are simple enough to obtain the following solution
 =   (1− )  +  (κ − )
2  (2.12)
 = −  (κ − ) (1− )  +  (κ − ) (1− ) (2.13)
  =  (1− )
¡+ κ2 − κ¢  −  (κ − ) ( − κ) (2.14)
 =  
2
 2 (1− )  − 

 (1− ) (2.15)
+1 =  (κ − )2  −   (κ − )
2  (2.16)
+1 = −  (1− )  +  (1− ) (2.17)
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where  = ¡(1− )+ (κ − )2¢−1  The claim in proposition immediately follows.
Following a disturbance, debt remains permanently high (low) and permanently higher
(lower) taxes are used to finance the additional debt.
Benevolent Discretionary Policy
Our discretionary policy is standard, and discussed in e.g. Backus and Driﬃll (1986),
Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003a). We describe the
discretionary equilibrium for our model in order to demonstrate that the system under
discretionary control of benevolent policy makers demonstrates very diﬀerent dynamics
than the system under commitment.
Proposition 2 The cooperative discretionary policy of benevolent policy makers results
in stationary equilibrium for    and  .
Proof. private sector’s reaction function is a linear function of the state:
 =  (2.18)
Use equation (2.18) for + 1 and substitute equation (2.9) to obtain:
 =  + (κ − )  + ( − )   (2.19)
The private sector observes policy and the state, and takes into account the ‘instanta-
neous’ influence of the policy choice, measured by (κ − ) and ( − ).
Assuming the quadratic form for the appropriate value function we can write the
Bellman equation for the cooperating policy makers:
2 = min 
¡2 + 2 + 2+1¢ (2.20)
Substitute equation (2.11) and equation (2.19) into equation (2.20)
2 = min 
¡








where we substituted constraints (2.11) and (2.19) written for the appropriate period
Minimization yields the policy reactions in form of
 = ˜ + ˜    = ˜  + ˜  (2.22)
with coeﬃcients
˜ = −
(κ − ) −  
+ (κ − )2 +  22
 ˜ = −
(κ − ) ( − ) + 2 
+ (κ − )2 +  22
˜  = −
( − ) − 
( − )2 + 2 
 ˜  = −
( − ) (κ − ) + 2 
( − )2 + 2 

In the time-consistent equilibrium the policy reactions can be written as functions of
the state only:
 =  (2.23)
  =   (2.24)
which yields the following equations for  and   :
 = −
³
(κ − ) ( + ( − )  )−  (1−  )
´
³
+ (κ − )2 +  22
´  (2.25)
  = −
³
( − ) ( + (κ − ))−  (1− )
´
³
( − )2 + 2 
´  (2.26)
Equations (2.18), (2.19), (2.23) and (2.24) yield
 = κ +    +   (2.27)
it determines the time-consistent reaction of the private sector in (2.18).
Substitute (2.23) and (2.24) into (2.21) to yield the following equation for the value
function
 = 2 + 2 + 1 (1−  −  )
2  (2.28)
The stationary discretionary equilibrium can be described by the set of coeﬃcients
{    } Indeed, for a given 0 = ¯ each trajectory {    }∞=0 which solves
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the system of first order conditions (2.11), (2.18), (2.23) and (2.24) we can uniquely map
into the set of coeﬃcients {    }, satisfying (2.25)-(2.28). Conversely, if the set of
coeﬃcients {    } solves (2.25)-(2.28) we can uniquely map it into the trajectory
{    }∞=0 solving system (2.11), (2.18), (2.23) and (2.24) for given 0 = ¯
It remains to demonstrate stationary of the discretionary equilibrium. The system of
first order conditions (2.25)-(2.28) can be reduced down to two equations in { =   =
  + }:
+  (κ − ) + (κ − )2  = 0 (2.29)
2 − − (κ − )
2
  −
(1− ) (κ − )2
 2 = 0 (2.30)
Equation (2.30) only depends on  and always has exactly one positive solution as the
free term is negative.
The unique positive root satisfies
1
 |1− |  1 (2.31)
or equivalently 1−    1+  so that the equilibrium is stationary. To see this, note
that if + is the positive root of (2.30), then − = − ¡(1− ) (κ − )2¢  ( 2+)  and
 (+ + −) + = 1+(1− ) (κ − )2  ¡ 22+¢  0 (i) We show that   (1− )  .
Indeed, suppose ˜+ = (1− )  ˜+ is not the positive root of (2.30); if it was the posi-
tive root then the negative root would be ˜− = − (κ − )2  () and their sum should
have been equal to the negative linear coeﬃcient but ˜+ + ˜−  ¡− (κ − )2¢  () 
Moreover, any ˜+  (1− )  is not a root of (2.30), because  (+ + −) +  0
(ii) We show that   (1 + )  . Indeed, suppose ˜+ = (1 + )  ˜+ is not the
positive root to (2.30); if it was the positive root then the negative root would be
˜− = − (1− ) (κ − )2  ( (1 + )) and their sum ˜+ + ˜−  ¡− (κ − )2¢  () 
Moreover, any ˜+  (1 + )  is not a root of (2.30), because  (+ + −) +  0
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The dynamics of the economy under control can be described by the following two
equations
 = −1 + 
+1 = 1 (1−  (  + )) 
This system has two eigenvalues, 1 = 1 and 2 = 1 (1−  (  + )) = 1 (1− )  We
proved above |2| = 1 |1− |  1 This implies that  once disturbed, converge back
to the initial level and so it is the only remaining variable, price level , has unit-root
behavior.
Discretionary Price Level Targeting
When price level becomes a target, the past price becomes an additional state, so the
equilibrium reactions can be written as:
 = −1 +  (2.32)
 = −1 +  (2.33)
  =  −1 +   (2.34)
As before, we lead (2.32) by one period, and substitute the evolution of the economy and




1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 
1−    (2.35)
The private sector observes policy and the state, and takes into account the ‘instanta-




The policy makers problem in period  can be described by the following Bellman
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equation (we consider the case  = 1):




(1− )2 (−1 +  + (κ − )  + ( − )  )
2
+2 + 1 ( −  −  )
2 + 2

1−  ( −  −  )
× (−1 +  + (κ − )  + ( − )  )) 
and the optimization yields the following reactions
 = ˜−1 + ˜ + ˜  (2.37)












´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  + ¶ (2.39)
˜ = −
³³












´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  + ¶
˜ = −
³³
(1 + ) κ−1− − 
´
−







´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  + ¶
˜  = − (( − ) (1 + )−  (1− ))
(1 + ) ( − )2 + (1− )2  2 − 2 (1− ) ( − )
(2.40)
˜  = − ((1 + ) ( − )−  (1− ))




( − ) −   (1− )
´
(1− )
(1 + ) ( − )2 + (1− )2  2 − 2 (1− ) ( − )
˜  = − (( − ) (1 + )−  (1− )) (κ − )





  (1− )−  ( − )
´
(1− )
(1 + ) ( − )2 + (1− )2  2 − 2 (1− ) ( − )
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´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  +  (2.43)
−
³







´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  + 
 = −
³
(1 + ) κ−1− − 
´ +(−)
















´2 − 2κ−1− +  1  + 
  = − (( − ) (1 + )−  (1− )) (1 + (κ − ))





  (1− )−  ( − )
´
(1− )
(1 + ) ( − )2 + (1− )2  2 − 2 (1− ) ( − )
  = − ((1 + ) ( − )−  (1− )) ( +  (κ − ))




( − ) −   (1− )
´
(1− ) (1− )
(1 + ) ( − )2 + (1− )2  2 − 2 (1− ) ( − )




1−    +
κ − 




1−    +
κ − 
1−   (2.48)
Finally, the value function can be determined from
 = (1 + ) (1 + )2 + 2 − 2 (1 + ) ( +  ) + 
2
  ( +  )
2(2.49)
 = (1 + )2 + 2 + 2 (1−  −  ) + 1 (1−  −  )
2(2.50)
 = (1 + ) (1 + ) +  −  (1−  −  ) ( +  ) (2.51)
+ ((1 + ) (1−  −  )−  ( +  ))
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We summarize these results in the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The cooperative PLT discretionary equilibrium can be described by the
set of coeﬃcients {          }
Proof. Indeed, for a given 0 = ¯ 0 = ¯ there is one-to-one mapping between each
trajectory {     }∞=0 which solves the system of first order conditions (2.10)-
(2.11), (2.32)-(2.34), (2.36) and the set of coeﬃcients {          },
satisfying (2.43)-(2.51).
2.3.2 Non-Cooperative Policy: Monetary Price Level Targeting
under Discretion
Policy Reactions in the Regime of Simultaneous Moves
If the monetary policy maker moves simultaneously with the fiscal policy maker then it
does not take into account any eﬀect of fiscal policy on the economy. The optimization
problem of the monetary policy maker can be written as:
2−1 + 2−1 + 2 = min
¡
( − (1− ) −1)2 + 2 (2.52)
+ ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ 
subject to constraints (2.10)-(2.11), (2.34) and (2.35). As a result, the optimal monetary









1−  −  
+ ( + 1) (κ−)2(1−)2 − 2κ−1−  + 1 ()2 
(2.53)
˜ = −
(+  + (1− )) (κ−)1− − 












  − κ−1− 
´





so that the coeﬃcients of (2.33)-(2.34) satisfy
 = −
³











1−  −  
´
(1−  )









1− +  
2
  















Similarly, the Bellman equation for the fiscal policy maker can be written as:
2−1+2−1+2 = min 
¡2 + 2 +  ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ (2.58)
subject to constraints (2.10)-(2.11), (2.33) and (2.35). The coeﬃcients in the fiscal policy
reaction function (2.38)
˜  = −
³












 + 2 
(2.59)
˜  = −
³
















 + 2 
(2.60)
˜  = −
³

















 + 2 
(2.61)
so that the coeﬃcients in (2.34) satisfy:
  = −
³



























 + 2 
  = −
³

















 + 2 
 (2.63)
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Policy Reactions in the Regime of Intra-period Fiscal Leadership
The assumption of fiscal intra-period leadership is motivated by the observation that
the monetary policy reaction function is much more transparent and predictable, so the
fiscal policy maker is able to take it into account when formulating policy. Using the
interest rate as an instrument implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are
made simultaneously, while in this model they are consecutive decisions taken by relevant
agents. This makes no diﬀerence for our results.
If the monetary policy maker acts as an intra-period follower, it treats the state of
fiscal policy parametrically, when choosing optimal policy. The policy maker exploits the
reaction of the private sector (2.35), as the private sector is the ultimate follower.
The monetary policy maker’s objective is (2.52), with constraints are (2.10)-(2.11)
and (2.35). As before, optimization with respect to  yields the monetary policy maker
reaction function (2.37) with coeﬃcients (2.53)-(2.55).
The fiscal policy maker’s Bellman equation is (2.58) where constraints (2.10)-(2.11),
(2.35), and (2.37) are applied in any period Optimization yields the following coeﬃcients
in (2.34)
  = −
Ã














1 + (κ − ) ˜
´







⎝˜2 +  2
³
˜ + 1










  = −
Ã




 + (κ − ) ˜






(κ − ) ˜ +  − 
1− 
Ã
(1 + )  + (κ − ) ˜






⎝˜2 +  2
³
˜ + 1






´ (κ − ) ˜ +  − 
1−  
!−1
In the regime of fiscal leadership, therefore, the monetary policy reaction function can
also be written in the form of (2.33) with
 = ˜ + ˜  (2.66)
 = ˜ + ˜  (2.67)
Value Functions
In both leadership regimes value functions can be described by
 = ( + )2 + 2 +  (1 + )2 − 2 ( +  ) (1 + ) (2.68)
+ 
2
 ( +  )
2
 = ( + +  (1 + )−  ( +  )) +  (2.69)
+
µ
 (1 + )−   ( +  )
¶
(1−  ( +  ))
 = (1 + )2 + 2 + 2 (1−  ( +  )) (2.70)
+ 1 (1−  ( +  ))
2
 = 2 + 2 +  (1 + )2 − 2 ( +  ) (1 + ) (2.71)
+ 
2
 ( +  )
2
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 = ( +  (1 + )−  ( +  )) +  (2.72)
+
µ
 (1 + )−   ( +  )
¶
(1−  ( +  ))
 = (1 + )2 + 2 + 2 (1−  ( +  )) (2.73)
+ 1 (1−  ( +  ))
2
with  and  satisfying
 =  + (κ − ) + ( − )  
1−  (2.74)
 =  + (κ − ) + ( − )  
1−  (2.75)
We summarize our results in the form of two propositions.
Proposition 4 The non-cooperative simultaneous-moves discretionary equilibrium can
be described by the set of coeﬃcients {             }
Proof. Indeed, for a given 0 = ¯ 0 = ¯ there is one-to-one mapping between each tra-
jectory {     }∞=0 which solves the system of first order conditions (2.10)-(2.11),
(2.32)-(2.34), (2.52)-(2.58) and the set of coeﬃcients {           
 }, satisfying (2.56)-(2.57), (2.62)-(2.63), (2.68)-(2.75).
Proposition 5 The non-cooperative discretionary equilibrium with fiscal intra-period lead-
ership can be described by the set of coeﬃcients {˜ ˜ ˜           
 }
Proof. Indeed, for a given 0 = ¯ 0 = ¯ there is one-to-one mapping between each tra-
jectory {     }∞=0 which solves the system of first order conditions (2.10)-(2.11),
(2.32)-(2.34), (A.62)-(2.58) and the set of coeﬃcients {˜ ˜ ˜          
  }, satisfying (2.53)-(2.67), (2.68)-(2.75).
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2.4 Value of Delegation
Figure 2.1 plots dynamic responses of the economy to a unit-increase in the level of
government debt as well as the social loss as function of the degree of PLT (where relevant)
for the following four scenarios.
I: Cooperation of benevolent policy makers under commitment. This is the
first of benchmark scenarios which we discussed in Section 2.3.1. As a result of initial
disturbance, there is an unexpected raise in government debt. To stabilize the economy,
policy makers face two options: balancing the budget at a new higher level of debt, by
a permanently increased tax rate which leads to a permanently lowered consumption; or
bringing the debt back to its initial level, at the cost of much higher inflation volatility.
Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) showed that under
commitment, inflation stability outweighs the cost of sustaining a permanently higher
debt level. Therefore, the debt under commitment exhibits random walk behavior. To
achieve the minimum social welfare loss, government debt level is chosen as the absorber
to the shock, rather than inflation. We confirmed this in our impulse responses shown
in Figure (2.1): the level of debt remains permanently higher, tax rate is permanently
raised but only to a level which is enough to serve the new higher level of debt, so
inflation is pushed-up only slightly, and is brought back within one period; consumption
is permanently below its initial level, see Proposition 1. This regime delivers the lowest
level of social loss. The first column in Table 2.1 which presents the welfare loss in terms
of compensating consumption — the permanent fall in the steady state consumption
level, as percentage of steady state consumption, that would balance the welfare gain
from eliminating the volatility of consumption and leisure (Lucas, 1987).
II: Cooperation of benevolent policy makers under discretion. In presence of
an endogenous state, Markov-perfect discretionary policy is unable to manipulate the
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Table 2.1: Social Welfare Loss
Absolute loss, % of Relative Loss,
steady state consumption normalized
type of disturbance → initial debt cost-push shock any
Commitment of benevolent policy makers 0.0028 0.0117 1.000
Discretion of benevolent policy makers 0.0471 0.1938 16.625
Cooperative PLT under discretion 0.0317 0.1304 11.183
Monetary PLT, simultaneous moves ( = 1) 0.0075 0.0308 2.6454
Monetary PLT, fiscal leadership ( = 1) 0.0056 0.0232 1.9915
private agents’ expectation anymore. When a disturbance to debt level happens, the
households expect the government is tempted to adjust tax rates until debt return to
its original steady state. The change in tax rate will be significantly larger than in the
commitment case. Now the private agents’ decision on inflation depends on the level
of debt, for a higher debt, households expect a higher inflation. The optimal time-
consistent policy has to stabilize debt at the original steady state; the expectation of
the households is validated. Proposition 2 proves that stationary equilibrium exists and
unique, all relevant economic variables are brought back to the steady state. The base line
calibration suggests that a unit-change in consumption is about 10 times more eﬀective
than a unit change in tax rate in terms of stabilizing inflation, but nearly equally eﬀective
in their eﬀects on debt. Therefore the optimal policy bring debt to the steady state by
changing tax rates, and stabilize inflation by reducing demand to reduce the marginal
costs. The stabilization is relatively slow. Inflation goes back to steady state gradually
while price level reaches a new high level and stays. The loss of this policy in consumption
equivalent is about 15 times greater than the loss under commitment, see Table 2.1. There
is no price stability in this regime.
III: Cooperation on price level targeting of discretionary policy makers. If we
are to delegate a diﬀerent target to the monetary policy maker, it is imperative to look at
the cooperative delegation first, as usually diﬀerent targets increase the conflicts between
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the policy makers and oﬀset the eﬀects of each other’s action. This scenario illustrates
some important properties of PLT policymaking, which are likely to realize under any
type of price-level targeting, whether cooperative or not. (The equilibrium is defined in
Proposition 3.)
We assume pure price level targeting ( = 1) for both monetary and fiscal policy.
When the price level becomes explicit policy target the private sector recognize that, if
inflation is higher than steady state level, the future policy makers will have to arrange
for a negative inflation to achieve price stability. No commitment policy plan is required,
just the presence of price stability among the targets will lead the future policy makers to
generate the path of future endogenous states required for a negative inflation to happen.
In this case, given the same initial conditions, expected future inflation (+1) is lower
than in the scenario of cooperative inflation targeting discussed above. Adjusting their
expectation on next period price with smaller scale, the households react less to the same
level of disturbance, which results in less violent current inflation. This is represented by
a smaller feedback of inflation on state variables in our system. Moreover, as past period
price level is a state variable which will be considered when the firms setting new price,
inflation becomes more persistent.
The fiscal policy maker can exploit this to stabilize debt faster, by implementing
a tax rate higher than that under inflation targeting, without causing extra increase
in current inflation. Due to the lowered future inflation expectation, every same sized
increase in tax corresponds to lower level of inflation. Similarly, the monetary policy
maker who implements the same reduction in demand, will engineer lower inflation, due
to the reduced future inflation expectation. Figure 2.1 suggests that the transmission path
of consumption in this regime is the same as before-only partially pull down inflation.
Although changing demand has stronger impact on inflation, volatility of consumption
is costly. As the fiscal policy maker cooperates towards the same price level targeting, it
is more beneficial to change tax rate for the common target-price stabilization. Figure
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Responses of an unexpected initial debt level deviation
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2.1 shows that, compare to the benevolent discretionary case, it is optimal for the fiscal
policy maker to increase tax rate initially by more to ensure the first-period reduction in
the level of debt, while its cost-push eﬀect on inflation is mitigated by the lower expected
inflation; then tax rate drops sharply to a lower level, to deliver the required inflation
overshooting baseline. Then tax rate gradually reduces to base-line level, with inflation
also gradually increases back. When inflation overshoots, the price level is reduced. With
inflation gradually goes back to steady state, the price level converges to its steady state.
The economy converges back to the steady state at the same speed under the price level
targeting and under the cooperation of benevolent policy makers. This is apparent from
the identical reaction of consumption in both cases taking into account that there is unique
rate of convergence of all variables in linear models. The half-lives of both processes are
identical.6 Here the welfare gain can only be obtained because of the diﬀerence in the
magnitude of inflation deviation from the steady state. Table 2.2 reports numerical values
of policy and the private sector reaction functions. The equilibrium feedback of demand
on debt is the same in these two scenarios, while consumption feedback negatively on last
period price level as well in the latter scenario. The same dynamic path for demand is
only possible if debt level is lower during the whole convergence process with price level
targeting than with inflation targeting, otherwise consumption would be even lower due
to the required action on positive price level. This lower debt is realized optimally by tax
rate increase.
Two conclusions follow. First, cooperation on PLT improves the social welfare. By
definition price level targeting delivers the long-term price stability. Even if social welfare
still only cares inflation stability not price stability, welfare still gains from this regime due
to smaller inflation volatility. The essential diﬀerence which leads to this improvement
comparing to inflation targeting, is that the expectation of future inflation is lowered
when policy makers target price level. Although discretionary policy makers cannot
6We can check this numerically, and the result holds for all calibrations of the model.
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Table 2.2: Agent’s reactions in discretionary equilibrium
structural form reduced form
Benevolent  = 0000−1 − 0033 − 0037   = 0000−1 − 0066
cooperation   = 0000−1 + 0192 − 10269   = 0000−1 + 0867
 = 0000−1 + 0005 + 0065 + 0005   = 0000−1 + 0005
PLT  = −3931−1 − 0044 − 0013   = −2680−1 − 0066
cooperation   = −11732−1 + 1123 − 7943   = −96036−1 + 1645
 = −0443−1 + 0003 + 0036 + 0003   = −0804−1 + 0005
Monetary  = −7145−1 − 0007 − 0042   = −10222−1 − 0014
PLT, simu-   = −36259−1 + 0020 − 10701   = 73123−1 + 0170
ltaneous  = −0320−1 + 0000 + 0045 + 0004   = −0476−1 + 0000
Monetary  = −5448−1 − 0006 − 0032   = −5751−1 − 0010
PLT, fiscal   = 9475−1 + 0142   = 9475−1 + 0142
leadership  = −0359−1 + 0000 + 0042 + 0002   = −0565−1 + 0000
Benevolent  = 0000−1 − 00040 + 01612
commitment∗   = 0000−1 + 00897 + 1594472 = 0000−1 + 00003 + 09882
Note: ∗ Commitment coeﬃcients correspond to equations (2.12)-(2.17)
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aﬀect expectations directly, they can aﬀect the states to achieve their targets. Knowing
that the policy makers target price level stability, the private sector expects declining
prices following an above steady state inflation, and a negative inflation will happen in
the future in order to drive price back, even if there will be another new policy maker
re-optimize in the next periods, as long as they still undertake price level targeting. This
results in lower expected inflation set by price-setters, which improves the welfare.
Second, fiscal policy plays important role in achieving price stability. The required
inflation overshooting is generated by a tax cut, together with the reduction in consump-
tion. This is only possible if the fiscal policy maker also targets the price. Additionally,
the initial-period increase in taxes leads to lower level of debt in all consequent peri-
ods, which helps to lower inflation and prevents consumption to fall more. As shown in
Table2.2, inflation is positively related to the debt level while consumption reacts to debt
negatively. The parameters in these two regimes are very close; therefore a lower debt
level leads to smaller volatility in both consumption and inflation, which means higher
welfare. The initial-period increase of inflation due to higher taxes is outweighed by a
reduction of inflation in the following periods caused by expectations of negative future
inflation. The initial inflation is not higher than that in the inflation targeting case, hence
no extra cost occurs.
Following the intuition from Blake and Kirsanova (2011), that non-coincide policy
objectives may lead to one strategic policy maker tries to oﬀset some actions of the other
policy maker, we would expect the welfare worsened comparing to the case with only
central bank is assigned price level targeting. However, in the following analysis, we show
that our case counters this conventional intuition: diﬀerent targeting can improve social
welfare.
IV: Monetary price level targeting. In this Section we study the case when the
policy makers have diﬀerent objectives: the discretionary fiscal policy maker remains
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benevolent, while the discretionary monetary policy maker targets the price level to some
degree (the degree is measured by parameter  in objective (2.7)).We firstly focus on
comparing the delegation merits, so we consider the case of pure price level targeting
( = 1) and both policy makers optimize simultaneously. Table 2.1 demonstrates that
the social welfare loss with pure PLT ( = 1) is greatly reduced: it is only 25% of the loss
under the cooperative price level targeting. This is despite the main component of the
social loss is the inflation volatility, and the reduction of inflation volatility was helped
by fiscal policy maker who now does not have an incentive to do the same.
It is instructive to compare all the impulse responses in this case to those in benevolent
discretion and under discretionary PLT cooperation. We plotted the dynamic responses
of the economy to an initial increase in debt, see Figure 2.1. The monetary price level
targeting is assumed to be strict, with  = 1 All dynamic responses of monetary policy
targeting price level with inflation targeting fiscal policy are plotted using the solid line.
Figure 2.1 shows that when monetary policy targets price level and fiscal policy targets
inflation, the transition path is the closest to the benchmark commitment case.
Recall that in the time-consistent equilibrium the future inflation is a function of
future states. As soon as any policy maker targets the price level, the price-setting
private sector knows that any positive current inflation will be followed by a dynamic
path of predetermined states such that demand will be suﬃciently lowered to make it
optimal for a firm to set negative inflation in the future. This expectation results in
optimal firms decide to set initial inflation lower than inflation targeting regime, for same
level of marginal cost, cet. par.
Table 2.2 shows that when only monetary policy targets price level, demand is far more
sensitive to price level deviation. Fiscal policy maker knows that cost-push inflation
due to tax raise will cause a strong monetary reaction. To ensure price stability, an
inflation overshooting is required, which will cause larger inflation volatility and demand
reduction, both harm the inflation targeting fiscal policy’s benefit. Fiscal policy maker’s
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expectation of monetary policy’s stronger reaction to cost-push inflation makes it optimal
to set a smaller feedback of tax on debt deviation, leading to a slower return of debt. The
resulted cost-push inflation is relatively small and price is stabilized by the monetary
policy maker. To bring the future inflation below the base line to achieve the price-
level target, monetary policy maker reduces demand by a relatively smaller amount but
keeps consumption below the steady state level for a suﬃciently longer time. Due to the
expectations eﬀect and moderate cost-push inflation, the required fall in demand is not
too large. The tax rate has to stay high for a long time, to oﬀset the eﬀect of demand on
debt and ensure the debt stabilization.
In this regime, the diﬀerent targets actually prevent policy makers’ volatile behaviors
which would lead to large fluctuations. Each policy authority expects the other will react
to its own action stronger, causing significant loss to them. It is optimal to avoid the large
volatility by moving the policy instruments carefully and gently. To reduce fluctuation in
inflation, it is better for fiscal policy to adjust tax rate only at a small scale, to avoid a big
overshooting of the inflation. Households with rational expectations understand these,
and set a lower inflation accordingly. The policy makers and the economic variables
behave more like under commitment regime. As a result, there is a substantial welfare
gain, as inflation and consumption remain close to the base line for the whole period of
adjustment.
In this case, expected future inflation can still be lowered due to monetary policy
targeting price level. On top of this beneficial influence, the inflation targeting fiscal policy
maker prefers to avoid inflation overshooting by not change tax as violently as before.
Therefore, this further gain of welfare, comparing to the case with both policy makers
targeting price level, is due to fiscal expectation towards monetary policy. Therefore
an inflation targeting fiscal policy maker tries to avoid the inflation variance due to
overshooting by not starting the fight with the monetary policy maker, who will be
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determined to produce the overshooting large enough for price stability.
2.5 Value of Leadership
In the previous section we demonstrated that the large welfare gain observed under the
monetary PLT was merely the result of expectations of the price setters that any current
inflation will have to be followed by a period of low demand and (optimally set) negative
inflation. The substantial gain was achieved despite the non-cooperative behavior with
diﬀerent objectives of the two policy makers, and potential incentives of the two policy
makers to oﬀset each other’s actions in the regime of simultaneous moves. In this section
we investigate the eﬀect of intra-period leadership on social welfare, with diﬀerent weight
on price level and inflation to check the intermediate regimes.
Figure 2.2 plots the social welfare loss for three regimes, cooperative PLT regime and
two monetary PLT regimes as function of the degree of price level targeting, . One
of these two monetary PLT regimes is with the intra-period fiscal leadership; the other
characterizes both policy makers making decisions simultaneously. The loss values are
renormalized so that the zero loss level corresponds to the loss under commitment, while
the level of one corresponds to the loss under discretionary cooperation of benevolent
policy makers.
Two observations are apparent. First, the regime of fiscal leadership substantially
outperforms all other PLT regimes. Second, the graph of loss in the regime of simultane-
ous shows that, with a positive  the initial gain of introducing PLT is quickly increasing
until  ' 005 then the increase in gain is substantially slowed down until  ' 01 before
the loss is relatively quickly and steadily reduced achieving its global minimum in the
strict PLT regime with  = 1
In order to understand these results, we plot dynamic responses to a unit-increase
level of debt in the initial period in Figure 2.3. We plot responses for three values of
 = {005 01 10} Each panel contains impulse responses for three regimes: cooperation
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monetary PLT, fiscal leadership
monetary PLT, simultaneous moves
cooperation on PLT
Figure 2.2: Welfare loss under diﬀerent leadership with diﬀerent degree of PLT
of benevolent policy makers, monetary PLT under fiscal leadership, monetary PLT with
simultaneous moves.
There are two eﬀects of higher degree of PLT, : 1) the expectation eﬀect of price
level targeting and 2) the eﬀect of diﬀerent policy objectives of the two policy makers.
We discuss the monetary PLT with simultaneous moves first. With small  the
monetary policy maker has to deliver the overshoot of the inflation eventually, but with
little motivation to sacrifice with dramatic inflation fluctuation. Both policy makers
expect the other behave similar to under cooperation benevolent case, as the similar
objectives: to stabilize the economy the fiscal policy maker raises taxes slightly less
than in the cooperation case, because the fiscal policy maker takes into account the
expectations of the private sector which are aﬀected by the future negative inflation.
Once the degree of the price level targeting  increases further, the incentives of the
two policy maker to oﬀset each other’s actions increase in the regime of simultaneous
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses after initial debt deviation with diﬀerent degree of PLT
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moves. With higher , the fiscal policy maker raises taxes by more and keeps them
high, the monetary policy maker generates lower demand and keeps it low. As a result,
inflation does not rise by much in the initial moment, but a long period with large negative
inflation is generated. There is practically no extra welfare gain relative to the case with
 = 005, as the high welfare loss of the prolonged period of negative inflation and low
consumption nearly outweighs the gain of the lower initial-period inflation.
With further increase in  the fight between the two policy makers in the regime of
simultaneous moves becomes counterproductive. Stronger monetary and fiscal response
would create a greater negative inflation, and smaller initial increase in inflation, but to
keep the price level stability the integral under the graph of inflation should be equal to
zero. In order to engineer this, and given temporarily higher taxes, the monetary policy
maker has an incentive to lower initial demand less but keep it positive and small in the
future for infinitely long time. Conversely, with not too low current demand, the fiscal
policy maker will choose not to increase taxes too high; a moderate increase in taxes will
not create inflation and is suﬃcient to stabilize the debt.
However when the fiscal policy takes action before monetary policy, the tax rate is
raised by much less in all these cases with diﬀerent values of . Because the fiscal policy
maker takes monetary reactions into account and knows that higher taxes will only result
in lower demand, but similar inflation, while a moderate tax can avoid demand fall by
too much. The fiscal leadership can completely avoids the fight between policy makers
we described before in the simultaneous case, and takes most of the advantage of PLT
from a small  when increasing  this gain stays. When the fiscal policy maker targets
inflation but not price level at all, fiscal instrument will not be used to deliver inflation
overshooting, and it is the monetary policy maker who will have to deliver the future
negative inflation. Moreover, the fiscal policy maker is unwilling to raise taxes as high
as in the case of benevolent cooperative policy makers. Such an increase would result in
cost-push inflation, the monetary policy maker would have to reduce demand by more
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than in the case of inflation targeting cooperation, so the overall result for the fiscal policy
maker would be worse.
However, stabilization of inflation in a time-consistent way requires stabilization of
debt, so the fiscal policy maker does raise the tax rate. This increase in taxes results
in debt reduction with relatively small consequent increase in inflation. The monetary
policy maker responses to this raise in inflation by more than in the benevolent case, to
reduce demand and bring the future inflation below the steady state line. Expectations
of this result in lower present inflation.
As a result, inflation does go up, but by much smaller amount than in other regimes.
The monetary policy maker does generate negative inflation, but with a substantial delay;
inflation remains negative for a long time, but the size of this negative bias is relatively
small. Therefore, there is a large social welfare gain.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates that although the maximum welfare gain is achieved with
strict PLT ( = 1) the loss is relatively flat in  This shape of the loss is easy to
understand. Once   0 the negative inflation is inevitable and the described above
mechanism is at work. This leads to a sharp immediate reduction in the strength of
policy responses and in large welfare gains.
When with fully price targeting monetary policy, fiscal leadership delivers better wel-
fare than simultaneous moves. In the former case, fiscal policy knows that if tax rate
does not increase a lot, monetary policy as the follower has no incentive to generate a
large reduction in consumption to let inflation overshoot more. However in the case of
simultaneous moves, fiscal policy expects the monetary policy expecting a higher tax rate
so will reduce the demand in order to pull the inflation to a negative level, it is optimal
for fiscal policy to validate this expectation by increase tax rate by more than the value
in the fiscal leadership case.
To summarize, the fiscal policy maker acts as an intra-period leader and anticipates
the relatively low future demand which will be generated in response of current high taxes,
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it therefore decides not to raise taxes by much and avoids the fight with the monetary
policy maker despite the diﬀerence in targets.
The price level targeting brings two major eﬀects to the economy: long term price sta-
bilization and short term inflation fluctuation in the form of overshooting. With rational
expectations, a pure price level targeting can actually lower this inflation fluctuation due
to the lowered expected future inflation. Two factors decide the volatility: how forceful
the policy maker is to deliver the overshooting for price stability, which increases with
the weight on price level target; and how much of the future inflation expectation can
be lowered, which is also increasing with the weight of price level target. They increase
at diﬀerent rate. In simultaneous movement setting, in a small range of alpha, the loss
of fluctuation from overshooting can go up with increasing alpha, until the expectation
eﬀect catches up (which lowers the fluctuation). While under fiscal leadership, the benefit
of price level targeting can be captured with only a small weight.
2.6 Impact of steady state level of debt
Up till now we have analyzed the impact of PLT under diﬀerent regime but all under
the assumption of zero steady state debt level, which is far-fetched in current economy.
In order to understand if the merit of price level targeting remains with higher level of
steady state debt, in this Section we compare the impulse responses of economic variables
with three diﬀerent positive level of debt to our previous results.
When steady state debt level is positive, the law of motion of the deterministic econ-
omy has to include the Euler equation and the monetary policy tool is interest rate. The
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the system of Equation 2.9 to Equation 2.11 is transformed to:
 = +1 + κ +   (2.76)
 = −1 +  (2.77)
+1 = 1 ( −  −  −  ) +  (2.78)
 = +1 −  ( − +1) (2.79)









(1−)   = (1−)(1−)(+)  Debt  and price −1 are endogenous. is nominal interest rate.
Assuming steady state level of debt is   =  is the proportion of debt to GDP in
steady state. We normalize  = 1 Figure 2.4 illustrates the impulse responses to an
initially higher than steady state level of debt, under diﬀerent regimes with diﬀerent level
of ( Both monetary PLT is under fiscal leadership)
The first column shows the cases we discussed before with  = 0 Then we increase 
by a small value ( = 025) the transmission paths behave similar as before but fluctuate
to a larger scale: the pure monetary PLT delivers the results closest to the commitment
benchmark case (shown in A.1) comparing to all the other regimes we considered, followed
by monetary PLT with  = 005 showing that even just a small degree of PLT can help
to reduce most of the stabilization bias.
However, when  is raised to 07 and higher in our framework, the direction of the
impact of monetary fiscal interactions start to change. See the last two columns in
Figure 2.4. If the fiscal policy maker does not raise taxes it knows that the monetary
policy maker will be forced to stabilize debt in order to deliver price stability. This can
be achieved with ‘passive’ monetary policy when interest rate is lowered in the immediate
response to the higher debt but then raised to fight the consequent inflation. Moreover,
because of the requirement of price stability the movements of interest rate are likely
to be large so that inflation overshoots the base line. (Keeping interest rate high for a
long time may not be optimal because of the confliction with debt stabilization.) Such
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses of diﬀerent discretionary policy with diﬀerent steady state
debt level
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Loss under fiscal leadership with diﬀerent steady state debt level and
degree of PLT
policy naturally leads to high volatility of inflation, which the fiscal policy maker would
like to avoid. Therefore, it becomes optimal for the fiscal policy maker to intervene. The
third column in Figure 2.4 demonstrates that with higher debt and small degree of PLT
( = 005 solid line) taxes are raised nearly as high as under the joint PLT, so the fiscal
policy maker eﬀectively tries to coordinate with monetary policy maker rather than to
oﬀset its actions. With higher degree of PLT, the fiscal policy maker moves taxes more
violently, but initially higher taxes are not high enough to ensure debt stabilization so
the monetary policy maker operates in ‘passive’ way: interest rate is lowered when  = 1
With further increase in the steady state level of debt all cooperative and non-
cooperative regimes become very similar. The monetary policy maker finds it very diﬃcult
to stabilize debt and deliver overshooting of inflation, so the fiscal policy is forced to react
more aggressively to debt and to inflation in the similar way as in all cooperative regimes.
When  = 0, Monetary PLT makes fiscal policy behaves like under Commitment as
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well. This is due to the fiscal policy maker’s also expects Monetary policy maker will
forcefully reduce and negatively overshoot the inflation if tax creates any, which does no
good for the inflation targeting fiscal policy.
With a higher  interest rate has a direct eﬀect on the accumulation of debt, the
increase in debt will induce a higher tax, which leads to higher inflation. Below certain
threshold, further rise in  creates more problems for policy makers if monetary policy
raises the interest rate in response to an increase in inflation. The higher interest rate
will put upward pressure on debt accumulation which makes fiscal policy less eﬀective
on debt stabilization. When  is below this threshold, the gains from less volatility of
targeted variables outweigh the losses from the slow stabilization of the economy. When
 is above this threshold, it becomes welfare improving to stabilize debt quicker. As the
first-order eﬀect of interest rates on debt is large, a fall in interest rates reduces the level
of domestic debt. Therefore, it becomes optimal to lower the interest rate in the first
period after the shock and raise it in the second period. This policy leads to faster debt
stabilization, also curtails inflation.
The impulse responses show that under PLT, this threshold is lower than that under
Inflation targeting regime: in the case of  = 07, interest rate is lowered instead of
increased after the initial disturbance. In order to stabilize price, Central Bank chooses
to help tax to bring debt down by lowering interest rate to increase consumption. This
way the lowered debt leads to a reduced tax which can deliver the negative overshoot of
the inflation.
If steady state debt level goes up even more, e.g. = 12, Central bank lowers interest
by more, therefore tax does not need to raise as much as before. Fiscal Policy maker
knows that monetary policy, the follower, will have to lower interest by larger size to pull
back debt in order to achieve the price stability. All regimes are more similar in the case
where  = 12.
Figure 2.5 shows that  = 12 has lower loss than  = 07 in all discretionary
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regimes with diﬀerent  in our framework. This demonstrates that the social loss is a
non-monotonic function of , which is consistent with the striking change in the way the
stabilization policy works.
In relatively high debt case (e.g.  = 07  = 12), the welfare loss in PLT is
higher than inflation targeting. PLT has two opposite eﬀects, on one hand, it lowers
inflation after the disturbance by lowering expected future inflation, which makes the
task of stabilization easier; on the other hand, an overshoot of inflation is required in
order to return the price level to baseline, which causes a higher volatility of inflation.
With higher , there will be higher tax, and initially lowered interest rate which cause
the realized inflation almost as high as under inflation targeting; when inflation is at the
same level, due to the higher volatility of inflation required to deliver price level stability,
PLT causes higher loss.
2.7 Conclusion
This Chapter revisited the idea that the PLT delegation scheme can reduce the stabi-
lization bias in monetary policy models. We present a detailed account of discretionary
monetary and fiscal policy interactions assuming that the monetary policy maker imple-
ments the PLT while the fiscal policy maker remains benevolent and has incentives to
pursue its own benefit and oﬀset some or all of monetary policy actions. If steady state
debt level is low, we demonstrate that delegating PLT to the monetary policy maker
results in substantial reduction of the social welfare loss even in case of strategic fiscal
policy. A comparison to the joint PLT suggests that fiscal policy should be prevented from
maintaining price stability — unilateral monetary PLT substantially outperforms the joint
PLT regime. The ability of the fiscal policy maker to conduct itself as an intra-period
leader results in greater welfare gain.
First we compared the case that both policy makers target price level and the case both
of them target inflation. Our study confirms the appealing features of price level policy on
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general: price-level targeting lead the discretionary results closer to the best commitment
results, in which: 1) price level will come back to initial path; 2) the volatility in inflation
and consumption (output) is smaller 3) tax rate no longer increase dramatically as a
response to a positive shock to debt , the dynamic complementarity between fiscal and
monetary policy is weakened 4) welfare loss is reduced with a price level targeting.
Then we assign price level targeting to monetary policy only, and let fiscal policy
targets inflation. Surprisingly, this non-cooperative setting-up can further reduce the
welfare loss. Monetary PLT makes fiscal policy behaves like under Commitment as well.
This is due to the fiscal policy maker expects Monetary policy maker to forcefully reduce
and negatively overshoot the inflation in order to sustain price level, if any created by
tax. This does no good for the inflation targeting fiscal policy. The conflict between the
policy makers is lessened rather than increased.
Later, we compare the case of fiscal leadership with both policy makers making de-
cision simultaneously. We found out that fiscal leadership improves the social welfare
further, and just a small weight on price target can demonstrate the appealing features
of price level, the economic variables behave similar to those under commitment regime,
while if policy makers re-optimize at the same time, the interactions between them lead
to a relatively higher cost at lower level of price target weight, and it behaves more like
inflation targeting discretionary policy makers.
In both monetary PLT regimes the maximum welfare is achieved under strict price
level targeting, i.e. in the case when the inflation stabilization term in policy objective
is replaces by the price stabilization term.
However, when the steady state debt level is high, the strengthened dynamic com-
plementarity between policy makers causes a higher inflation even under PLT, and the
loss from volatility of inflation required by price level targeting dominates. This shows
that PLT will deteriorate the economy and cause more violent fluctuation rather than
improves the social welfare. PLT may only be a good alternative to inflation targeting
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when the steady state debt level is relatively low.
Despite demonstrating these results using a particular model, this model is at the core
of more general and empirically relevant DSGE models widely used in policy analysis.





Fiscal and monetary policies face diﬀerent institutional restrictions and operate at diﬀer-
ent frequencies. Monetary policy makers set interest rate every month and the decision
process can arguably be described as (constrained) optimization with the clear aim to
stabilize short run fluctuations.1 In contrast, fiscal decisions are often taken annually,
and the policy of contemporary fiscal authorities can rarely be described as aiming to
stabilize the economy in the short run. This situation is likely to change, however, if
fiscal policy is given a more active short run stabilization role: not only the fiscal policy
becomes more focussed on stabilization, but also the decision process becomes more reg-
ular. This Chapter contributes to the discussion on the institutional design of stabilizing
fiscal policy, which operates at a lower frequency than monetary policy, uses distortionary
taxes as a policy instrument and acts without implementation lags.
This institutional design has important implications for the dynamics of the economy.
With a longer fiscal cycle the optimal fiscal adjustments are bigger. They impact more
on the monetary policy maker and escalate the conflict between the two authorities when
the fiscal policy maker uses distortionary taxes. Indeed, optimal actions of the monetary
and the fiscal policy makers are dynamic complements in the sense of Cooper and John
1There is an extensive literature on the subject, see e.g. King (1997), Svensson (2010).
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(1988). Higher tax rate, set by the fiscal policy maker in response to a higher debt
level, generates cost-push inflation, which increases the marginal return to a monetary
policy decision to raise the interest rate and contribute to debt accumulation. In standard
quarterly models this reinforcement mechanism is weak. We demonstrate that it is greatly
amplified if discretionary fiscal policy operates only infrequently.
We show that the gain from monetary and fiscal policy stabilization of macroeconomic
fluctuations can be greatly overestimated, if it is evaluated using models with frequent
fiscal policy stabilization. These models fail to account for arising expectations traps
(King and Wolman, 2004) with implications of excessive volatility of welfare-relevant
economic variables; these models fail to demonstrate the necessity to constrain the fiscal
policy maker, as time-consistent policy may not exist.
We study interactions of monetary and fiscal policies in the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) class of infinite horizon non-singular discrete-time linear dynamic models that is
typically used to study aggregate fluctuations in macroeconomics. We use the standard
New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices to demonstrate
the results. The economy is controlled by monetary and fiscal policy makers which act
non-cooperatively at diﬀerent frequencies. The monetary policy maker optimizes every
period while the fiscal policy maker optimizes less frequently, choosing the distortionary
tax rate once every several periods. After the tax rate is chosen, it stays at this level until
the next fiscal optimization, which happens with certainty after the given finite number of
periods. The fiscal policy maker can be characterized as having intra-period leadership.
In other words, the monetary policy maker observes fiscal policy in each period, and the
fiscal policy maker knows that the monetary policy maker optimizes every period and
takes this into account when formulating policy.
More specifically, we demonstrate the existence of expectations traps in the case of
longer fiscal cycles. However, we also find that these traps are unlikely to present a
problem for a policymaking as we invoke coordination mechanisms. Following Dennis
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and Kirsanova (2012) we investigate stability properties of these equilibria and find that
the agents are likely to coordinate on the Pareto-preferred equilibrium in all cases that
we study. More importantly, we demonstrate that discretionary equilibria may not exist,
once the fiscal cycle is suﬃciently long — one year in our model — and the reinforcement
mechanism between the optimal actions of the two policy makers becomes particularly
strong. We demonstrate that these adverse eﬀects can be mitigated if the fiscal policy
maker is constrained in its actions. We use a number of policy scenarios to illustrate our
findings which include the scenario with debt stabilization faster than socially optimal
and the scenario with constrained fiscal policy maker.
This research contributes to the literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policies in
linear-quadratic (LQ) rational expectations (RE) models, as exemplified by e.g. Leeper
(1991), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997); Schmitt Grohe
and Uribe (2000); Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Linnemann (2006), Leith and von
Thadden (2008) and Schabert and von Thadden (2009). It draws on the literature on
time-consistent policy with expectations traps (King and Wolman, 2004; Blake and Kir-
sanova, 2012) and on coordination in RE models, see Evans (1986), Guesnerie and Wood-
ford (1992); Evans and Guesnerie (1993, 2003, 2005); Evans and Honkapohja (2001), El-
lison and Pearlman (2011), Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). The design of policy which we
study is similar in spirit to the limited commitment framework (Schaumburg and Tam-
balotti, 2007; Debertoli and Nunes, 2010), but diﬀers crucially by assumptions regarding
the number of policy makers, the certainty of reoptimizations and the finite number of
periods between reoptimizations.
The Chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section we present a model of
monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Section 3.3 presents the general framework with
infrequent stabilization. Section 3.5 discusses policy implications in three special cases:
quarterly, biannual and annual fiscal stabilization. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 The Model with Government Debt
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model, discussed in Woodford (2003a),
modified to take account of the eﬀects of fiscal policy.2 It is a closed economy model
with two policy makers, the fiscal and monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is assumed
to support monetary policy in stabilization of the economy around the non-stochastic
steady state.
The economy consists of a representative infinitely-lived household, a representative
firm that produces the final good, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms
and a monetary and fiscal authority. The intermediate goods-producing firms act under
monopolistic competition and produce according to a production function that depends
only on labor. Goods are combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to pro-
duce aggregate output. Firms set their prices subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity.
Households choose their consumption and leisure and can transfer income through time
through their holdings of government bonds. We assume that the fiscal authority faces
a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are financed by levying
income taxes3 and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
3.2.1 Government debt
We assume that all public debts consist of riskless one-period bonds. The nominal value
B of end-of-period public debt then evolves according to the following law of motion:
B = (1 + −1)B−1 +  −   (3.1)
where   is the share of national product  that is collected by the government in period
, and government purchases  are treated as exogenously given and time-invariant. 
is aggregate price level and  is interest rate on bonds. The national income identity
2See e.g. Benigno and Woodford (2003).
3We could use distortionary consumption taxes to finance the deficit. The transmission mechanism
would be the same.
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yields
 =  + (3.2)
where  is private consumption. For analytical convenience we introduce  = (1 +
−1)B−1−1 which is a measure of the real value of debt observed at the beginning of
period , so that (3.1) becomes
+1 = (1 + )
µ
−1 −   +
¶
 (3.3)
The first-order approximation of (3.3) about the non-stochastic zero-inflation and







 −  (  + )
¶

where  =  ,  = ln
¡ ¢,   = ln ¡  ¢   = ln ¡ ¢   = ln ¡ ¢ and letters without
time subscript denote steady state values of corresponding variables in zero inflation
steady state. The private sector’s discount factor  = 1(1+ ). We have assumed  = 0
in order to make the presentation of the model particularly simple. This assumption
results in no first-order eﬀects of the interest rate and inflation on debt, so that the final
version of the linearized debt accumulation equation can be written as
+1 = 1 ( + (1− ) (1− )  −  −  )  (3.4)
where we used the linearized (3.2) to substitute out output and denoted  =  .4
3.2.2 Private Sector
The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve that describes Calvo-type price-setting
decisions of monopolistically competitive firms is standard (Benigno and Woodford, 2003,
Sec. A.5) and marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. A log-linearization of the
4Because we work with one-period debt only, its proportion in the total stock of debt is not very
large. We discuss implications of this assumption for policy in Section 3.3.
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aggregate supply relationship around the zero-inflation steady state yields the following
New Keynesian Phillips curve












where  = (1−)(1−) (+) is the slope of Phillips curve. Parameter  is Calvo parameter,
parameter  is Frisch elasticity of labour supply,  is elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion and parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods Cost
push shock  follows an autoregressive process.
3.2.3 Social Loss Function






 ¡2 + 2¢  (3.6)





=0  (     )   ∈ {} Each policy maker knows the laws
of motion (3.4)-(3.5) of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when for-
mulating policy. The following assumption follows Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and
substantially simplifies the exposition of the model.
3.2.4 Assumptions
Assumption 4 (policy instruments) The monetary policy maker chooses consump-
tion  and then, conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of  and  decides on the
value of interest rate that achieves the desired  and . The fiscal policy maker uses the
tax rate   as policy instrument and keeps government spending constant  = 0.
Apart from making the exposition clear, keeping fiscal spending constant allows us to
focus on the particular transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal policy.
5The criterion is derived under the assumption of steady state labour subsidy. Here parameter  is
a function of model parameters,  =  and  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
monopolistically produced goods.
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Despite the simplicity of the model, finding time-consistent optimal policy is not triv-
ial. Of course, the economy can be completely insulated against shocks if the two policy
instruments are adjusted to oﬀset the eﬀect of shocks on inflation and debt. However,
such policy would be time-inconsistent as it would need to oﬀset the eﬀect of expectations
E+1 on current inflation. In what follows we assume that both policy makers and the
private sector know that the decision making is sequential and a diﬀerent policy maker
may be in the oﬃce in future periods. We refer to this policy as policy under discretion.
Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (policy) Monetary and fiscal policy mix satisfies the following assump-
tions.
(i) Monetary and fiscal authorities act non-cooperatively.
(ii) Both authorities are assumed to optimize sequentially under time-consistency con-
straint.
(iii) The monetary policy maker optimizes every period, but the fiscal policy maker
optimizes once every  periods,  ≥ 1.
(iv) The fiscal authority has intra-period leadership.
The assumption of fiscal intra-period leadership is motivated by the observation that
the monetary policy reaction function is much more transparent and predictable, so the
fiscal policy maker is able to take it into account when formulating policy.6 Using the
interest rate as an instrument implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are
made simultaneously, while in this model they are consecutive decisions taken by relevant
agents. This makes no diﬀerence for our results.
The assumption of time-consistency prevents the complete and instantaneous stabi-
lization of the economy. Moreover, the relatively large adjustments of infrequent fiscal
6Simultaneous moves of the two policy makers could be another possibility. Empirical evidence
(Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010) suggests that in countries without fiscal decentralization, like the UK,
the regime of fiscal leadership is the most relevant.
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policy may create more diﬃculties for monetary policy to oﬀset the eﬀect of disturbances
on the economy. Smooth stabilization may not be possible any more.
The infrequency of fiscal decisions can be interpreted as fiscal commitment to the
policy of fixed tax rates in all periods between the optimization. Such policymaking,
however, remains sequential, without the ability to manipulate the expectations of the
private sector beyond the periods between fiscal reoptimizations.
Assumption 6 (policy objectives) Both policy makers are benevolent.
Diﬀerent objectives of the two policy makers are likely to result in a conflict between
the policy makers as one policy maker tries to ‘undo’ the perceived harm done by the
other.7 We shall demonstrate that a similar conflict exists even if both policy makers are
benevolent but operate at diﬀerent frequencies. The assumption of diﬀerent frequencies
also makes the leadership structure important. If both policy makers are benevolent and
face identical constraints, then the intra-period leadership does not play any role. In our
case the policy makers face diﬀerent constraints, so the leadership does matter. In this
Chapter we have chosen to study fiscal leadership as arguably most empirically relevant.
Finally, we make the assumption which is crucial for clear exposition without the loss
of generality.
Assumption 7 The model is perfect-foresight deterministic.
If the stochastic model is linear-quadratic then the stochastic component of the so-
lution can be obtained in the unique way once the deterministic component is known.8
We are interested in issues of existence and uniqueness of the time-consistent policy and
these properties are unaﬀected by the introduction of stochastic components in the LQ
framework.
7See e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Lambertini (2006).





Discount factor  0.99 —
Calvo parameter  0.75 —
Consumption share  0.75 —
Intertemporal elasticity  0.3 [0.1, 1.3]
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  3.0 [0.3,4]
Elasticity of substitution between goods  11.0 [4,11]
To summarize, the law of motion of the deterministic economy can be written as:
 = +1 + κ +   (3.7)
+1 = 1 ( −  −  )  (3.8)







  =  
(1−) 
Debt  is the only endogenous predetermined state variable. The objectives of each
policy maker coincide and are given by formula (3.6).
3.2.5 Calibration
This model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Table 3.1 reports the
baseline calibration of parameters. Calibration of   and  is relatively straightforward,
they correspond to the most frequently estimated values of the steady state annual interest
rate of 4%, the average frequency of price changes of one year, and consumption to
output share of 75%. Estimation and the consequent calibration of the remaining three
parameters varies across studies.
Estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply  vary widely, depending on whether
macro- or micro-evidence is used. Peterman (2012) reports values of  ∈ [29 31] from
the empirical work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages.
This range is consistent with values used by macroeconomists to calibrate general equi-
librium models but greater than the estimates of  ∈ [03 08] which are obtained in
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microeconomic studies even if decisions on labour participation are taken into account,
see Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The main source of this diﬀerence lies
in the heterogeneity of the workforce’s reservation wages. When a larger proportion of
the workforce’s reservation wage is about the market wage, a small change in the mar-
ket wage leads to a large change in the labour force participation, see Chang and Kim
(2005) and Gourio and Noual (2009). However the density of marginal workers can only
be observed at the macro-level; the eﬀect is larger in countries with higher involuntary
unemployment which leads to higher aggregate elasticity of labour supply. This eﬀect is
not identified at the micro-level where a small change in the market rate often does not
lead to a noticeable change in the participation status of an individual. So we consider
values between 0.3 and 4 plausible for .
Similarly, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity  vary depending on the wealth
of the representative households and the proportion of nondurable goods in their con-
sumption bundle, see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The
empirical evidence for  is quite far-ranging from near 0.1 reported in e.g. Hall (1988)
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989), to above 1 reported in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) find that the estimate of  increases from 0.3
for the aggregate data to 0.8 for cohort data, suggesting that the aggregation, which is
implicit in the macro data, may cause a significant downward shift in the estimate of .
The elasticity of substitution between goods,  determines the monopolistic mark-
up. Chari et al. (2000) argue for a mark-up of 11% for the macro economy as a whole.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) obtain elasticity of substitution 7.88, corresponding to
a markup of 14.5%. Diﬀerent industries have diﬀerent mark-ups, Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001) report mark ups of 27-45% for automobiles and branded
cereals industries.
In all numerical exercises we use the base line values of parameters as reported in the


















Figure 3.1: Timing of events
results to the range of alternative calibrations given in the second column in Table 3.1.
3.3 Discretionary Equilibrium
In this Section we define discretionary equilibrium in which the monetary policy maker
reoptimizes every period while the fiscal policy maker decides once every  periods,
1 ≤   ∞ We refer to the period between fiscal reoptimizations as the fiscal cycle.
We denote the set of numbers  congruent to a modulo  as [] . There are exactly 
diﬀerent sets []  We shall identify these sets with the corresponding residue: [] = 
so  denotes the time period after the latest fiscal reoptimization. Both the monetary
and fiscal policy makers optimize in period 0 = [0] . Only the monetary policy maker
optimizes in periods [1] ,..,[ − 1] , which are labelled  = 1   − 1. The timing of
events is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Suppose the monetary and fiscal policy maker both optimize at period . private
sector’s reaction function is a linear function of the state:
+ = +  = 0   − 1 (3.9)
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Use (3.9) for + 1 and substitute (3.7) for the appropriate period to obtain:
+ = +1 + +
¡κ − +1 ¢ + + ¡ − +1 ¢  + (3.10)
The private sector observes policy and the state, and takes into account the ‘instanta-
neous’ influence of the policy choice, measured by
¡κ − +1 ¢ and ¡ − +1 ¢.
The monetary policy maker’s problem in period  = 0   − 1 can be described
by the following Bellman equation, where the value function depends on the number of
periods passed since the last fiscal optimization. Assuming the quadratic form for the
appropriate value function we can write the Bellman equation for the monetary policy
maker in period :
2+ = min+
¡2+ + 2+ + +12+1¢ (3.11)
2+ = min+




 (+ − + −  +)
¶2!

where we substituted constraints (3.8) and (3.10) written for the appropriate period
Minimization with respect + yields the following monetary policy reaction function:
+ = + +  + (3.13)
where
 = −
¡κ − +1 ¢+1 −  +1¡κ − +1 ¢2 + + 22 +1  (3.14)
 = −
¡κ − +1 ¢ ¡ − +1 ¢+ 2 +1¡κ − +1 ¢2 + + 22 +1  (3.15)
and  = 1   − 1 The monetary policy maker observes fiscal policy, and takes into
account its ‘instantaneous’ influence, measured by  .
The fiscal policy maker only optimizes in periods [0] . Suppose the optimization
happens at time . The Bellman equation which describes the fiscal policy decision can
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be written as:
 2 = min 
Ã−1X
=0
 ¡2+ + 2+¢+  2+
!
(3.16)
where constraints (3.8), (3.10), and (3.13) are applied in any period  = 0   − 1
because the state in period [ ] ≡ [0] depends on fiscal policy in all intermediate
periods,  +  = 0   − 1
We assume that the fiscal policy maker, when chooses   also sets  +  = 1  −1
such that
 + =   (3.17)
This policy has the following representation
 + =  +  = 1   − 1 (3.18)
Indeed, take (3.18) one period forward and use (3.17) to obtain
 ++1 =  +1 ++1 = +1 1 (1− 

 −  (1 + )  ) +
=  +
from where
 +1 = 


1−  −  (1 +  )     = 0   − 2
Using recursive substitution we can write the complete set of constraints as
+ = Π0  +Π0   + = C0  + C0   ++1 = B0  + B0  
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where the coeﬃcients Π0  Π0  C0  C0  B0 and B0 are defined by
Π0 =
+1 +




























































Substitute these constraints into the Bellman equation (3.16) and diﬀerentiate with
respect to   to yield:
  = −
P−1
=0 
¡Π0 Π0 + C0 C0 ¢+ B0  B0P−1
=0 
³¡Π0 ¢2 +  ¡C0 ¢2´+  ³B0 ´2  (3.25)
From (3.10), (B.21) and (B.25) it follows
 = +1 +
¡κ − +1 ¢  + ¡¡κ − +1 ¢  + ¡ − +1 ¢¢   (3.26)
which determines the time-consistent reaction of the private sector in (3.10).
The resulting transition of the economy for  = 0   − 1 can be written as:
+ =  + (3.27)
+ = + (3.28)
++1 =  + (3.29)
where
 = 1 (1− 

 −  ( + 1)  )
 =  +  
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Substitute them into (3.12) and (3.16) to yield







()2 +  ( )2
´ Y
=0
¡−1 ¢2 +  −1Y
=0
( )2 (3.31)
It follows that  = 0 =  : in periods when both benevolent policy makers reoptimize
their value functions are the same.
Proposition 6 Given Assumptions 5-7 the stationary discretionary equilibrium with
intra-period fiscal leadership can be described by the set of coeﬃcients  ∪{         }−1=0 
Proof. For a given 0 = ¯ each trajectory {    }∞=0 which solves the system of first
order conditions (3.8), (3.10), (3.13), and (3.18) we can uniquely map into the set of coeﬃ-
cients  ∪{         }−1=0 , satisfying (3.14), (3.15), (3.25), (3.26), (3.30) and (3.31).
Conversely, if the set of coeﬃcients  ∪{         }−1=0 solves (3.14), (3.15), (3.25),
(3.26), (2.28) and (3.31) we can uniquely map it into the trajectory {    }∞=0
solving system (3.24), (3.10), (3.13) for given 0 = ¯
3.4 Coordination Mechanisms
Discretionary policy may result in multiple policy equilibria, see Albanesi, Chari, and
Christiano (2003), King and Wolman (2004), Blake and Kirsanova (2012); in our case
it implies that system (3.14), (3.15), (3.25), (3.26), (2.28) and (3.31) may have several
distinct solutions. Current policy decisions depend on the forecast of future policy, which
are made by the private sector. If there are dynamic complementarities between actions
of economic agents then multiple equilibria might arise and coordination failures occur.
Not all equilibria are empirically relevant: economic agents may coordinate on some
equilibria more likely than on others. Following Evans (1986) and drawing on the large
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literature which employs learning to analyze coordination in rational expectations (RE)
models9 Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) develop and apply several iteration expectations
(IE) stability criteria for LQ RE discretionary policy models with one policy maker. In
this Section we extend these criteria to the case of two policy makers. This allows us to
focus on empirically-relevant discretionary equilibria.
Specifically, we consider learning by the private sector, the joint learning by followers,
the private sector and the monetary policy maker, the joint learning of all economic agents
and learning by the leader. We label these types of learning PS-, JF-, J- and L-learning
correspondingly.
3.4.1 Learning by Private Agents
In this section we investigate the IE-stability of RE private sector equilibria, in which the
private sector rationally responds to the given policy rules of both policy makers. The
given pair of rules represents equilibrium discretionary policy.
Discretionary equilibrium is fully characterized by the set  ∪ {         }−1=0 .
We want to examine whether private agents can learn their equilibrium reaction {}−1=0 ,
given policies which are described by  ∪ {       }−1=0 .
Suppose the private agents know that the policy makers implement (3.13) and (3.18)
within each fiscal cycle. They know that the fiscal policy maker changes the tax rate at
periods [] = 0, so that all policies and reactions have a ‘seasonality’ component. The
private sector starts the learning process and forms the expectation of the whole vector
of responses within the fiscal cycle
+ = ¯+  = 0   − 1
Here and below we denote the guessed values with bars. This perceived reaction of the
private sector will be consistent with a RE equilibrium if it is supported by the evolution
9See Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), Evans and Guesnerie (1993), Evans and Guesnerie (2003),
Evans and Guesnerie (2005), Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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of the economy. The evolution of the economy (2.9)-(3.24) implies
+ = ¡¯+1 + ¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ + ¡ −  ¯+1 ¢  ¢ +
where  =  +    Equating coeﬃcients yields
 = (1−  (  +  )) ¯+1 + κ +     = 0   − 1 (3.32)
Definition 7 Equations (3.32) define revision mapping T from the initial guess of the
decision rule ¯ = {¯}−1=0 to the revised decision rule  = {}−1=0  summarized by
 = T (¯) 
Definition 8 Fix-point ∗ = {∗ }−1=0 of the T− map,  = T (¯) is said to be
locally IE-stable under private sector learning if
lim→∞T
 (¯) = ∗
for all ¯ in a neighborhood of ∗ ¯ 6= ∗
It follows that ∗ is locally IE-stable if and only if it is a locally stable fix-point of the
system of diﬀerence equations
+1 = T ()
where the index  denotes the step of the updating process. A fix-point of this map-
ping results in a perceived law of motion for the economy which is consistent with the
economy’s actual law-of-motion in a RE equilibrium.
3.4.2 Joint Learning by Followers
Suppose that the monetary policy maker is also learning. The monetary policy maker
and the private sector take the fiscal policy decisions as given. The monetary policy
maker and the private sector jointly learn their equilibrium reactions {      }−1=0 
given fiscal policy which is described by {  0} 
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Recall that the fiscal policy maker chooses the policy once, at the beginning of the
fiscal cycle, and keeps the tax rate level constant until the next reoptimization. The
state-dependent representation of this policy within the fiscal cycle depends on the state,
which is aﬀected by decisions of other agents. We assume that the private sector and the
monetary policy maker treat the intra-cycle fiscal policy parametrically, as given, but once
they revise their expectations they realize the eﬀect of the revision on the representation
of the intra-cycle fiscal reaction function, and revise the representation. In what follows
we treat  = ¯    = 2  −1 but we omit this notation to avoid writing each equation
twice, once for  = 0, and once for all other periods.
The monetary policy maker and the private sector form expectations about the RE
equilibrium. The perceived reaction of the private sector should be supported by the
evolution of the economy in order to be consistent with a RE equilibrium. The evolution
of the economy (2.9)-(2.11) implies
+ = ¡(1−  ) ¯+1 +  ¢ + + ¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ + (3.33)
for  = 0   − 1
The perceived reaction of the monetary policy maker should also be consistent with
implementing the best response to the guessed reaction of the private sector:
2+ = min+






) + − +)
¶2!

where  = 0   − 1 The revised reaction rules + =  + with coeﬃcients
 = −
³¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ ¡(1−  ) ¯+1 +  ¢− ¯+1  (1−  )´³
()2
 ¯+1 +
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢2 + ´ = 
¡¯ ¯¢ (3.34)





(1−  ) ¯+1 +  
¢
+
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ ¡¯ ¯¢¢2 (3.35)
+ ¡ ¡¯ ¯¢¢2 + 1 ¯+1 ¡(1−  )−  ¡¯ ¯¢¢2
¶
where
© ¡¯ ¯¢ª−1=0 are determined in (2.25). The revision process of the private sector
described by (3.33) can be written as + = +  = 0   − 1 where
 =
¡
(1−  ) ¯+1 +   +
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ ¡¯ ¯¢¢ =  ¡¯ ¯¢  (3.36)
Finally, the representation of intra-cycle fiscal policy is updated according to




¡¯ ¯¢−     = 0   − 2 (3.37)
Definition 9 Equations (3.34)-(3.37) define the revision mapping T from the initial
guess of the reaction ¯ = ©¯ ¯ ¯ª to the updated reaction  = {  }   = T (¯) 
Definition 10 A fix-point, ∗ = (∗ ∗ ∗) of the T− map,  = T (¯) is said to be
locally IE-stable under JF-learning if
lim→∞T
 (¯) = ∗
for all ¯ in a neighborhood of ∗ ¯ 6= ∗
By construction, the fix-point of the revision mapping results in the law of motion of
the economy which is consistent with the RE equilibrium. As before, the fix-point of the
mapping needs to be locally stable to allow the private sector and the monetary policy
maker to learn the RE equilibrium.
3.4.3 Joint Learning
We now assume that all agents learning the equilibrium described by  ∪{         }−1=0 
Both policy makers and the private sector make their guess about the RE equilibrium.
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The perceived reaction of the private sector should be supported by the evolution
of the economy in order to be consistent with a RE equilibrium. The evolution of the
economy (2.9)-(2.11) implies
+ = ¯+1 + +
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ + + ¡ − ¯+1 ¢  +
for  = 0   − 1
The perceived reaction of the monetary policy maker should be consistent with im-
plementing the best response to the guessed reaction rule of the private sector:
2+ = min+




 (+ − + −  +)
¶2!
where  = 0   − 1 The revised reaction rules + = ++  +  = 0   − 1
with coeﬃcients
 = −
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ ¯+1 −  ¯+1¡κ − ¯+1 ¢2 + + 22 ¯+1 = 
¡¯ ¯¢ (3.38)
 = −
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢ ¡ −  ¯+1 ¢+ 2 ¯+1¡κ − ¯+1 ¢2 + + 22 ¯+1 = 
¡¯ ¯¢ (3.39)
implement the best policy response. Consistent with the revised reactions, the intra-cycle
representation of fiscal policy  
¡¯ ¯¢ satisfies
 +1 = 


1−  ¡ ¡¯ ¯¢+  ¡¯ ¯¢  ¢−   =  +1 ¡¯ ¯¢   = 0   − 2 (3.40)
The perceived reaction of the fiscal policy maker should be consistent with imple-
menting the best response to the guessed reaction rules of the private sector and of the
monetary policy maker:
 2 = min 
Ã−1X
=0
 ¡2+ + 2+¢+  ¯ 2+
!
subject to constraints
+ = Π¯0  + Π¯0   + = C¯0  + C¯0   ++1 = B¯0  + B¯0  
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where the functional form of Π¯ C¯ and B¯ can be determined from
Π¯0 =
¯+1 +




























































¡¯ ¯¢ and  ¡¯ ¯¢ determined in (3.38)-(3.39). Therefore, Π¯ C¯ and B¯ also
depend on guessed values of ¯ and ¯
The revision of   can be written as   =  0 with coeﬃcients
 0 = −
P−1
=0 
¡Π¯0 Π¯0 + C¯0 C¯0 ¢+  B¯0 ¯ B¯0P−1
=0 
³¡Π¯0 ¢2 +  ¡C¯0 ¢2´+  ¯ ³B¯0 ´2 =  0
¡¯ ¯¢  (3.41)
Therefore, the consistent with RE equilibrium revision of the private sector reaction
function can be written as + = +  = 0   − 1 with
 = ¯+1 +
¡κ − ¯+1 ¢  ¡¯ ¯¢ (3.42)
+
¡¡κ − ¯+1 ¢  ¡¯ ¯¢+ ¡ − ¯+1 ¢¢   ¡¯ ¯¢ =  ¡¯ ¯¢
Finally, consistent with RE equilibrium revision of value functions is




+1 ¡1−  ¡¯ ¯¢−  ¡ ¡¯ ¯¢+ 1¢   ¡¯ ¯¢¢2
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¡¯ ¯¢−  ¡ ¡¯ ¯¢+ 1¢   ¡¯ ¯¢¢¶2 
Definition 11 Equations (3.38), (3.39), (3.40), (3.41), (3.42), (3.43), (3.44) define the
revision mapping T from the initial guess of the reaction ¯ = ©¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  ¯ ª to the
updated reaction  = {      }   = T (¯) 
Definition 12 A fix-point, ∗ = (∗ ∗ ∗  ∗  ∗) of the T− map,  = T (¯) is said
to be locally IE-stable under J-learning if
lim→∞T
 (¯) = ∗
for all ¯ in a neighborhood of ∗ ¯ 6= ∗
By construction, the fix-point of this natural revision mapping results in the law of
motion of the economy which is consistent with the RE equilibrium. The fix-point of the
mapping needs to be locally stable to allow all agents to learn the RE equilibrium jointly.
3.4.4 Learning by the Leader
We now assume that only the fiscal policy maker learns the RE equilibrium policy { 0   } 
knowing the reaction of all agents {    }−1=0 . The perceived reaction of the fiscal
policy maker should be consistent with implementing the best response to the known
reaction rule of the private sector and of the monetary policy maker:
 2 = min 
Ã−1X
=0




+ = Π0  +Π0   + = C0  + C0   ++1 = B0  + B0  
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where coeﬃcients Π C and B are the same as in (3.19)-(3.24).
It is straightforward to see that optimization problem (3.45) is equivalent to the
standard discounted LQ problem, described in e.g. Lancaster and Rodman (1995) and
Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972). The revised reaction rule  0
¡¯ 0  ¯ ¢ in
  =  0 =  0
¡¯ 0  ¯ ¢ 
and the corresponding update of the value function  =  ¡¯ 0  ¯ ¢ are consistent with
RE equilibrium by construction.
The corresponding revision map  0 = T (¯ 0) has at most one10 stationary fixed point
which is always locally stable, see Lancaster and Rodman (1995), see also Dennis and
Kirsanova (2012) where the same fact is proved for the LQ RE models with single policy
maker.
3.5 Policy Interactions
In this section we study how an increase in the length of the fiscal cycle aﬀects the
economy under discretionary policy. Dynamic complementarities play a crucial role in
shaping the dynamics of the economy once the fiscal cycle becomes longer.
We start with the known case of frequent monetary and fiscal policy stabilization.11
We use this example to discuss the transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policy
interactions.
We continue with the case of biannual fiscal optimization, which enables us to demon-
strate how the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of consequent mon-
etary policy makers within the fiscal cycle results in multiple discretionary equilibria and
potential expectation traps. We also demonstrate that the agents are likely to coordinate
on the best equilibrium.
10Because of discounting the stationary solution may not exist.
11See Blake and Kirsanova (2011) for a general form solution to this class of problems.
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These two cases help us to investigate the more complex case of annual fiscal opti-
mization, which is arguably the most empirically relevant case. We demonstrate how
the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of monetary and fiscal pol-
icy makers leads to expectation traps. Although we demonstrate that in this case the
coordination problem is likely to be resolved as well, as all agents are more likely to
coordinate on the best equilibrium, we also show that the existence of these equilibria is
very sensitive to the parameterization of the model and to the length of fiscal cycle. We
argue that actions of the fiscal policy maker should be restricted to some extent, as this
ensures the existence of good equilibrium outcome for a wide range of parameterization
of the model and policy scenarios, as well as for longer fiscal cycle.
3.5.1 Quarterly Fiscal Stabilization
In the standard case of frequent stabilization both policy makers operate at the same
quarterly frequency. The model is simple enough to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 13 If 0    1   0   0 then a stationary discretionary equilibrium
exists and unique
Proof. The system of first order conditions (2.53), (2.55), (3.25), (2.27), (2.28) and
(3.31) can be written as follows (where we omit the index ):
 = −
(κ − )  −  
(κ − )2 + + 22 
(3.46)
 = −
(κ − ) ( − ) + 2 
(κ − )2 + + 22 
(3.47)
  = −((κ − )  +  − ) ( + (κ − ) ) + 
((κ − )  +  − )2 + 2 + 2 (1 + )2 
(3.48)
− 1
 (1 +  ) (1− )
((κ − )  +  − )2 + 2 + 2 (1 +  )2 
 = ( + (κ − )  + ((κ − )  + ( − ))  ) (3.49)
 = 2 +  ( +  )2 + 1 (1−  −  (1 + )  )
2 (3.50)
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Introduce new variable,  =  +  . Using several substitutions we transform
the system of first order conditions (3.46)-(3.50) into the system of two equations in
{   + }:
 (   + ) =  +  (κ − ) (  + ) + (κ − )2 (  + ) = 0 (3.51)
  (   + ) = (  + )2 − − (κ − )
2
 (  + )−
(1− ) (κ − )2
 2 = 0(3.52)
Equation (3.52) only depends on  =  + and always has exactly one positive solution
as the free term is negative.
The unique positive root satisfies
1
 |1−  ( +  )|  1 (3.53)
or equivalently 1−    +   1+ so that the equilibrium is stationary. To see
this, note that if + is the positive root, then − = − ¡(1− ) (κ − )2¢  ( 2+) 
and  (+ + −) + = 1 + (1− ) (κ − )2  ¡ 22+¢  0 (i) We show that   +
  (1− )  . Indeed, suppose ˜+ = (1− )  ˜+ is not the positive root to (3.52);
if it was the positive root then the negative root would be ˜− = − (κ − )2  ()
and their sum should have been equal to the negative linear coeﬃcient but ˜+ + ˜− ¡− (κ − )2¢  ()  Moreover, any ˜+  (1− )  is not a root of (3.52), because
 (+ + −) +  0 (ii) We show that   +   (1 + )  . Indeed, suppose ˜+ =
(1 + )  ˜+ is not the positive root to (3.52); if it was the positive root then the
negative root would be ˜− = − (1− ) (κ − )2  ( (1 + )) and their sum ˜+ + ˜− ¡− (κ − )2¢  ()  Moreover, any ˜+  (1 + )  is not a root of (3.52), because
 (+ + −) +  0
Panel I in Figure 3.2 presents constraints (3.51)-(3.52) in {   + } space. Solu-
tion to equation (3.52) is plotted with the dashed line, and solution to equation (3.51) is
plotted with solid line. The unique equilibrium is labelled  in Panel I in Figure 3.2 and
its characteristics are given in Table 3.2.
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Panel I: Analytical Solution
 
 






















































Figure 3.2: Unique Equilibrium in Frequent Fiscal Optimization Model
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Equilibria
Eq. A Eq. B
Frequent Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy [ ] [08671] —
Monetary Policy [] [−00657] —
Private Sector [] [00048] —
Normalized Loss  1.0000 —
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] —
Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy [ 0 ;  1 ] [079; 096] [357; 3472]
Monetary Policy [0 ;1 ] − [641; 687]× 10−2 [272; 4836]× 10−2
Private Sector [0 ;1 ] [47; 50]× 10−3 [238; 07]× 10−3
Normalized Loss  0.9956 18.8413
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] [Y,N,N]
Annual Fiscal Stabilization
Fiscal Policy [ 0 ;  1 ;  2 ;  3 ] [071; 084; 104; 136] [123; 172; 287; 902]
Monetary Policy [0 ;1 ;2 ;3 ] − [62; 70; 79; 83]× 10−2 − [010; 013; 017; 035]
Private Sector [0 ;1 ;2 ;3 ] [46; 52; 57; 60]× 10−3 − [08; 10; 14; 23]× 10−2
Normalized Loss  1.0256 2.0068
IE-stability [PS,JF,J] [Y,Y,Y] [Y,Y,N]
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Equilibrium  is IE-stable under all types of learning discussed in Section 3.4, and
we report this in Table 3.2.
It is easy to see that because equilibrium  is stationary, i.e. 1 |1−  (  + )|  1
then equation (3.32) implies that the fix-point of T is locally stable under the PS-
learning.
IE-stability under the JF-learning plays an important role in the analysis of cases
with longer fiscal cycle. Using the fact that all equilibria are IE-stable under the L-
learning, and replicating the steps of the revision process of all agents who are learning,
helps us to discover RE equilibria in this and more complex cases with longer fiscal cycle.
We illustrate this process in Panel II of Figure 3.2. Suppose the fiscal policy maker
considers implementing policy   which is not necessarily optimal. In response to this
policy the followers learn their optimal response {  }. Their learning problem is
equivalent to the joint learning in the single-policymaker setting, which is discussed in
details in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) and Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). If   = 0 then
the fiscal policy maker does not respond to debt and there is unique set {  }
which describes the case in which the monetary policy maker and the private sector
coordinate on the reaction so that in response to higher debt the monetary policy maker
generates high demand and accommodates high inflation so that debt is quickly steered
back to its equilibrium level. The corresponding positive  is plotted in the left chart
in Panel II. If    0 and suﬃciently large then the process of debt stabilization is tightly
controlled by fiscal policy and in response to higher debt the monetary policy maker and
the private sector coordinate on the response {  } in which the demand is lowered
and inflation is not accommodated. The corresponding positive  is plotted in the left
chart in Panel II.12 If   is moderate, both types of responses of the monetary policy
maker and the private sector exist, as shown in the left chart in Panel II. In response
to each {  }  ∈ {} the fiscal policy maker can learn its optimal response
12There is close resemblance between these two partial equilibria and ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary
policy described in Leeper (1991).
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 ∗   ∈ {}. For each set {  } the response ∗ is unique if it exists, see Section
3.4.4. Therefore, for an initial guess   we find the update in the revision process of the
fiscal policy maker  ∗ ( )  We plot  ∗ =  ∗ ( ) for a range of initial guesses and for
each equilibrium reaction {  }  ∈ {} in the right chart in Panel II in Figure
3.2 with the solid line. By construction, all points of intersection of this line with the 45
line are the points of discretionary equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning
by construction.
The result of Proposition 13 on the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not obvious if the
model has dynamic complementarities between action of the economic agents (Cooper
and John, 1988). Optimal actions of the monetary authority and of the aggregated
private sector can be dynamic complements. Suppose the reaction of fiscal policy is given
and fixed at  ∗  For a given reaction of the private sector  in  =  the monetary
policy finds the optimal response by solving the corresponding Bellman equation, taking
into account its intra-period leadership. If  is suﬃciently high (low) then in response
to higher-than-steady-state debt the monetary policy maker optimally raises demand.
Greater tax base leads to higher tax collection and reduces the level of debt towards the
steady state. Inflation starts moving back to the steady state. We plot this U-shaped
optimal reaction function  =  () in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3.3
with the solid line. In its turn, the optimal reaction of the private sector  =  () is
increasing in  If the debt is higher than its steady state level and the monetary policy
maker generates higher demand, the total eﬀect of the higher demand on marginal costs
is always positive, as the tax rate is fixed to ∗  We plot the positively sloped reaction
function  =  () in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3.3 with the dashed
line. Both lines are positively sloped in the area with relatively large , and this can
result in multiplicity of partial equilibria, i.e. in multiplicity of optimal responses of the
monetary authorities and the private sector. Indeed, if we reduce (e.g. halve) the fiscal
feedback   then there are three points of intersection of optimal reactions of monetary
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authorities and the private sector, see the right hand side chart. The case in the left hand
side chart in Panel I corresponds to multiple discretionary equilibria discussed in Blake
and Kirsanova (2012) where the fiscal feedback on debt of non-strategic fiscal policy was
relatively small to guarantee multiplicity of equilibria.














































































Figure 3.3: Dynamic complementarities between agents’ actions
Optimal actions of fiscal policy and the private sector can be dynamic complements
too. Keeping the monetary policy reaction fixed at the optimal level ∗  0 produces
reactions of the fiscal authority   =   () and of the private sector  =  ( ) plotted
in Panel II in Figure 3.3. The reaction of the private sector is positively sloped as higher
tax rate set by the fiscal authority in response to higher debt   always results in higher
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prices set by firms. The reaction curve of the fiscal policy maker is also positively sloped
but only for moderately positive response of inflation to debt,  To understand this,
suppose the debt is higher than its steady state level, due to ∗  0 the demand is
automatically reduced as well as the marginal costs. Lower demand also contributes to
faster debt accumulation. If the response of inflation to debt is only moderately positive,
then the optimal response of taxes to debt rises with stronger response of inflation.
This will keep debt under control, and will not compromise inflation stabilization. As
a result, the reaction curves of the private sector and the fiscal policy maker are both
positively sloped, but only in a relatively narrow area of responses of the private sector.
For our baseline calibration, and given ∗  there are three jointly optimal discretionary
responses of fiscal policy maker and the private sector. However, only one of them results
in discretionary equilibrium in the model, as the other two partial equilibria require
diﬀerent optimal policy response once the monetary policy becomes strategic.
Finally, and most importantly for our study, optimal actions of the monetary and
the fiscal policy makers can also be dynamic complements. Higher tax rate, set by the
fiscal policy maker in response to a high debt level,   , generates greater cost-push
inflation, which increases the marginal return to a monetary policy decision to reduce
demand and contribute to the debt accumulation. The monetary policy reaction function
 =  ( ) is negatively sloped, see Panel III in Figure 3.3. Conversely, a reduction in
response of demand to debt,  makes it optimal to raise taxes in order to prevent too
fast accumulation of debt. As a result, the fiscal policy reaction function   =   () is
also negatively sloped in wide area, see Panel III in Figure 3.3.
The presence of dynamic complementarities is a necessary condition for the multi-
plicity of discretionary equilibria, see King and Wolman (2004) and Blake and Kirsanova
(2012). However this condition is not suﬃcient and, as we argue next, the interaction of
the two mechanisms in the model with frequent fiscal optimization results in the unique-
ness of the equilibrium.
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First, the complementarity between optimal decisions of the private sector and of the
monetary policy maker may result in multiplicity only if fiscal policy optimally responds
to debt only weakly, see Panel I, the right hand chart. The optimal fiscal response  ∗
even to the weak initial guess   is strong enough to rule out the equilibrium with passive
monetary policy.
Second, although the optimal decision of the fiscal policy maker is increasing in the
optimal decision of the monetary policy maker, this dynamic complementarity between
optimal decisions of the two policy makers in case of frequent fiscal optimization is not
strong enough to create the multiplicity.
The following two cases demonstrate how the longer fiscal cycle increases the strength
of dynamic complementarities in the model and how this shapes the optimal outcome of
monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
3.5.2 Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Suppose that both policy makers optimize in even periods, and we index all such periods
with index 0. Only the monetary policy maker optimizes in odd periods, we index such
periods with index 1. To save on notation we use the period index  ∈ {0 1} and use −
to indicate odd periods if  = 0 and even periods if  = 1.
Despite we cannot prove analytically the existence and multiplicity of equilibria, we
can find all discretionary equilibria numerically.
Proposition 14 For the base line calibration of the model two discretionary equilibria
exist.
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Proof. The first order conditions derived in Section 3.3 can be written as
 0 = −Π
0Π0 + 00 + Π10 Π10 + C10 C10 + 2B20 B20 
(Π0 )2 +  (0)2 + 
¡Π10 ¢2 +  ¡C10 ¢2 + 2 ¡B20 ¢2 (3.54)
 1 = 
0
1−  ((1 + 0)  0 + 0) (3.55)
 = −
¡κ − − ¢− −  −¡κ − − ¢2 + + 22 − (3.56)
 = −
¡κ − − ¢ ¡ − − ¢+ 2 −¡κ − − ¢2 + + 22 − (3.57)
0 =  (3.58)
1 = ¡1¢2 +  ¡1 ¢2 + 0 ¡1 ¢2 (3.59)
 = ¡0¢2 +  ¡0 ¢2 +  ³¡1¢2 +  ¡1 ¢2´ ¡0¢2 + 2 ¡0 ¢2 ¡1 ¢2 (3.60)
After multiple substitutions the system of first order conditions (3.54)-(3.60) can be
reduced to the polynomial system of two equations 0 (0   0) = 0 and  0 (0  0) = 0
although at the expense of much complexity. We plot solutions to these equations in
Panel I in Figure 3.4. The curves intersect in two points with  = 0  0 1  0 and
|01 |  1We label these points of intersection as equilibria  and .
Multiplicity of discretionary equilibria implies that following a disturbance, for ex-
ample a higher initial debt level, the economy can follow one of multiple paths, each of
which satisfies conditions of optimality and time-consistency. Each of these paths is asso-
ciated with diﬀerent monetary and fiscal policies; see Figure 3.5 which plots two diﬀerent
adjustment paths following the same initial increase in the debt level. For comparison,
the Figure also includes responses in case of frequent fiscal stabilization.
Suppose the level of debt is above the steady state and fiscal policy raises the tax rate
for two periods. Following the high marginal cost inflation will rise and stay above the
steady state for these two periods. The monetary policy maker will find it optimal to
intervene. The monetary policy maker at time 0 takes into account monetary policy in
period 1. There is a dynamic complementarity between the actions of the two consequent
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Figure 3.4: Discretionary Equilibria in the Biannual Fiscal Stabilization Model
monetary policy makers within the fiscal cycle: the deeper is the future cut in demand,
the bigger payoﬀ the current monetary policy maker gets from engineering high demand
today. A high demand today results in optimal reduction of demand in the future, within
the same fiscal cycle. Two point-in-time equilibria arise. In the first such equilibrium,
the period-0 monetary policy maker will keep the current demand low and the period-1
monetary policy maker does not generate a big cut in demand. In the second equilibrium,
the period-0 monetary policy maker stimulates high demand in anticipation that the
period-1 monetary policy maker will implement a cut in demand. The fiscal policy maker
when choosing policy in period 0, perceives the both possibilities. The optimal fiscal
response in the first point-in-time equilibrium response is to raise the tax rate less than
in the second equilibrium. The strong response of the tax rate in the second equilibrium
generates a ‘zig-zag’ pattern of adjustment: with low two-period-average demand, the
increase in the tax rate generates substantial fall in the stock of debt so that the second
half year cycle ‘mirrors’ the first half year one, but with the opposite sign. Figure
3.5 also demonstrates that in equilibrium  the paths of all variables ‘approximate’ the
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optimal paths of the corresponding variables under frequent optimization, and we shall
call equilibrium  ‘approximating’. We call equilibrium  ‘zig-zag’.
Despite the clearly increased inflation volatility, the loss in the approximating equilib-
rium is slightly lower than it is in the unique equilibrium under frequent optimization, see
Table 3.2. This is mainly due to faster stabilization of the economy in this equilibrium.
The two-period tax rate increase predominantly determines the two-period speed of debt
adjustment |01 | = 064  096 = ||2  This welfare gain of faster stabilization is
slightly higher than the welfare loss of higher volatility. The loss in the ‘zig-zag’ equilib-
rium is much higher than in the ‘approximating’ equilibrium. Not only it generates the
relatively slow speed of adjustment, as |01 | = 079  |01 |  but it also induces
very high volatility of economic variables.
Finally, equilibrium  is IE-stable under all types of learning we consider in this
Chapter. Equilibrium  is not IE-stable under both JF-and J-learning. Panel II in
Figure 3.4 illustrates this.
To summarize, the main conclusion from the example of biannual fiscal stabilization
is the demonstration of the existence of the approximating equilibrium. Although the
other equilibrium exists, the approximating equilibrium delivers the best possible outcome
under the infrequent discretionary fiscal stabilization, and is also the only equilibrium
which is IE-stable under all types of learning we study in this Chapter. In this equilibrium
the monetary policy maker can oﬀset most adverse eﬀects of fiscal infrequency on welfare-
related macroeconomic variables. In the next example we argue that we should not take
this result for granted once the fiscal cycle becomes longer.
3.5.3 Annual Fiscal Stabilization
Multiplicity of Discretionary Policy Equilibria
Building on results in the previous section we present the third example of infrequent
fiscal stabilization. Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant setup in which the
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Panel I: Equilibrium A

































Panel II: Equilibrium B





















frequent Eq. A frequent Eq. B
Figure 3.5: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes
every other period.
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monetary policy maker reoptimizes every quarter, but the fiscal policy maker reoptimizes
only at the beginning of every four quarters.
In this model we are unable to present the system of first order conditions as a system
of two polynomial equations and use the graphical method of finding solutions. We have
to resort to numerical methods and the stability properties to find discretionary equilibria
of interest.
Proposition 15 If the monetary policy maker takes decisions quarterly and the fiscal
policy maker optimizes annually then for the base line calibration of the model there are
two discretionary equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning.
Proof. The proof relies on the use of numerical methods. As discussed in Section 3.5.1
we search for equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning by replicating the steps
of the revision process of all agents who are learning. For every, not necessarily optimal
 0 we find all lim→∞T (¯) = ∗ where ¯ is an initial guess of  = (  )  as explained
in Section 3.4.2.13 For every ∗ we find  0∗ = lim→∞T (¯ 0) for the initial guess ¯ 0  We,
therefore obtain the mapping  0∗ =  0∗ ( 0) which is plotted in Panel I in Figure 3.6 with
the solid line. The curve  0∗ =  0∗ ( 0) intersects the 45 line in two points, labelled 
and . By construction, these points are the points of discretionary equilibria which are
IE-stable under the JF-learning. With further increase in  0 no further equilibria were
discovered.14
The dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of the two policy makers
is responsible for the multiplicity of equilibria. An optimal response of monetary policy
reinforces the action of fiscal policy: higher levels of taxation have a cost-push eﬀect and
so the optimal monetary response is to reduce demand and the tax base. Smaller tax
base requires a higher tax rate to ensure the desired speed of debt stabilization. Both
policy makers can coordinate on either slow or fast correction of the level of debt towards
13The limit is computed numerically with tolerance |+1 − |  10−13.
14In the area of discontinuity in Panel I the time-consistent representation of the fixed tax rate policy
requires infinitely large feedback on debt in the last quarter 3 . No discretionary equilibria exist there.
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Figure 3.6: Discretionary Equilibria
the target. Figure 3.7 illustrates these interactions. Consider equilibrium . Suppose
the initial debt is higher than in the steady state and the tax rate is kept high for four
periods. This implies a steep reduction in debt. The eﬀect of future high tax rates and
high marginal cost creates expectations of high future inflation. If monetary policy does
not oﬀset the eﬀect of fiscal ‘infrequency’ then debt and consumption adjust in a linear
way between the periods of fiscal optimization. The eﬀect of lower consumption is smaller
than the eﬀect of higher tax rate and inflation stays above the frequent optimization
solution benchmark. The tax rate remains high for the four periods and, by the end of the
fourth period, it is much higher than it would be if optimization happened every period.
The tax correction in the fifth period brings inflation down. Figure 3.7 demonstrates
that the ability of the optimal monetary policy to reduce inflation volatility is limited.
Indeed, it is clear from the picture that consumption should go down first and then up
in the first four periods if the inflation humps in first two periods to be eliminated. Such
stabilization results in sub-optimally high volatility of consumption. In what follows we
call equilibrium  ‘slow approximating’. This equilibrium is IE-stable under all types of
learning we consider in this Chapter, lim→∞ T ( 0) =  0   ∈ {  }
Under discretionary equilibrium  the tax rate is initially kept above the frequent-
optimization benchmark. This generates a much steeper reduction of the level of debt
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Panel I: Solution A































Panel II: Solution B
























quarterly fiscal sabilization annual fiscal stabilization
Figure 3.7: Impulse responses and counterfactual simulations. Fiscal policy optimizes
once a year.
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than is observed in the slow approximating equilibrium . The higher tax rate results
in a higher level of inflation and lower consumption. We call equilibrium  ‘fast ap-
proximating’. This equilibrium is not IE-stable under the J-learning but is stable under
the private sector learning and the JF-learning. The IE-stability under the JF-learning
allowed us to locate it, see Figure 3.6.
To summarize, in case of the annual fiscal cycle there are at least two discretionary
policy equilibria. Only two equilibria are IE-stable under the JF-learning. Their existence
is a result of the strong dynamic complementarity between optimal actions under the two
policies, monetary and fiscal, given that fiscal policy uses distortionary taxes as the policy
instrument. However, their existence is likely to be non-robust to the model specification;
this is suggested by Panel I in Figure 3.6. Indeed, equilibria  and  are located on the
same curve  0∗ ( 0)  which may not intersect the 45 line at all. In the next section we
discuss why this may occur.
Existence of Approximating Policy Equilibrium
We argue that the existence of the approximating equilibrium is not robust to changes
in model calibration and to policy scenarios. To communicate the argument we present
several examples.
Fast Stabilization of Debt Consider a policy scenario in which the fiscal policy maker
is assigned an additional target to stabilize debt faster than socially optimal, such as the
new European Fiscal Treaty. Suppose the monetary policy maker is benevolent, but the





 ¡2 + 2 + 2¢ 
If the fiscal policy maker is benevolent, as studied above, then  = 0.
The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends on the calibration of . Both
approximating equilibria do not exist if   0 and is suﬃciently high.15 In order to
15For the benchmark calibration of model parameters this threshold value of  = 00003
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understand this result, consider the familiar scenario of high initial debt. Suppose that
both policy makers are benevolent and we are in the slow approximating equilibrium 
see the left panel in Figure 3.7. If we impose a debt target for fiscal policy, i.e. start
increasing  ≥ 0, the fiscal policy maker will try to speed up the debt stabilization with
an increase in the tax rate relative to the benchmark case of  = 0. The cost-push eﬀect
will increase inflation more and so the monetary policy maker will choose to engineer a
bigger fall in consumption. This, of course, will slow down the speed of debt stabilization
and require an even higher tax rate. The process converges: each additional reduction
in demand requires a smaller increase in the tax rate. Equilibrium exists, and in this
equilibrium the debt is reduced faster than is plotted in the left panel in Figure 3.7.





























































no debt target, quarterly debt target, quarterly debt target, annual
Figure 3.8: The Limiting Case of the Unique Approximating Equilibrium in the Annual
Fiscal Optimization Model
This contrasts with the eﬀect of introducing the debt target in equilibrium. Suppose
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debt is higher than in the steady state by one unit, policy makers are benevolent and we
are in the fast approximating equilibrium  see the right panel in Figure 3.7. Note that
in this equilibrium debt is stabilized with an observed overshooting after the first year.
If we impose a debt target, i.e. start increasing  ≥ 0, then raising the tax rate in the
first several periods becomes counterproductive. If the tax rate is raised higher than in
the  = 0 case, this results in even bigger overshooting of debt, which works towards
destabilizing the debt. In order to ensure faster debt convergence the tax rate has to rise
less and monetary policy has to engineer a smaller fall in consumption. The fiscal policy
maker anticipates that demand will not respond much and will lower the tax rate. This
process converges: each additional reduction in the size of demand cut requires a smaller
reduction in the size of the tax rate increase.
To summarize, with the increasing weight on the debt target equilibria  and  move
towards each other so that the dynamics of the economy in equilibria  and  become
similar. The dynamic of the economy in response to the higher debt level in the limiting
case  =  is plotted in Figure 3.8. For comparison we also plot the result of frequent
stabilization without the debt target.
If the debt target becomes even stronger, then no approximating equilibrium exists.
Any proposed increase of the tax rate  0 results in a strong optimal IE-stable under
the JF-learning response of the other agents within the fiscal cycle. To counteract the
perceived response requires the bigger initial rise  0∗ =  0∗ ( 0)   0 . We can summarize
this outcome in the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 16 For the base line calibration of the model and with suﬃciently high
weight on the debt target of fiscal authorities the approximating discretionary equilibrium
does not exist.
Proof. The proof is numerical. Our iterative approach finds two equilibria under the
base line calibration with  = 0. With an increase in parameter  the two equilibria
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eventually coincide and disappear as  0∗ =  0∗ ( 0) does not intersect the 45 degree line.
This result does not imply that there is no discretionary equilibrium if equilibria
 and  do not exist. Yet another equilibrium might exist. In particular, Panel II in
Figure 3.6 and its similarity with Panel II in Figure 3.4 suggests that ‘zig-zag’ equilibrium
might exist.16 Strategic complementarity between the actions of subsequent monetary
policy makers may lead to a zig-zag adjustment of demand within the fiscal cycle. These
adjustments might be ‘fine tuned’ such that the annual average magnitude of them is
not large enough to provoke the destabilizing increase in the tax rate. However, such
equilibrium is not IE-stable under the JF- and J-learning. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to call
such equilibrium ‘approximating’.
The existing algorithms for finding solutions are not suited to obtaining all possible
equilibria in a complex case with many states. We could only do this for the quarterly
and the biannual models. However, Figure 3.6 makes it clear that the approximating
equilibrium will disappear if the debt target is suﬃciently strong, rather than we suddenly
became unable to locate it numerically. We can be reasonably sure that if an additional
equilibrium exists in the annual optimization model, this equilibrium will not be IE-stable
under the JF- and J-learning, it will also generate a very low level of social welfare because
of the high volatility in macroeconomic variables.
Calibration of the Model The existence of the approximating equilibrium is also
sensitive to the calibration of the model. Calibrations of the model which result in
stronger reactions of monetary and fiscal policies are likely to lead to non-existence of
the approximating equilibrium.
Both approximating equilibria do not exist if the Frisch elasticity labour supply  is
reduced to 2.3, or if the baseline value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
16We cannot use the ‘continuity’ argument as the reaction function of an agent is described by a
rational function, not by a polynomial function.
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is only slightly increased to 035 or if the elasticity of substitution between goods  is
reduced to 5.7 which corresponds to an increase of the mark up to 21%.
All these threshold values of parameters are completely plausible and are within the
range of estimates which are often obtained in empirical studies of aggregated data, as
we argue in Section 2.2.
High Level of Debt The main case discussed in Section 2.2 assumes zero level of the
steady state debt. This assumption reflects the relatively small proportion of the short-
term debt in a typical developed economy, and allows us to present many results in an
analytical way. However, high and persistent level of debt is not uncommon.
We can rewrite our model in the more general form, using interest rate as the monetary
policy instrument, and retaining the possibility to study implications of higher level of
steady state debt. We can demonstrate that the size of the steady state level of debt
aﬀects the strength of the dynamic complementarity. The eﬀect of the nominal interest
rate and inflation on the process of debt accumulation rises linearly with the steady state
level of debt. In response to high inflation the optimal monetary policy will raise interest
rate; both the high (real) interest rate and the consequently low tax base increase the
rate of debt accumulation, and this eﬀect is stronger with higher steady state level of
debt.
The numerical analysis of this scenario produces diagrams that are remarkably similar
to the case of the debt target. If the steady state debt to output ratio reaches approx-
imately 0.25 — which corresponds to short-term debt to annual output ratio of 0.07 —
then discretionary equilibria  and  coincide. With higher debt to output ratio the
approximating equilibrium does not exist.
Frequency of Fiscal Optimization The strength of the dynamic complementarity
depends on the frequency of fiscal optimization. The longer the period between the
reoptimizations the longer the tax rate remains fixed, and the stronger action of monetary
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policy is required in order to oﬀset the adverse eﬀect on inflation when the tax is adjusted.
The approximating discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
Constraining the Fiscal Policy maker In order to preserve the approximating equi-
librium the strength of the complementarity should be reduced. One way to achieve this






 ¡2 + 2 +  2¢ 
If  is not too large then this policy results in the unique IE-stable under the JF-learning
equilibrium. However, if  is suﬃciently large then the complementarity between the
monetary policy maker and the private sector’s actions leads to multiplicity, very similar
to the result in Dennis and Kirsanova (2012). Panel III in Figure 3.6 demonstrates
the outcome when  = 01 There are two stationary equilibria, both of which are
IE-stable under all types of learning which we consider. If fiscal policy does not react
to debt suﬃciently strongly — in this case because it is constrained — then the agents
can either coordinate on equilibrium  in which the private sector does not expect the
monetary policy maker reacts to debt but stabilized inflation and the monetary policy
maker validates these expectations, or they can coordinate on equilibrium  in which
the private sector expects the monetary policy maker accommodates inflationary shocks
but ensures fast stabilization of domestic debt and the monetary policy maker validates
these expectations.
3.6 Conclusion
This Chapter studies the implications of infrequent discretionary fiscal optimization for
the stabilization of the economy, assuming dynamic interactions of monetary and fiscal
policy makers where both policy makers are benevolent and the fiscal policy maker uses
distortionary taxes to stabilize the economy. We demonstrate the presence of dynamic
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complementarity between the optimal monetary and fiscal policies. A higher tax rate,
which is required to stabilize higher debt, will have a cost-push eﬀect. The optimal
monetary policy response to this will generate a reduction in demand and in the tax
base, and faster debt accumulation. Anticipating this, the fiscal authorities will wish to
raise tax rates further.
If both policies operate with the same frequency, this reinforcement mechanism is
weak and does not lead to adverse eﬀects. However, with longer fiscal cycle, the eﬀect
of this mechanism is greatly amplified. If the length of fiscal cycle is not too long then
expectation traps arise. With more periods between fiscal reoptimizations and with
stronger reinforcement mechanism an (IE-stable) discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
We demonstrate the latter outcome for many practical scenarios. We argue, therefore,
that the fiscal policy maker who reoptimizes only infrequently should be constrained. A
moderate penalty on variability of the fiscal instrument can be suﬃcient to reduce the
degree of dynamic complementarity between the actions of the two policy makers.
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Chapter 4
Infrequent fiscal policy with
Blanchard Yaari consumers
In this Chapter, by employing Blanchard-Yaari type of overlapping generations instead
of infinite living households, I extend the framework of optimal policy design with in-
frequent fiscal policy, which was developed in Chapter 3, to investigate the interactions
among central bank, government and aggregated private sector, as well as the dynamic
macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary and fiscal policy.
To focus on the impact of infrequent fiscal policy and overlapping generation with the
tax as fiscal instrument and interest rate as monetary instrument, we continue to assume
that government spending G is exogenous and constant.
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter Two, we analyzed the macroeconomic impacts of infrequently optimized fiscal
policy. We demonstrated that the longer fiscal period strengthened the conflicts between
monetary and fiscal policy, which makes the economy more sensitive to the debt increase,
the existence of learnable time-consistent equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.
These results were found under the assumption of infinitely lived households. Yet this
limiting case eliminates the direct eﬀect of debt on the households’ consumption pattern.
It is of interest to investigate how the consequences of interactions between monetary
and infrequent fiscal policy, with presence of higher-than-steady-state debt, discussed
101
in the previous Chapter will change if the households have mortality instead. In this
case government debt aﬀects aggregate consumption dynamics. Due to this property,
theoretical studies of fiscal policy and its interaction with monetary policy under the
overlapping generations’ assumption have been increasing. This Chapter builds the new
Keynesian framework with infrequent fiscal policy into a Perpetual Youth model to assess
how inter-generational redistributions of wealth and the frequency of policy optimization
impact the economic consequences of accumulated government debt. The representative
households are assigned an identical constant mortality rate, regardless of age.
It is known that a higher steady state debt-GDP ratio reinforces the dynamic com-
plementarity between fiscal and monetary policies, makes the economy more diﬃcult to
be stabilized. A positive mortality rate introduces direct impacts of changes in debt,
inflation and propensity of consumption on aggregate consumption. We modified the set-
up of overlapping generations which was modelled through the Blanchard-Yaari (Yaari
(1965); Blanchard (1985)) version. Two opposite eﬀects on the conflicts between policy
makers emerge: positive eﬀect of debt increase on aggregate consumption strengthen-
ing the conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy, and negative impact of inflation
on aggregation consumption weakening dynamic complementarities of these two policy
makers. Whether the transmission paths of the economic variables back to the steady
states will be more volatile or not depends on which eﬀect dominates. Using standard
calibration, our impulse responses results show that the conflicting eﬀect dominates the
stabilizer eﬀects.
The remainder of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the economic
model. Section 3 establishes the existence of steady states and summarizes the dynamic
linearized system around these steady states. Section 4 discusses the analytical intuition
of the model. Section 5 listed the calibration of the structural parameters. Section 6
delivers the numerical results and discussion of the main results in this Chapter. Technical
parts and proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
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4.2 The Model
Under a Blanchard-Yaari framework, in which individuals have an exogenous, identical,
constant death probability every period and households enjoy a perpetual youth, we
modified the now-mainstream macro policy model discussed in Woodford (2003a) to
take account of the fiscal policy and monetary policy eﬀects. It is a closed economy
model with two policy makers, the fiscal and monetary authorities. Here fiscal policy is
allowed to support monetary policy in stabilization of the economy around the steady
state, and re-optimize with a less frequent rate. The labor supply decision is endogenous.
Consumption goods are produced by monopolistic competitive firms who set price in a
Calvo sticky price style. Households are benefit from an exogenous government spending
and receive lump-sum transfers from the government who finance them by nominal debt
and distortionary tax on households income.
4.2.1 Households
Individuals
The economy is inhabited by a large number of households who specialize in the pro-
duction of a diﬀerentiated good (indexed by ) which cost them () of eﬀort. They
consume a basket of goods and derive utility from per capita government consumption.
Each household faces a constant death probability .  is time preference rate, which
is assumed the same value as the intertemporal discount factor applied by infinite living
households. In order to focus on the impact of distortionary tax, government spend-
ing and lump-sum transfers are assumed to be constant and excluded from households
utility function for simplicity. When  = 0 the model reduces to the infinitely lived
representative households setup in the last Chapter.
At time , the representative household born at time  chooses consumption of goods
 and the eﬀorts, which is measured by the working hours  () put to produce the








[(  )− ( () )] (4.1)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
∞X
=
E() ≤ A +H (4.2)
where () is the utility the household derived from consumption, and () is the
disutility caused by working.  is the stochastic discount factor by which the value
of nominal income in time T is determined in time t. For simplicity, we assume the
particular utility functions as: 
(  ) = (
)1−1
1− 1 (4.3)
( () ) = κ (
)1+1
1 + 1 (4.4)
Here  is stochastic shocks.  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e. the
inverse of the household’s relative risk aversion.  influences the decision on delaying
consumption, it can be seen as a measure of the responsiveness of the growth rate of
the future consumption to the compensated real interest rate;  is the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, which indicates the sensitivity of labor supply to real wage. Nominal
human capital H is the nominal present value of the expected total future after-tax





(1 −  ) (() () +())  +  )  is the
aggregate price level,  = R 10 ()() () is the price of a diﬀerentiated good z
while () is the consumption level of good z. A is the household’s nominal financial
assets, we assume no physical capital in this model, so A = B the government debt.
  is the proportional income tax rate1. () is the nominal wage rate the household
1it would make no diﬀerence if assuming the share of total output that the government collected is
from revenue tax instead of labor income tax, as income tax will be transfered to firm’s total revenue via
wage level required. The final impact of income tax and revenue tax on the price setting decision would
be the same.
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takes, () is the profit the household receives from the firms invested, T is a constant
lump-sum tax or subsidy from the government.  is a stochastic discount factor which
determines the compensation the household in time t requires if postpone consumption
and carry the state-contingent amount A of wealth from time t to time v. As was
pointed out by Yaari (1965), expected future utility is discounted both because of pure
time preference and life-time uncertainty.
First-order conditions for household’s utility maximisation show that:
() = κ (
)1 ()1 
(1−  ) (4.5)



































where Π++1 = ++1+ is the ratio of price levels at two successive times.
2There are other ways to define this nominal stochastic discount factor. For example, Farmer, Nourry
and Venditti (2011) derived an expression for the pricing kernel in Blanchard-Yaari economy. They set
 as the price of the security that pays one unit of the consumption commodity to price the cash flows.
Their results allow for aggregate shocks in an internally consistent way. However the main part of this
Chapter focuses on deterministic case, for simplicity of the model, I assume the aggregated +1is the
same as the individual stochastic discount factor.
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An individual’s consumption and wealth for a generation born at time  :
(A +H ) =  +
∞X
=+1
 = Φ (4.8)
where




















We define propensity to consumption as the proportion of total resources, composed
of human capital and financial assets, the household spend on consumption. Φ represents
the reverse of propensity to consumption. Positive probability of death, , reduces the




Applying the same method as Blandchard, we assume that at any time the fraction of
total population of a new-born generation s is  which implied that the size of gener-






We aggregate all relationships across all generations


































¡A−1 + (1− ) −  ¢




 ((1−  ) +   ) = 1+1 (H












(() () +()) 
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Aggregating relationship (4.8) yields:
 = 1Φ (A
 +H ) 
To derive a dynamic Euler equation for aggregate consumption, we move this equation





















1 +  (A
 + (1−  ) −  )
so when  is a positive number, higher real government debt pushes the financing
of government expenditures onto future generation, which has a positive wealth eﬀect
on consumption of living generations. This relationship between real government debt
and aggregate consumption, which only exist with finite-living households, is critical for
understanding the aggregate consequences of debt accumulation with the infrequent fiscal
policy.
4.2.2 Firms
The market is monopolistically competitive, the representative firm in the production
sector employs labour and produces goods z, at time t, it discounts future profit with 







 ( ()  ()− ()) 
subject to the production function:
 () =  () 
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Each producer of good  understands that sales depend on the demand it faces  (),
which is a function of prices, elasticity of demand  and aggregate output   . Intra-






and each period firms are able to reoptimize their prices with probability 1 − , so
that their prices remain fixed as last period with probability :
 () = ∗ ()
+1 () =
½ ∗ ()  with prob +1 ()  with prob1− 
Profit maximisation problem can be split into to separate problems: decision on hours
of labour required to minimize cost intra-temporally and choice on prices to maximize
present value of expect future profit.
Employment
Firm  choose how much labor it will employ to minimize nominal cost:
min()
( ())
subject to the production constraint
 () =  () 
we denote ∆ = R ³() ´−  as price dispersion, which is the variation in prices across






















Therefore the real marginal cost is
 =  =

 =
κ ( )1 ()1
(1−  )
Price setting
Firm  chooses a price at time  to maximize the expected discounted present value of
profit, with wages independent on index (), as labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile






 ( ()  ()− ())
subject to:




 () = ∗ ()
+1 () =
½ ∗ ()  with prob +1 ()  with prob 1− 








In a equilibrium, all producers make identical decisions, first order condition with

























where is Π = −1 is the ratio of price level at time t and time (t-1) and
 =  + EΠ(1+1)+1 +1
 =  + EΠ−1+1+1





 = ()− 1  







The government finances its deficit by short-term nominal bonds, The evolution of the
nominal debt B accumulation is:
B+1 = (1 + )(B + −  ) (4.12)
in which  is assumed to be constant in real term so it is not used to balance the budget
or stabilize the economy;   is set to ensure that any increases in the market value of
debt are met with the expectation that future taxes will raise by enough to match the
higher debt and retire it back to its stationary level; and  is responsible to inflation
stabilization.  is the only state variable in our model.
4.2.4 Market clearing condition
Equilibrium requires the national total output equals to household consumption plus
government spending each period:
 =  +
as we assume no physical investment. The equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of
prices, {Π }∞=0 and quantities,
n




4.2.5 Steady States and Linearized System
We assume at steady state, price is constant, i.e. Π = 1  6= 0. The steady state value
















 = κ(1 + 1) ( +)
1+1
(1− ) (1− )
 = 
− 1 ( +)
(1− )
∆ = 1
 = −(1 + ) (−  ( +))
 =  = −
(1 + ) (1−  − )
 (4.13)
 =  (1−  − )
 −  (1−  − ) (1 + ) (1 + )1−
 (1 + )− (1 + )− (1 + ) (4.14)
where  =  and  = (1− ) due to  =  +
To focus on the impact of the dynamic complementarity which is caused by discre-
tionary tax and interest rate on the economy where the fiscal policy maker can only set
the tax rate less frequent than monetary policy can decide on the interest rate, we assume
the government spending is constant. Therefore, linearization around Π = 1 and  6= 0
steady states yields the deterministic system:
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+1 = (1 + )
³
 − ˆ − ˆ −  ˆ 
´
+ ˆ (4.15)







(1− ) ˆ 
¶
(4.16)
ˆ = [(1 + )]− Φ
³
+1 − ˆ+1 − Φˆ+1
´
+ [(1 + )]−ˆ+1 (4.17)
− (ˆ − +1) (4.18)
Φˆ = ((1 + ))

(1 + )(1 + )Φˆ+1 −
(1− ) ((1 + ))
(1 + )(1 + ) (ˆ − +1) (4.19)
When  = 0 and  = 0this final system reduces to be the same as in the previous
Chapter, where an increase in debt leads to higher tax, followed by higher inflation
therefore higher interest rate to depress consumption, and unavoidably reduces tax-base
and eﬀect of tax on inflation, which induces an even stronger tax rate. When  = 0
and   0the debt will influence household consumption dynamics, however, this extra
impact can be oﬀset completely by a corresponding higher interest rate alone. It is not
the case with   0when interest rate changes the debt accumulation directly as well as
through consumption. The inter-generational wealth transfer is of most interest when the
households have financial assets, hence we loose up our previous assumption of zero debt
steady state and investigate the more usual case when steady state level of government
debt is positive, i.e.  is no longer zero.
4.2.6 Policy Makers
There are two policy makers in our economy: a monetary authority setting the nominal
interest rate  and a fiscal authority determining the rate of proportional tax on household
income  , as we assume government spending and transfers are constant in real terms so
they are not used to balance the budget or stabilize the economy. In our framework the
monetary policy maker reoptimizes every period while the fiscal policy maker decides once
every periods, 1 ≤  ∞We refer to the period between fiscal reoptimizations as the
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fiscal cycle. We denote the set of numbers  congruent to a modulo  as [] . There are
exactly  diﬀerent sets [] We shall identify these sets with the corresponding residue:
[] =  so  denotes the time period after the latest fiscal reoptimization. Both the
monetary and fiscal policy makers optimize in period 0 = [0] , and fiscal policy maker
makes decision before monetary policy maker, i.e. fiscal leadership. Only the monetary
policy maker optimizes in periods [1] ,..,[ − 1] , which are labelled  = 1   − 1.
As quantitative impact of the perpetual youth set-up depends on the planning horizon
of households, the deviation of welfare metric from that in standard Ramsey set-up may
be non-trivial. We assume the benevolent policy makers take into account the welfare loss
of the future unborn generations as well as living generations. (Calvo and Obstfeld, 1988)
defined the social welfare function consisting two parts: the total utility of representative
unborn generations and the total utility of currently living households. Both of them
are discounted back to the time when the current generations were born, instead of
the current period. By treating generations symmetrically, this method can avoid the
time inconsistency in preferences, also spit the problem into an intratemporal one across
generations at a given point in time, and an intertemporal one over time.
However, in this Chapter the prime interest is the macroeconomic impact of the inter-
generational wealth transfer of debt, so I focus on the intertemporal problem. Assuming
a weighting scheme to equalize the welfare of aggregated overlapping generations and the
infinitely lived households can be implemented, the policy makers ignore the distribution
of variables across generation at a given period.
Therefore the benevolent policy makers are assumed to minimize the discounted sum
of all future losses of social welfare, which is the same social welfare loss function as in









− ¡2+ + 2+¢
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Where + = + and  is chosen as if the household will live forever.
Following the same set-up as on page 67-68 in the last Chapter, The monetary policy
maker’s problem in period  = 0  −1 can be described by the same Bellman equation
as Equation (3.11), where the value function depends on the number of periods passed
since the last fiscal optimization:
2+ = min
¡¡2+ + 2+¢+  2+1¢ (4.20)
While the fiscal policy maker only optimizes in periods [0] , at the time  when
optimization happens, the infrequently adjusted fiscal policy aims to solve the Bellman
equation:
 2 = min 
Ã−1X
=0
 ¡2+ + 2+¢+  2+
!
(4.21)
 is the length of fiscal cycle, at the beginning of which the tax rate is set, then it
stays at the constant level until the fiscal period finishes. As leader fiscal policy maker
will take into account both the reaction of private sector and the monetary policy to fiscal
policy.
As there is only one state variable-the government debt, the policy actions can be
expressed as feedback coeﬃcients on the debt:
+ = + +  + = ( +  ) + (4.22)
 + =   =   =  + (4.23)
Where  = 1   − 1
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4.3 Analytical Intuition
The critical diﬀerence brought in by Blanchard-Yaari type of consumers is the inter-
generational wealth transfer, which makes the debt level, inflation and propensity to
consume relevant to households’ consumption decision.
We discussed the existence of dynamic complementarity between the action of central
bank optimally concentrate on inflation stabilization and the action of government focus-
ing on stabilizing debt in the last Chapter: increased tax rate induced by above steady
state debt level has cost-push eﬀect on prices, to bring the inflation down, a higher inter-
est rate is needed, but this reduces tax base and weakens the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy.
A positive steady state debt level introduces a direct impact from interest rate change
and inflation on debt accumulation; the higher , the stronger positive eﬀect of interest
rate on debt.
The system 4.15-4.19 shows that higher mortality rate has two opposite eﬀects on this
conflict we described.
On the one hand, positive probability of death increases the conflicts of the two
authorities which lead to a higher degree of dynamic complementarity. The higher the
mortality rate, the more likely that the living generations, who benefit from increased
government debt, will die before taxes come due. Due to the expected shift of the tax
burden onto future generations, debt as a financial asset owned by households has a
positive wealth eﬀects on living generations consumption at time t. Equation (4.17)
shows that a higher debt generates a higher consumption for the living generation. This
pushed-up aggregate demand will increase the inflation, on top of the cost-push eﬀect of
raised tax rate aiming to reduce debt.
In the positive steady state debt case, a positive  makes the task of inflation sta-
bilization more diﬃcult not just by causing higher inflation but also by reducing the
eﬀectiveness of the interest rate. Higher interest rate is imposed to lower the inflation, by
depressing current consumption through intertemporal substitution eﬀect. This policy
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needs to enlarge the gap between interest rate and expected future inflation, shown in
Equation (4.17). In the meantime this gap also raises the propensity of consumption (see
the last term of Equation (4.19)) and consumption (via the term −Φˆ+1 in Equation
(4.17)). The household with financial assets can benefit from higher interest rate and
have higher propensity to consume in current period. This cancels out some of the eﬀect
from the interest rate to consumption. Therefore, in order to achieve the same reduction
in the consumption (via the last term − (ˆ − +1) in Equation (4.17))as in the infinite
agents’ case, Central bank has to set an even higher interest rate.
With  6= 0 this higher interest rate has stronger eﬀect on debt which leads to
stronger reaction of the fiscal policy, tax raises by more. Followed by this larger cost-
push, the task of inflation stabilization becomes heavier, interest rate will rise higher.
The dynamic complementarity between monetary policy and fiscal policy is strengthened.
This magnifies the volatility introduced by an infrequently optimized fiscal policy, and
further weakens the power of policy instruments on stabilizing the economy.
On the other hand, Blanchard-Yaari consumers may lessen the conflicts we described.
There are two stabilizer eﬀects emerged due to a positive p. The first one is between debt
and consumption. Although higher debt increases consumption and output, a higher tax
base helps to reduce the debt. The second one is between inflation and consumption.
When  6= 0, the finitely lived agents feel poorer when higher inflation happens, because
it reduces real financial wealth, which imposes negative wealth eﬀects. The shorter the
planning horizon, the stronger this negative wealth eﬀect from positive inflation is. The
living generations will reduce their consumption, which contributes to stabilize inflation.
These two mechanisms may take some pressure oﬀ debt and inflation stabilization of the
policy makers’ shoulders.





Discount rate of pure time preference  0.99 —
Calvo parameter  0.75 —
Consumption share in national income  0.75 —
Intertemporal elasticity  0.3 [0.1, 1.3]
Frisch elasticity of labour supply  3.0 [0.3,4]
Elasticity of substitution between goods  11.0 [6,11]
4.4 Calibration and Solution Technique
The model is calibrated the same as in the previous Chapter except for debt-output ratio
and mortality rate, summarized in Table 4.1. The model is highly stylized and involves
relatively few parameters. We take the monetary policy frequency to be quarterly and
calibrate the model at a quarter frequency. Our debt level,  = 0.1, corresponds to
2.5% of annual output, which is less than the level of debt in a number of European
economies. However, we only consider one-period debt, so the figure of 2.5% is large
enough to demonstrate qualitative diﬀerence with  = 0, which corresponds to 0% of an-
nual output and which we treat as benchmark case. Morality rate p measures households’
life expectancy by definition, which is around 0.5% if we consider 50 years of working
time as a reasonable number. However, households can be myopic and only make deci-
sions considering shorter planning horizon. Therefore a higher value for p is also justified
to examine how greater deviations from Ricardian equivalence due to shorter planning
horizon impact equilibrium outcomes on top of infrequent fiscal policy. We considered
 = 005 and  = 01 to investigate the sensitivity of .
4.5 Numerical Results
In this section, our numerical results show that the presence of inter-generational redistri-
butions of wealth increase the volatility of debt and inflation and further compromise the
eﬀectiveness of the macro control policies with infrequent fiscal policy. The consequential
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danger of this is that the existence of equilibrium become even more fragile.
4.5.1 Benchmark case
We assume that in our benchmark case households live infinitely and steady state level
of debt is zero. The corresponding impulse responses of economic variables following an
surprisingly increased debt are shown by solid line in Figure (4.1). A higher than steady
state debt causes the action of fiscal authority, the tax rate is increased. This has a cost-
push eﬀect on price level, to combat higher inflation, central bank raises interest rate
to press the consumption down. Although a lower aggregate demand stabilize inflation,
the shrinking tax base reduces the tax eﬀect on debt which may lead to even higher tax.
However as we discussed in the last Chapter, with two policy makers re-optimise at the
same period, This complementarity is not strong enough to result in multiple equilibrium.
Figure (4.1) illustrates the impulse responses after a sudden high level debt. We use this
as a benchmark to investigate the influence of positive steady state debts and finite lived
households brought on the transition paths to steady states.
4.5.2 Positive Steady State Level of Debt
First, we keep mortality rate constant, and check how the changes in debt can influence
the transition path of the variables to steady state, after an initially higher than steady
state debt happens. Comparing with the benchmark case, a positive steady state debt
imposes a positive influence of interest rate and negative eﬀect of inflation on debt accu-
mulation. Every level of interest rate now leads to higher level of debt, as more future
debt needs to be financed due to the interest rate payment. Fiscal policy maker will
increase tax rate by more, this produces higher inflation which has to be reduced by a
higher interest rate, which adds extra burden on debt stabilization. However, the positive
inflation caused by distortionary tax reduces the real value of debt. But the interest rate
is higher enough to reduce inflation, so the positive eﬀect of an increased interest rate
dominates the negative impact of a positive inflation on debt. This added burden on
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p=0,χ=0 p=0,χ=0.1 p=0.05,χ=0.1 p=0.1,χ=0.1
Figure 4.1: Impulse responses to an initial higher than steady state level of debt with
quarterly fiscal optimization.
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debt will induce a higher tax rate for stabilization. As we discussed before, this reinforce
the monetary action of increasing interest rate more. Therefore, interest rate can influ-
ence inflation via two diﬀerent path: directly through demand reduction, and indirectly
through helping fiscal policy reduce debt to result a lower tax rate and a lower overall
marginal cost. With relatively moderate debt level, optimal monetary policy maker raises
interest rate because it is the more eﬀective method to achieve targeted inflation. The
impulse responses of the case with infinitely lived households and positive steady state
debt,  = 01, is represented by the dashed line in Figure (4.1), showing that the policies
are implemented with a larger magnitudes, responded by stronger changes with faster
return to steady states in the other economic variables.
4.5.3 Increased Mortality Rate
If steady state level of debt is zero, a higher p requires a higher interest rate as agents
discount future more; a higher portion of total wealth will be consumed; as current
consumption has no change, the total human resources as well as total resources are
lowered. However the inter-generational wealth transfer has no eﬀect on transition path
of tax, debt, inflation and consumption at all. Therefore, to facilitate the analysis of
the mortality rate impact on transition path toward the steady state, we fix steady state
level of debt at  = 01, then simulate impulse responses with diﬀerent length of planning
horizon, the results are illustrated by the crossed line with a lower p=0.05 and the dotted
line with a higher p=0.1 in Figure (4.1).
Although by strict definition value of p is around 0.02, higher values for the probabil-
ity of death can account for agents being myopic. Higher values for p are also justified to
examine how greater deviations from Ricardian equivalence due to shorter planning hori-
zon impact equilibrium outcomes. When mortality rate is larger, any fluctuations from
target are stronger and the monetary authority’s ability to control inflation is weakened,
regardless of the presence of an infrequent fiscal policy. Increased volatility stems from
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the wealth eﬀects created by unexpected raised debt. When agents restrict their planning
horizons, government liabilities are seen as additional wealth.
Figure (4.1). shows that, in this case a shorter planning horizon of the households
induces stronger policy feedbacks on debt deviation. With a positive probability of death
(and non-zero debt steady state value), debt, inflation and the propensity to consumption
become determinants of current consumption change ˆ, and their influences on ˆ are
increasing with mortality rate . The reverse of the proportion of current consumption
in total resources Φˆ has a negative relationship with the diﬀerence between interest rate
and the expected inflation in the next period, this relationship is weakened with a higher
.
We illustrated in the previous Chapter that the dynamic complementarities between
monetary policy and fiscal policy after a surprising raise of debt plays an important
role in equilibrium analysis. Fiscal authority will set a higher tax in order to stabilize
debt, which will induce a higher marginal cost followed by mounting inflation. Monetary
policy takes action to reduce inflation by increasing interest rate so as to lower aggregate
demand. However, higher interest rate in a positive steady state level of debt together
with a lowered tax base contributes to debt accumulation and may significantly weaken
the impact of fiscal policy on debt reduction. Fiscal authority increases its action, i.e.
higher feedback of tax rate on debt, as a response to the monetary authority’s increased
action.
With Blanchard-Yaari consumers, this dynamic complementarity is strengthened due
to the stronger influence of debt on inflation. When households have a shorter planning
horizon, debt as a financial asset owned by households increases the current generations’
wealth. The debt influences inflation dynamics not just via fiscal policy but also via in-
creased consumption. Equation 4.17 shows that a higher debt push up aggregate demand
which put extra up-ward pressure on inflation leading to a stronger monetary reaction.
In order to reduce the inflation, central bank chooses to control the demand by raising
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interest rate; with positive steady state debt level, this has a direct impact on future debt:
the real value of future debt will have to increase. Moreover, a higher interest rate enlarges
the gap between itself and the expected next-period inflation, Φˆ is reduced, although
the direct eﬀect from interest rate to consumption dominates here, the eﬀectiveness of
contracting monetary policy on current consumption is weakened. Therefore, a higher
than in the benchmark interest rate is required. So the presence of mortality rates makes
it more diﬃcult for the policy makers to control the economic variables, the dynamic
complementarities get stronger. From the Figure 4.1 we can see that a higher  causes
larger magnitudes of the changes in policy instruments and private sectors actions, with
a faster return to steady states.
As we discussed before, higher expectation of inflation makes the finitely lived agents
feel poorer, as inflation reduces real financial wealth, which imposes negative wealth
eﬀects. Current generations will reduce their consumption which in turn may help sta-
bilizing inflation. Another stabilization eﬀect appears under finite lived households as-
sumption is that the consumption increased with debt may help reduce debt. However,
these eﬀects are relatively weak and were dominated.
When agents face a higher probability of death, their expected lifetimes become fur-
ther misaligned with the government’s infinite planning horizon and wealth eﬀects are
magnified. We next investigate how this aﬀects the responses in the infrequent fiscal
policy framework.
4.5.4 Infrequent fiscal policy
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse responses when  = 01 and  = 005 with diﬀerent length of
fiscal cycle. The impact of longer fiscal cycle to the transition paths is similar comparing
to Panel I in 3.7: Tax rate is fixed during the fiscal period, it is lower than the required
level of tax comparing with the benchmark case when tax rate can be optimized every
period, and higher than the needed level during the latter part of the fiscal period; when
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses with infrequent fiscal policy
the new fiscal period starts, the gap between the tax rate implemented by an infrequent
fiscal policy maker and the tax rate in our benchmark case is relatively large. While tax
rate is not high enough to peg down debt, monetary authority is forced to help stabilize
debt by allowing inflation rises higher than the level in the bench mark case. When the
fixed tax rate is higher than the optimal level in the benchmark case, the interest rate is
raised with a rather large amount to keep inflation under control. Here with a positive
, in the annual case the consumption dropped further in the second period before it
increases, due to the anticipated future higher inflation and lower debt comparing with
the benchmark case.
As 4.1 shows, when the mortality rate is larger, any fluctuations from target are
stronger and the monetary authority’s ability to control inflation is weakened. With
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Figure 4.3: Equilibriums when Fiscal Policy Re-optimise Annually (fiscal cycle = 4 peri-
ods)
the presence of an infrequent fiscal policy, the existence of the equilibrium becomes more
fragile. We take annual fiscal stabilization as an example. In this case,  = 4 in Equation
(4.21). Due to the dynamic complementarity between monetary and fiscal policy makers
that we described, there are two equilibrium. Figure 4.3 illustrates the impact of a higher
steady state debt, and increased mortality rates on these two equilibrium. The impulse
responses in Figure 4.2 corresponds to Point C in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the responses of fiscal policy to debt fluctuation   in both
equilibrium become stronger with increasing  and . Higher feedback on debt is to
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compensate the weaker controlling power of fiscal policy on debt stabilization. This extra
controlling diﬃculty stems from the wealth eﬀects created by unexpected increased debt,
mainly due to that when agents restrict their planning horizons, government liabilities are
seen as additional wealth. We label the equilibrium with smaller   as good equilibrium
as it characterizes smoother transition pathes back to the steady states, approximating
our benchmark case and resulting a smaller social loss. The variables in the other equi-
librium behave as a zig-zag way which cause larger consequential loss, we call it the bad
equilibrium. The sensitivity of   in these two equilibriums to  is diﬀerent. Although
they both move up with increasing , the good equilibrium is much more sensitive than
the bad equilibrium, as shown in Figure 4.3, it moves up faster. Hence, these two equi-
librium are getting closer with increasing . A higher   in the good equilibrium leads
to both stronger fiscal and monetary policy actions. Economy is stabilized faster at the
cost of a larger volatility.
The sensitivity of   to  in the good equilibrium is increasing with , which means
  moves faster and faster. Eventually   causes over-shoot of the variables and behaves
more like the zig-zag equilibrium, until both equilibrium disappear, leave the economy
unstable.
Correspondingly, due to the complementarity between the policy makers, the current
monetary policy maker may choose diﬀerent path to stabilize the inflation, depending
on his expectation of the next monetary policy maker’s decision. When facing an ex-
pected higher than bench mark case tax rate, monetary authority can choose to reduce
the consumption relatively smoothly over period or increase consumption while during
lower-than-benchmark-tax-rate period, then pull it down sharply. Moreover, when the
households have a shorter planning horizon and steady state debt is higher than certain
threshold level, the inflation caused by distortionary tax has a positive net impact on
consumption. This further weakens the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, and may lead to
stagflation where consumption is low with a high inflation. The longer the fiscal period is,
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the more violently the interest rate fluctuates, so do the policy targets: consumption and
inflation. The longer the tax stays higher than needed, the more severe of the stagflation
risk.
4.6 Conclusions
This Chapter extended our previous framework with infrequent fiscal policy to investigate
the impact of finite living households. The shorter planning horizon may strengthen the
dynamic complementarity between monetary and fiscal policy due to a positive eﬀect from
debt on consumption to inflation, or may weaken this complementarity due to automatic
stabilizer created by wealth impact of inflation.
However our results show that with finite living households the problems observed in
the last Chapter get worse. The former impact dominates. Higher mortality rate, or more
myopic households, reduce the eﬀectiveness of policies. Therefore stronger policies have
to be implemented which causes more volatile responses of economic variables. Multiple
equilibriums still exist, the relative good equilibrium is more sensitive to the mortality
rate and both equilibriums disappear with higher , leaves the economy unstable and a




There has been a long history in analyzing the design of optimal macro control policies
aiming to maintain economic stabilization and achieve the social welfare maximization.
Comparing with the rich literature devoted to the impacts of monetary policy on economic
activities, the study of strategic fiscal policy is a relatively new area. Analysis of using
fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool has been receiving more and more
attraction especially since this recent recession. Fiscal policy proposals are typically
motivated by the need to design a powerful stabilization instrument in situations when
monetary policy is constrained. Since the rational expectations revolution in the 1970s,
one important line of research has been the study of the interactions between policy
makers as well as private agents. It is well understood that discretionary policy making
can result in expectation traps and multiple equilibria due to the policy makers inability to
control the expectation of the private sector. There is no doubt that fiscal policy maker
can behave as another strategic player, that the monetary policy maker will take its
action into account while setting monetary policies. This interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy makers can change the policy impacts concluded from previous literature.
If the dynamic complementarity between their actions strengthened due to diﬀerent re-
optimization frequency, debt level or diﬀerent policy targets, the policy regimes which
were considered to be optimal in the absence of them may worse oﬀ the situation and
even lead economy into a turmoil.
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This thesis contributes to the research agenda by providing a better understanding of
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy when the assumptions are changed
and the resulted economic impacts.
Chapter 2 investigates the stabilization bias that arises in a model of monetary and
fiscal policy stabilisation of the economy, when monetary authority implements price level
targeting. We demonstrate that in the low debt case, the monetary price level targeting
unambiguously leads to social welfare gains even if the fiscal authority acts strategically,
faces diﬀerent objectives and has incentives to pursue its own benefit and oﬀset some or
all of monetary policy actions. If the fiscal policymaker is able to conduct itself as an
intra-period leader the welfare gain of monetary price level targeting is particularly large.
However, when steady state debt level is high, price level targeting is not as eﬀective as
in the low debt case in terms of achieving a low inflation expectation; therefore it brings
more volatility when delivering the inflation overshooting. The level of steady state debt
is crucial to the impact of PLT.
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated how the diﬀerent re-optimization frequency between the
policy makers can influence the impact of the policies on economy. We study discretionary
non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilization in a NewKeynesian model, where
the fiscal policymaker uses a distortionary tax as the policy instrument and operates
with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of the instrument. We
demonstrate that longer fiscal cycles result in stronger complementarities between the
optimal actions of the monetary and fiscal policymakers. When the fiscal cycle is not
very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a suﬃciently
long fiscal cycle -one year in our model - no learnable time-consistent equilibrium exists.
Moreover, we show that constraining the fiscal policymaker in its actions may help to
avoid these adverse eﬀects.
Chapter 4 extended the framework in Chapter 3, to study the case of finite living
households. We assigned a mortality rate to the representative households who have
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perpetual youth; this assumption brings in the intergenerational wealth transfer due to
the government debt. We found out that in this case the dominating eﬀect makes the
dynamic complementarity between the policy makers more serious, which leads to an
even worse situation. An infrequent fiscal policy brings more diﬃculties for stabilization
problem when the households are myopic.
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In this section we derive the aggregate supply function needed for Phillips Curve.
The economy is inhabited by a large number of households who specialize in the pro-
duction of a diﬀerentiated good (indexed by ) which cost them () of eﬀort. They
consume a basket of goods and derive utility from per capita government consumption.
 is time preference rate, which is assumed the same value as the intertemporal discount
factor applied by infinite living households. In order to focus on the impact of distor-
tionary tax, government spending and lump-sum transfers are assumed to be constant
and excluded from households utility function for simplicity. When  = 0 the model
reduces to the infinitely lived representative households setup in the last Chapter.
At time , the representative household at time  chooses consumption of goods 
and the eﬀorts, which is measured by the working hours () put to produce the goods




[]− [( )− (() )] (A.1)
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subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
∞X
=
E() ≤ A +H (A.2)
where () is the utility the household derived from consumption, and () is the
disutility caused by working.  is the stochastic discount factor by which the value
of nominal income in time T is determined in time t. For simplicity, we assume the
particular utility functions as: 
( ) = ()
1−1
1− 1 (A.3)
(() ) = κ ()
1+1
1 + 1 (A.4)
Here  is stochastic shocks.  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e. the
inverse of the household’s relative risk aversion.  influences the decision on delaying
consumption, it can be seen as a measure of the responsiveness of the growth rate of
the future consumption to the compensated real interest rate;  is the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, which indicates the sensitivity of labor supply to real wage. Nominal
human capital H is the nominal present value of the expected total future after-tax





(1 −  ) (()() +())  +  )  is the
aggregate price level,  = R 10 ()() () is the price of a diﬀerentiated good z
while () is the consumption level of good z. A is the household’s nominal financial
assets, we assume no physical capital in this model, so A = B the government debt.
  is the proportional income tax rate1. () is the nominal wage rate the household
takes, () is the profit the household receives from the firms invested, T is a constant
lump-sum tax or subsidy from the government.  is a stochastic discount factor which
determines the compensation the household in time t requires if postpone consumption
1it would make no diﬀerence if assuming the share of total output that the government collected is
from revenue tax instead of labor income tax, as income tax will be transfered to firm’s total revenue via
wage level required. The final impact of income tax and revenue tax on the price setting decision would
be the same.
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and carry the state-contingent amount A of wealth from time t to time v. As was
pointed out by Yaari (1965), expected future utility is discounted both because of pure
time preference and life-time uncertainty.
First-order conditions for household’s utility maximisation show that:
() = κ ()
1 ()1 
(1−  ) (A.5)







Where +1 is the nominal individual stochastic discount factor of time  + 1 at time






A firm in monopolistic competition market employs labour and produces goods z, it
discount future profit with  , Nominal wages  are equalized across all firms. A firm
chooses employment and prices to maximize profit, we consider these two parts separately
in the following.
Employment First we consider the firm  chooses how much labor it will employ
to minimize nominal cost:
min()
( ()) (A.8)
subject to the production constraint
 () =  () 
The Lagrangian can be written as:
 = ()−  ( ()−  ())
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
 () = −  = 0
From where
 =  = 
and
 = 
we denote∆ = R ³() ´−  as price dispersion, price dispersion is variation in prices




























() = κ (
)1 ()1 
(1−  ) (A.9)
Price setting Next the firm  chooses a price to maximize the expected profit,
with wages independent on index z, as labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile and so






 ( ()  ()− ()) (A.10)
subject to:





 () = ∗ ()
+1 () =
½ ∗ ()  with prob +1 ()  with prob 1−  (A.12)
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We only consider profits of those firms that fix price at time . Additional discount factor































¶−!(1+1) κ ()1 














 (1+1)+1 ∗ ()−(1+1)
!
















































− −1 (1 + 1) κ()
1
(1−)








Note this is a stochastic individual discount factor as function of individual con-
sumption































































































 =  + EΠ(1+1)+1 +1
 =  + EΠ−1+1+1
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 =  + EΠ(1+1)+1 +1 (A.15)
 =  + EΠ−1+1+1 (A.16)





 = ()− 1  






The Steady States of the System
In steady states,  = +1 therefore for our dynamic system the
Π = (1 + )





 = κ (1 + 1) ( +)
1+1
(1− ) (1− Π(1+1))
 = ()
− 1 ( +)
(1− Π−1)








 = (1 + )( 1Π +−  ( +)−  )
At zero inflation steady state i.e.Π = 1
 = 1
(1 + ) (A.18)
 + (1−) =  + (1−)
 = κ(1 + 1) ( +)
1+1
(1− ) (1− ) (A.19)
 = ()
− 1 ( +)
(1− ) (A.20)
∆ = 1 (A.21)
 = (1 + )( +−  ( +)−  ) (A.22)
A.1.2 Log-linearization
Now we linearize the system around zero inflation steady states A.18 to A.22
Philip’s curve
from A.14 to A.16
() + (1−) ¡1− Π−1 ¢ = (1− ) () + (1−)




 = ()− 1 ( +) + EΠ−1+1+1 (A.24)
K Here we assume:
(1−  ) = (1− )(1− ˆ )
ˆ  = ln (1−  )
(1− )
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´´1+1  ³1 + ˆ´1 + E (1 + ˆ+1)(1+1) ³1 + ˆ+1´













 (1 + 1) ˆ+1 + ˆ+1
´
delta Assuming that








1 + ∆ˆ = (1− ) −1−1 − (1− ) −1−1 −1 − (1− ) −1−1 −1 ˆ + 
³
1 + ˆ + ∆ˆ−1
´
F From A.24 and A.20
 = 








 () + EΠ−1+1+1
ˆ = (1− )
µ






(− 1) ˆ+1 + ˆ+1
´
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Inflation Given above linearized ˆ ˆ ∆ˆ and A.14 to A.17
() + (1−) ¡1− Π−1 ¢ = (1− ) () + (1−)µ
1 +

 +  (1− ) ˆ
¶
((1− )−  (− 1) ˆ) = (1− ) + (1− )  +  (1− ) ˆ












 (1 + 1) ˆ+1 + ˆ+1
´
ˆ = (1− )
µ






(− 1) ˆ+1 + ˆ+1
´








































































(1− ) ˆ 
¶¶


















with  = ˆˆ yields ˆ = ˆ + (1− )ˆ
So the Phillips curve in our model is







ˆ + (1− ) ˆ +

(1− ) ˆ 
¶
+ ˆ (A.26)




+1 = (1 + )(Π−1 + −   −  )
And from A.22
 = −(1 + ) (−  )
Therefore
(1 + ˆ+1) = (1 + )(1 + ˆ)((1 + ˆ)(1 + ˆ)−1 +(1 + ˆ)− (1 + ˆ ) (1 + ˆ))
1 + ˆ+1 = (1 + )(1 + ˆ)((1 + ˆ)(1− ˆ) + (1 + ˆ)−  (1 + ˆ )(1 + ˆ) )
ˆ+1 = ˆ + (1 + )ˆ − (1 + )ˆ −

³
(1− ) (1− ) ˆ − ˆ −  ˆ 
´
(1−  − )
+1 = + (1 + ) − (1 + )ˆ
+




(1− ) (1− ) ˆ − ˆ −  ˆ 
´
(1−  − )
+1 = (1 + ) − (1 + )ˆ − (1 + )ˆ + (1 + ) (1− ) (1− ) ˆ + − (1 + ) ˆ 
Where  is the proportion of steady state debt level to GDP:
 = ˆ
 =  = −
(1 + )(1−  − )

When  = 0, ˆ = 0 as government spending is assumed to be exogenous, substitute
(1 + ) = 1 in:
+1 = 1
³
 − ˆ −  ˆ 
´
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The final deterministic system for private sector is
Assuming exogenous government spending:
+1 = 1
³
 − ˆ −  ˆ 
´








with  = (1−)(1−) +
A.1.3 Objective function
The quadratic loss function for the benevolent policy objective is a second-order approx-
imation of expected utility derived around the steady state allocation. Frequent use is
made of the following second-order approximation of relative deviations in terms of log
deviations:
 −




ˆ =  −  is the log deviation from steady state for 
Therefore the second-order Taylor expansion of the representative households utility
around a steady state () yields:
 = + ( −  ) +
1
2
2( −  )





when market clears, ˆ = ˆ











































 (ˆ) = (− 1)
2
 ¡ˆ2¢





















































Now, the period t utility can be rewritten as


































Therefore the second-order approximation to the households’ welfare losses can be












































































− ¡2 + ˆ2¢







A.2 Discretionary Policies in Deterministic LQ RE
Models
In this section, we demonstrate the general optimal discretionary policy problems in
Linear Quaratic Rational Expectation models of the type described by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980).








− (0Q + 20P + 0R)  (A.27)
The matrix Qand R are assumed to be symmetric and positive semi-definite.
















Where  is an 1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions 0 given,
 is 2-vector of forward-looking (or jump) variables, and  is a -vector of policy
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instruments (control variables). For notational convenience we define the n-vector  =
(0 0)0 where  = 1 + 2. The matrices  and  are constant functions of structural
model parameters. We assume 22 is invertible.
Under discretion the policy maker is maximizing its objective function in each period
of time with respect to , taking private sector expectations and time-consistent reaction
 as given, and recognizing dependence of  on policy . The private sector expects
that future policy makers will implement the same decision process in subsequent periods.
Hence, expected future variables are taken as given and at any time  the policy maker
and the private sector respond only to the current states. Therefore both the private




+1 = +1 (11 +12 +1)
= 21 +22 +2
results in
 = (+112 −22)−1 (21 −+111)  + (+112 −22)−1 (2 −+11)
= − −
Therefore the constraints A.28 can be written as linear rules
+1 = 11 +12 +1 = (11 −12)  + (1 −12) (A.29)
= ∗ +∗ (A.30)
 = − − = − (A.31)
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where  = −and  =  −








−(0Q+20P+0R)+0+1(11+12+1−+1)+0 ( +  +) 
with +1 is a vector of (non-predetermined) Lagrangian multipliers, the FOCs are:

 = 
− (P 0 +R) +01+1 + 0 = 0 (A.32)

 = 
− (Q11 +Q12 + P1) +011+1 −  +  0 = 0 (A.33)

 = 
− (Q012 +Q22 + P2) +012+1 +  = 0 (A.34)

+1 = (11 +12 +1 − +1) = 0 (A.35)

+1 =  +  + = 0 (A.36)
0 =  ∗0 +∗ +∗0+1 (A.37)
0 = ∗ +  ∗ −  +∗0+1 (A.38)
0 = ( ∗ +∗ − +1) (A.39)
where
∗ = Q11 −Q12 −  0Q21 +  0Q22  ∗ =  0Q22 −Q12 + P1 −  0P2 (A.40)
∗ =  0Q22 +R− 0P2 − P 02 ∗ = 11 −12 ∗ = 1 −12 (A.41)
This system needs to be solved given initial conditions 0 = ¯ and subject to terminal
(transversality) conditions in the form lim→∞
 ∞2
2As all other variables will necesserily be linear finctions of  such terminal conditions impliy non-
explosiveness of all economic variables.
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First order conditions (A.32)—(A.35) treat the intra-period reaction function of the
second player explicitly. The optimization is conditional: we are looking for an extremum
on the other player’s reaction function. This defines a Stackelberg equilibrium. We
now solve system (A.32)—(A.35) for instrument as linear function of state variables ,
 = −









− ∗0 −∗ 0
















where we used  = −, denoted ˜ = [0 0]0 and used the reaction function of the















Ψ11 = ∗ Ψ12 = £ ∗ 0 ¤ 
where ∗  ∗, ∗ ∗ and ∗ are given by (A.40)-(A.41), and matrices Q, P and R are
partitioned conformally with  = [0 0]0 and .










It is easy to show that system matrices in (A.43) satisfy the following equations
 = ∗ + ∗0∗ − ( ∗0 + ∗0∗) (∗ + ∗0∗)−1 ( ∗0 + ∗0∗) (A.44)
 = (∗ + ∗0∗)−1 ( ∗0 + ∗0∗) (A.45)
where the first equation is a symmetric discrete algebraic Riccati equation (A.44) for 
Therefore, all solutions  of system (A.28) are among solutions of (A.44). The following
two results were shown in the literature:
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1. There is a unique symmetric solution to (A.44) if matrix pair (∗ ∗) is control-
lable, i.e. if the controllability matrix, [∗ ∗∗ ∗2∗  ∗1−1∗] has full row
rank.
2. Policy  ∗1 which is uniquely determined from (A.45) if  is given, is stabilizing,
i.e. all eigenvalues of matrix  that defines the evolution of the dynamic system
under control
+1 = 11 +12 +1 = (11 −12)  + (1 −12)
= (∗ −∗ )  = (A.46)
are strictly inside the unit circle.
Such solution satisfies all boundary conditions for system (A.28) and, therefore, is
a unique solution of (A.28). Practically, the solution can be found with either gen-
eralized Schur decomposition of (A.28) or with some iterative procedure that solves
(A.44).3 The equilibrium of the system of first order conditions to A.28-A.27 are matrices
{ }which can be solved from the following system:
3See results on symplectic matrix pencil in e.g. Wimmer (2006); they guarantee that the combination
of explosive and non-explodive generalised eigenvalues of matrix pair (ΦΨ) is always suitable for the
generalised Schur decomposition, as there are k infinitely large eigenvalues, 1 non-explosive eigenvalues
and 1 finite explosive eigenvalues.
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 = ∗ + ∗0∗
− ( ∗0 + ∗0∗) (∗ + ∗0∗)−1 ( ∗0 + ∗0∗)
 = (∗ + ∗0∗)−1 ( ∗0 + ∗0∗)
 = (22 +12)−1 ((21 −2 ) + (11 −1 ))
∗ = Q11 −Q12 −  0Q21 +  0Q22
 ∗ =  0Q22 −Q12 + P1 −  0P2
∗ =  0Q22 +R− 0P2 − P 02
∗ = 11 −12 ∗ = 1 −12
 = (12 +22)−1 (21 +11)
 = (12 +22)−1 (2 ++11)
A.3 Discretionary Policy (Simultaneous)
A.3.1 Monetary Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Simultane-
ous)
The monetary policy maker’s optimization problem in period  can be explained by the
following Bellman equation:
S() = min
¡2 + 2 + S(+1)¢  (A.47)
Because of the linear-quadratic nature of the problem we assume that the value function
S( ) is quadratic in state and substitute (2.35) and (2.11). We arrive to the following
form:
  =   +  −1
2−1 + 2−1 + 2
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¡2−1 + 2−1 + 2¢ = min ()2+ ()2+ ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢
2−1 + 2−1 + 2 = min
¡
(1− )2 + 2 + 2 (A.48)
+ ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ 
0 = 2
κ − 
1−  (+ )
µ
1 + ( − )  
1−  −1 +
 + ( − )  







1−  (1− )
µ + ( − )  
1−  −1 +
 + ( − )  









1 + ( − )  
1−  −1 +
 + ( − )  














 ((1−  )  −  −  −1)
¶
from where:
 =  + −1 (A.50)
where
 = −
(+ ) (κ−)(+(−))(1−)2 + (1− ) (κ−)(+(−))(1−)2
(κ−)2
(1−)2 (+ )− 2κ−1− + (κ−)
2









−   (1−  )
(κ−)2
(1−)2 (+ )− 2κ−1− + (κ−)
2




((+ ) (1 + ( − )  ) + (1− ) ( + ( − )  )) (κ−)(1−)2
(κ−)2
(1−)2 (+ ) + (κ−)
2








−  2  
(κ−)2
(1−)2 (+ ) + (κ−)
2




A.3.2 Fiscal Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Simultaneous)
The Bellman equation which describes the policy decision in period  can be written as:
 2 = min 
¡2 + 2 +  ¡ 2+1¢¢ (A.51)
and constraints are (A.64) and:
 2 = min 
¡2 + 2 +  ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ (A.52)
and constraints are (A.64) and:
 =  + (κ − )
1−  −1 +
 + (κ − )
1−   +
 − 
1−    (A.53)
+1 = 1 ((1− )  − −1 −  ) (A.54)
 = 1 + (κ − )
1−  −1 +
 + (κ − )
1−   +
 − 
1−    (A.55)
Substitute these equation into the Bellman equation




1− −1 + +(κ−)1−  + −1−  
´2




1− −1 + +(κ−)1−  + −1−  
´2
+2 1 ((1− )  − −1 −  )
³
1+(κ−)
































+ 1 −1 + −1− +(κ−)1− 
+ −































  =   +  −1 (A.58)
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where
  = −
(−)(+(κ−))
(1−)2 +  (−)(+(κ−))(1−)2 
(−)2







 + 2 
−
(−)(1−)−(+(κ−))
1−  −  (1− )
(−)2







 + 2 













 + 2 
+
(1+(κ−)+(−))











 + 2 
A.3.3 Transition of the Economy (Simultaneous)
The transition of the economy can be now described by (A.71) and
 =  (A.59)
 = ( + (κ − ) + ( − )) 
= Π (A.60)
+1 = 1 (1−  − ) 
=  (A.61)
A.3.4 Value Functions (Simultaneous)
Substitute (B.10)-(B.12) into (A.62) to obtain:
 = Π2 + 2 + 2
Similarly, substitute (B.10)-(B.12) into (A.51) to obtain:
 = Π2 + 2 +  2
so  = 
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A.3.5 Final System (Simultaneous)
The final system
 =  = 2 + 2 + 
µ
1
 (1−  −  )
¶2

  = −
³
( − ) ( + (κ − ))−  1 (1− )
´
³
( − )2 +  2
´
 = ( + (κ − ) + ( − )  )
 = −
³
(κ − ) ( + ( − )  )−  (1−  )
´
³
+  22 + (κ − )2
´
A.4 Discretionary Equilibrium (Fiscal leadership)
A.4.1 Monetary Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Follower)
The monetary policy maker’s optimization problem in period  can be explained by the
following Bellman equation:
S() = min
¡2 + 2 + S(+1)¢  (A.62)
Because of the linear-quadratic nature of the problem we assume that the value function
S() is quadratic in state and substitute (2.11) and (2.35). We arrive to the following
form:
¡2−1 + 2−1 + 2¢ = min ()2+ ()2+ ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢
2−1 + 2−1 + 2 = min
¡
(1− )2 + 2 + 2 (A.63)
+ ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ 
2 = min (1− )




 ( −  −  )
¶
(−1 + ) + 
µ
1
 ( −  −  )
¶2
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1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 






1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 
1−   
¶2
+ 2






1−   +
 − 





 ( −  −  )
¶2
from where:






1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 
1−   
¶
+ 2





1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 










1−   +
κ − 
1−   +
 − 












 ( −  −  )
¶



























 −  1
´
µ































 + 1 ()2 
¶ 
A.4.2 Fiscal Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Leader)
The Bellman equation which describes the policy decision in period  can be written as:
 2 = min 
¡2 + 2 +  ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢¢ (A.65)
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Substitute these equation into the Bellman equation A.65 and diﬀerentiate with re-
spect to   we obtain:
  =  −1 +   (A.71)
where
  = −
³
κ−






















1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
´
+2 +  2 ( + 1)2 
+







+  ( + 1)³
κ−





1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
´
+2 +  2 ( + 1)2 
  = −
³
κ−























1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
´
+2 +  2 ( + 1)2 
+







−  ( + 1) (1− )³
κ−





1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
´
+2 +  2 ( + 1)2 
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A.4.3 Transition of the Economy (Fiscal leadership)
The transition of the economy can be now described by (A.71) and































= −1 + 
+1 = 1 ((1− )−  ( + 1)  )  − 
1

































= −1 + 
A.4.4 Value Functions (Fiscal leadership)
Equation (A.62) can be written as:
¡2−1 + 2−1 + 2¢
= (−1 + )2 +  (−1 + )2 +  ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢
 = ¡ 2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2¢
 =  +  +  +  +  + 
 =  2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2
Similarly, Equation (A.65) can be written as:
¡2−1 + 2−1 + 2¢
= (−1 + )2 +  (−1 + )2 +  ¡2 + 2+1 + 2+1¢
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 = ¡2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2¢
 =  +  +  +  +  + 
 = 2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2
A.4.5 Final System (Fiscal leadership)
For Stackelberg Equilibrium the complete system is
 = ¡2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2¢
 =  +  +  +  +  + 
 = 2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2
 = ¡ 2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2¢
 =  +  +  +  +  + 
 =  2 + 2 +  2 + 2 + 2
 = ( +  )
 = ( +  )
 = − 1 ( + ( + 1)  )
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1−  + −1−
´
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´
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´
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1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
´
+ 2
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1−  + −1−
´
− 2 ( + 1)
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+ 2

































































 + ()2  1 + 
A.5 Dynamic responses in cooperative regimes
The impulse responses with diﬀerent level of steady state debt are plotted in A.1 below,
to show the diﬀerence between diﬀerent cooperative regimes and the commitment regime
which results the best outcome. Figure A.1 demonstrated that under all levels of  we
assumed, without risk premier, debt level goes up to absorb all the disturbance, and
tax rate is raised while consumption falls permanently but only up to the amount which
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is enough to sustain the higher steady state debt level. This results in much smaller
fluctuation in targeted variables and social welfare loss.



































































































































discretion, α=0.0 discretion, α=0.05 commitment, α=0.0 discretion, α=1.0
Figure A.1: Dynamic responses in cooperative regimes
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Model Derivation
The final deterministic system for private sector is same as in the last Chapter:
+1 = 1
³
 − ˆ −  ˆ 
´








with  = (1−)(1−) +
B.2 Quarterly Fiscal Stabilization Discretionary Pol-
icy
The private sector observes we guess and verify later that the private sector’s reaction
function is a linear function of the state:
 =  (B.1)
Take (B.1) one step forward and use (2.9) to obtain:
 =  + (κ − )  + ( − )   (B.2)
This is a linear reaction of the private sector to government debt, consumption and tax
rate.
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B.2.1 Monetary Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Follower)
The monetary policy maker’s optimization problem in period  can be explained by the
following Bellman equation:
S() = min
¡2 + 2 + S(+1)¢  (B.3)
Because of the linear-quadratic nature of the problem we assume that the value function
S( ) is quadratic in state and substitute (B.2) and (2.11) in:
2 = min (( + (κ − )  (B.4)
+( − )  )2 + 2 + 
µ
1
 ( −  −  )
¶2
from where:




(κ − ) −  
´
³




(κ − ) ( − ) +  2
´
³
(κ − )2 + +  22
´ 
B.2.2 Fiscal Policy Maker’s Reaction Function (Leader)
The Bellman equation which describes the policy decision in period  can be written as:
 2 = min 
¡2 + 2 +  ¡ 2+1¢¢ (B.6)
and constraints are (B.5) and:
 = ( + (κ − ) )  + ((κ − )  + ( − ))   (B.7)
+1 = 1 ((1− )  −  (1 +  )  ) (B.8)
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Substitute these equation into the Bellman equation and diﬀerentiate with respect to
  we obtain:
  =   (B.9)
where
  = −
³
((κ − )  +  − ) ( + (κ − ) ) +  −  (1 + ) 1 (1− )
´
³
((κ − )  +  − )2 + 2 +  2 (1 + )2
´
B.2.3 Transition of the Economy
The transition of the economy can be now described by (B.9) and
 = ( +  )  =  (B.10)
 = ( + (κ − )  + ((κ − )  + ( − ))  ) 
=  (B.11)
+1 = 1 (1−  −  (1 + )  ) 
=  (B.12)
B.2.4 Value Functions
Substitute (B.10)-(B.12) into (B.4) to obtain:
 = 2 + 2 + 2
Similarly, substitute (B.10)-(B.12) into (B.6) to obtain:
 = 2 + 2 +  2
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B.2.5 Final System
For Stackelberg Equilibrium the complete system is
 = 2 +  ( +  )2 + 
µ
1
 (1−  −  (1 + )  )
¶2
 (B.13)
  = −((κ − )  +  − ) ( + (κ − ) ) + ³
((κ − )  +  − )2 + 2 +  2 (1 + )2
´ (B.14)
+
 (1 +  ) 1 (1− )³
((κ − )  +  − )2 + 2 +  2 (1 + )2
´
 = ( + (κ − )  + ((κ − )  + ( − ))  ) (B.15)
 = −
³
(κ − ) −  
´
³




(κ − ) ( − ) +  2
´
³
(κ − )2 + +  22
´ (B.17)
Here 5 equations for 5 unknowns       
B.3 Biannual Fiscal Stabilization Discretionary Pol-
icy
The essential solution methods used for diﬀerent length of fiscal policy cycle are similar,
therefore we use  = 2 as an example. In this case, Equation B.11 and B.12 can be
written as:
 = ¡− + ¡κ − − ¢  + ¡¡κ − − ¢  + ¡ − − ¢¢  ¢ 
=  (B.18)
−+1 = 1 (1− 

 −  (1 + )  ) 
=   (B.19)
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B.3.1 Monetary PolicyMaker’s Optimization Problem (Follower)
The monetary policy maker’s problem in any period  ∈ { } is identical to the one
described in the previous section except that the value function depends on whether the
fiscal policy maker reoptimizes or not. Assuming the quadratic form for the appropriate
value function we can write the Bellman equation for the monetary policy maker in period
:
2 = min




 ( −  −  )
¶2!

where we substituted constraints (B.18) and (B.19) written for the appropriate period
 ∈ { }
Optimization with respect  yields:
 =  +   (B.21)
where
 = −
³¡κ − − ¢− −  −´³¡κ − − ¢2 + + 22 −´ 
 = −
³¡κ − − ¢ ¡ − − ¢+ 2 −´³¡κ − − ¢2 + + 22 −´
B.3.2 Fiscal Policy Maker’s Optimization Problem (Leader)
The fiscal policy maker only optimizes in even time periods. The Bellman equation which
describes the policy decision in period  can be written as:
 2 = min 
2 + 2 + 
¡2+1 + 2+1¢+ 2 ¡ 2+2¢ (B.22)
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constraints (B.21), (B.18) and (B.19) are applied at any period  ∈ { } Taking (B.19)
two periods forward and applying (B.21), (B.18) we obtain:
+2 = 12 (1− 
) (1− )  − 12 (1− 
)  (1 +  )   (B.23)
− (1 + 
)  +1
The state in the even period +2 depends on fiscal policy in both periods:   and  +1
We assume that the fiscal policy maker, when choosing   on dates , also sets  
such that
 +1 =   (B.24)
We can demonstrate that such policy can have a state-space representation
  =   (B.25)
Take (B.25) one period forward and use (B.24) to obtain
 +1 =  +1 = 1 
 (1−  −  (1 + )  ) 
=  
from where
  = 

(1−  ((1 + )   + )) (B.26)
Finally, we substitute (B.24) into constraint (B.23). The complete set of constraints
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can be written as
 = ( + (κ − ) )  + ((κ − )  + ( − ))   (B.27)
= Π +Π 
 =  +   (B.28)
+1 = 1 
 (1− )  +
µ
 −  
 (1 + )
¶
  (B.29)
=   +   
+1 = 1 (
 + (κ − ) ) (1− )  + ((κ − ) + (B.30)
 −  −  (
 + (κ − ) ) (1 + )
¶
 
= Π  +Π 
+2 = 12 (1− 
) (1− )  (B.31)
−
µ
(1 + ) + 1 (1− 
) (1 +  )
¶
 
=   +  
Substitute Equations (B.27) to (B.31) into the Bellman equation (B.22) and diﬀeren-
tiate with respect to   we obtain:
  = −
¡ΠΠ +  + ΠΠ +  + 2  ¢¡
(Π )2 +  ()2 +  (Π )2 +  ( )2 + 2 ( )2
¢ (B.32)
then substitute (B.26) and (B.32) into (B.27)-(B.31) we can solve the transition of
economy.
B.3.3 Value Functions
Bellman equation (B.20) yields
 = ()2 +  ( )2 +  ( )2 (B.33)
 = ()2 +  ( )2 +  ( )2 (B.34)
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 = ()2 +  ( )2 +  ()2 ( )2 +  ( )2 ()2 + 2 ()2 ( )2 (B.35)
 = ()2 +  ( )2 +  ()2 ( )2 +  ( )2 ()2 + 2 ( )2 ( )2 (B.36)
Therefore, for benevolent policy makers  =  At the period when both benevolent
policy makers reoptimize, their value functions are the same. The final system:
 = ()2 +  ( +  )2 +  ( )2
 = ()2 +  ( +  )2 + 
¡
()2 +  ( +  )2 +  ( )2 
¢
( )2
  = −
¡ΠΠ +  + ΠΠ +  + 2  ¢¡
(Π )2 +  ()2 +  (Π )2 +  ( )2 + 2 ( )2
¢
  = 

(1−  ((1 + )   + ))
 =  + (κ − ) ( +  ) + ( − )  
 =  + (κ − ) ( +  ) + ( − )  
 = −
³
(κ − ) −  
´
³




(κ − ) −  
´
³




(κ − ) ( − ) + 2 
´
³




(κ − ) ( − ) + 2 
´
³
(κ − )2 + + 22 
´
B.4 Biannual Fiscal Stabilization Discretionary Pol-
icy (Matrix form)
We assume a non-singular linear deterministic rational expectations model, augmented
by a vector of control instruments.1 Specifically, the evolution of the economy is explained
1None of the results presented here depend on the deterministic setup outlined and the consequent
assumption of perfect foresight. Shocks can be included into vector  see e.g. Anderson et al. (1996),
Blake and Kirsanova (2012).
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where y is an 1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions y0 given, x is
2-vector of non-predetermined (or jump) variables with lim→∞ x = 0, u and u are
the two vectors of policy instruments of two policy makers, named  and , of size 
and  respectively. For notational convenience we define the -vector z = (y0 x0)0 where
 = 1+2 and the -vector of control variables u = (u0  u 0 )0, where  =  + We
assume the equations are ordered so that 22 is non-singular.
Typically, the second block of equations in this system represents an aggregation of
the first order conditions to the optimization problem of the private sector, which has
decision variables x. Additionally, there is a first block of equations which explains the
evolution of the predetermined state variables y. These two blocks describe the ‘evolution
of the economy’ as observed by policy makers.








−(z0z + 2z0 u + u0u) (B.38)
The elements of vector  are the goal variables of policy maker ,  = C(z0 u0)0. Matrix
Q is assumed to be symmetric and positive semi-definite.2
B.4.1 Follower’s Problem
Central banker the follower re-optimizes discretionary monetary policy at every period,
i.e. times t=0,1,2,3,...
2It is standard to assume that  is symmetric positive definite (see Anderson et al. (1996), for
example). However, since many economic applications involve a loss function that places no penalty
on the control variables, we note that the requirement of Q being positive definite can be weakened to
Q being positive semi-definite if additional assumptions about other system matrices are met (Clements
and Wimmer (2003)). The analysis in this paper is valid for  ≡ 0.
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Even periods
Denote even periods welfare is V
y0  y = min
u
¡
z0 z + 2z0u + u0u + y0+1y+1
¢
(B.39)
















x+1 = −y+1 = −
¡11y +12x +11u +12u ¢
= 21y +22x +21u +22u
from where it follows:
x = −(22 +12)−1
¡
(21 +11)y + (22 +12)u
+(21 +11)u
¢
= −y −u = −y −u −u
 = (22 +12)−1(21 +11)
 = (22 +12)−1(22 +12)
 = (22 +12)−1(21 +11)
ˆ = 11 −12
ˆ1 = 11 −12
ˆ2 = 12 −12
y+1 = (11 −12) y +
¡11 −12¢ u + ¡12 −12¢ u

































 − 0 0 0
0 −0  0










































ˆ22 +  ˆ02 ˆ2
´−1 ³ˆ 02 +  ˆ02 ˆ´ y
−
³
ˆ22 +  ˆ02 ˆ2
´−1 ³ˆ012 +  ˆ02 ˆ1´ u
Where
ˆ = 11 −12 − 021 + 022
ˆ1 = 022 −12 + 11 − 021
ˆ2 = 022 −12 + 12 − 022
ˆ11 = 022 −021 −  021 +11
ˆ12 = 022 −022 −  021 +12
ˆ22 = 022 +22 −022 −  022
Finally for even time t:
u = −y − u
x = −















¡−¢ y = −y
x = −

























ˆ 01  ˆ11 ˆ12










= ˆ − 0ˆ 01 − ˆ1  + 0ˆ11  − ˆ2  −0ˆ 02 (B.42)
+0ˆ12 +0ˆ012  +0ˆ22 + 0 (B.43)
Odd periods


































x+1 = −y+1 = −
¡11y +12x +11u +12u ¢
= 21y +22x +21u +22u
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from where it follows:
x = −(22 +12)−1
¡
(21 +11)y + (22 +12)u
+(21 +11)u
¢
= −y −u = −y −u −u
 = (22 +12)−1(21 +11)
 = (22 +12)−1(22 +12)
 = (22 +12)−1(21 +11)
ˆ = 11 −12
ˆ1 = 11 −12
ˆ2 = 12 −12
y+1 = (11 −12) y +
¡11 −12¢ u + ¡12 −12¢ u
y+1 = ˆy + ˆ1u + ˆ2u
ˆ = 11 −12 − 021 + 022
ˆ1 = 022 −12 + 11 − 021
ˆ2 = 022 −12 + 12 − 022
ˆ11 = 022 −021 −  021 +11
ˆ12 = 022 −022 −  021 +12




ˆ22 +  ˆ02   ˆ2
´−1 ³ˆ 02 +  ˆ02   ˆ´ y
−
³
ˆ22 +  ˆ02   ˆ2
´−1 ³ˆ012 +  ˆ02   ˆ1´ u
u = −y − u
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Finally for odd time t:
u = −y − u
x = −





























ˆ 01 ˆ11 ˆ12









⎠+ 0  (B.46)
What remains is to find  and 
B.4.2 Leader’s Problem
Fiscal policy is set at even periods only, i.e. t=0,2,4,6... Denote welfare 





















































x+1 = −y+1 = −
¡11y +12x +11u +12u ¢
= 21y +22x +21u +22u
from where it follows:
x = −(22 +12)−1
¡
(21 +11)y + (22 +12)u
+(21 +11)u
¢
= −y −u −u
u = −y − u
x = −
¡−¢ y − ¡−¢ u
u = −y − u
y+1 = (11 −12) y +
¡11 −12¢ u + ¡12 −12¢ u
=
¡11 −12 − ¡12 −12¢¢ y + ¡11 −12 − ¡12 −12¢¢ u







































fiscal policy stays at the same value for two periods, which means
u+1 = u
Let’s check that this assumption makes sense so there will be a time-consistent represen-
tation. We know that

























































































































































22 + ¡¢20´−1 ³21 + ¡¢20´ y = −y
Finally for even time t:
u = −y






¡¢2 ¡ −¢0  ¡ −¢ (B.49)
175
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Model Derivations
C.1.1 Households

















(1−  ) (()() +Π())  + )
!
and the first order conditions are:





(  ) + (1−  )() (C.1)





(  )−  (C.2)































() = κ (
)1 ()1 
(1−  )


































































































¶1− ¡+++1¢1− +++1 = Φ
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where




















and from the last FOCs,i.e. household inter-tempral budget constrain, it follows that:
Φ = (A +H ) (C.8)







(1− ) (()() +Π())  +  
¶
To obtain consumption rule for all the households, we aggregate all relationships across








































































Aggregating relationship (C.8) yields:
 = 1Φ (A
 +H ) 
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A −  +
Z 1
0






1 +  (A




















 − (1− ))
Therefore
Φ+1+1+1 = A+1 +H+1 = A+1 + 1+1 (H








 −A+1 −  )
= −A+1 + 1+1
 (Φ − 1)






























1 +  (A
 + (1−  ) +   −  )
C.1.2 Firms
Profit Maximization A firm employs labour and produces goods z, it discount
future profit with  , Nominal wages  are equalized across all firms. A firm chooses






 ( ()  ()− ()) 
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subject to the production constraint
 () =  () 
All producers of good  understand that sales depend on demand, which is a function






and each period firms are allowed to reoptimize their prices with probability 1−, so
that they remain fixed with probability .
 () = ∗ ()
+1 () =
½ ∗ ()  with prob +1 ()  with prob1− 
Profit maximisation problem can be split into to separate problems: choose labour
to minimize cost intra-temporally and choose prices to maximize future profit. We can
deal with each of these problems separately. As we assume that the firms live forever,
the details and results for firms are the same as in Appendix to Chapter 2, see page 132
to page 136
C.1.3 Final System for private sector-Nonlinear Version:
We assume government debt is the only financial asset held by households: +1 = A+1
This yields:
+1 = 11 + 
1
1 +  (C.10)



















() + (1−) ¡1− Π−1 ¢ = (1− ) () + (1−) (C.13)
 = κ (1 + 1)
(1−  )1+1
( +)1+1 + EΠ(1+1)+1 +1 (C.14)
 = ()− 1 ( +) + EΠ−1+1+1 (C.15)






+1 = (1 + )( 1Π + −   (
 +)−  ) (C.17)
  =  + (C.18)
C.1.4 The steady state
































 = κ (1 + 1) ( +)
1+1
(1− ) (1− Π(1+1))
 = ()
− 1 ( +)
(1− Π−1)






 = (1 + )( 1Π +−  ( +)−  )
We assume that at the steady state inflation is zero, i.e. Π = 1the steady state values
are:
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Φ = (1 + ) (1 + )
(1 + ) (1 + )− ( (1 + )) (C.19)
 = Φ
1








 = κ(1 + 1) ( +)
1+1
(1− ) (1− ) (C.22)
 = 
− 1 ( +)
(1− ) (C.23)
∆ = 1
 = −(1 + ) (−  ( +)−  ) (C.24)

 =  =




¡−(1 + )−¢  ( − (1 + ) (1 + )1−) (1 + ) (1−  − )
(1 + ) (1 + )1− ¡1− ¡−(1 + )−¢¢  (C.26)

 = 1−  (C.27)

 =  = −
(1 + ) (1−  − )
 (C.28)
Finally
 (1−  − )
 (1 + ) =
 ( − (1 + )−)
( − (1 + ) (1 + )1−)
 (1−  − ) −  (1−  − ) (1 + ) (1 + )1− =  (1 + )− (1 + )− (1 + )
 =  (1−  − )
 −  (1−  − ) (1 + ) (1 + )1−
 (1 + )− (1 + )− (1 + ) (C.29)
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C.1.5 Linearization






ˆ = ln 
Therefore:
(1 + ) = (1 + ) (1 + ˆ)
ˆ = ln (1 + )
(1 + )
(1 + ) = (1 + ) (1 + ˆ)
ˆ = ln (1 + )
(1 + )
(1−  ) = (1− )(1− ˆ )
ˆ  = ln (1−  )
(1− )
and inflation:
Π+1 = +1 =
+1 − 
 + 1 = 1 + +1
Now we linearize the system we had arrived before, around zero inflation steady states
(C.19) to (C.24)
Reverse of consumption propensity Φˆ









(1 + ) (1 + ˆ+1)
(1 + ) (1 + ) (1 + ˆ)










(1 + ) (1 + )
¶1− h
(1− ) ˆ+1 − (1− ) ˆ + ˆ − ˆ+1 + Φˆ+1
i
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(1 + )(1 + )
((1 + )) Φˆ = Φˆ+1 − (1− ) (ˆ − +1) + ˆ − ˆ+1 (C.30)
Consumption ˆ









(1 + ) (1 + ˆ+1)







































assume  = ˆ where  =  :




+1 − +1 − Φˆ+1
´´
− (ˆ − Eˆ+1)+ ˆ+1− ˆ
(C.31)
Philip’s curve
As the non-linear system is the same as in the last Chapter, the resulted Philip’s Curve
will be the same as Equation(A.26)







ˆ + (1− ) ˆ +

(1− ) ˆ 
¶
+ ˆ (C.32)
where  = (1−)(1−) +
Debt
Substitute in C.17 and C.24:
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(1 + ˆ+1) = (1 + )(1 + ˆ)((1 + ˆ)(1 + ˆ)−1 +(1 + ˆ)− (1 + ˆ ) (1 + ˆ))
+1 = (1 + ) − (1 + )ˆ − (1 + )ˆ
+(1 + ) (1− ) (1− ) ˆ + − (1 + ) ˆ 
Where  is the proportion of steady state debt level to GDP,  =  = − (1+)(1−−)
and  = ˆ
C.1.6 The final deterministic system for private sector
+1 = (1 + ) − (1 + )ˆ − (1 + )ˆ + (1 + ) (1− ) (1− ) ˆ + − (1 + ) ˆ 







ˆ + (1− ) ˆ
¶
+ ˆ
ˆ = Φ[(1 + )]
³




[(1 + )] −  (ˆ − +1)
Φˆ+1 = (1 + )(1 + )
((1 + )) Φˆ + (1− ) ˆ − (1− ) E+1
with




 (1 + ) − (1 + ) (1 + )) (1− ) 
( (1 + ) − (1 + ) (1 + )) + ((1 + ) (1 + )− (1 + )) 
To focus on the impact of tax and interest rate on the economy, in which the fiscal
policy maker can only set the tax rate less frequent than monetary policy can decide on
the interest rate, we assume the government spending is constant so the deterministic
economy evolves according to system:
+1 = (1 + ) − (1 + ) − (1 + ) +  − (1 + ) 













[(1 + )] −  Φ
´
+1 + E+1 −  ΦΦˆ+1 = [(1 + )]
 + [(1 + )]
(1− )+1 + Φˆ+1 = (1 + ) (1 + ) (1 + ) Φˆ + (1− ) 
C.2 Impulse responses with infinite living household
and positive steady state debt
Figure C.1 shows the impulse responses when  = 01 and  = 0 with diﬀerent length
of fiscal cycle, to compare with Figure 4.2 where  = 01 and  = 005, illustrates that
a positive mortality rate introducing more fluctuation to the economic variables during
the stabilization process.












































Figure C.1: Impluse responses with  = 01 and  = 0
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